DÆDALUS

JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
SPRING 1994
US: $7.95
CANADA: $10.35

EUROPE THROUGH A GLASS DARKLY



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JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

Europe Through a Glass Darkly

Spring 1994

Issued as Volume 123, Number 2, of the
Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences



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Spring 1994, "Europe Through a Glass Darkly."
Issued as Volume 123, Number 2, of the Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

© 1994 by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 136 Irving Street, Cambridge, MA 02138.

Library of Congress Catalog Number 12-30299.

Editorial Offices: Dædalus, *Norton's Woods, 136 Irving Street, Cambridge, MA 02138.*

Dædalus (ISSN 0011-5266) *is published quarterly by the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Subscription rates: for individuals—$30, one year; $55, two years; $75, three years; for institutions—$45, one year; $75, two years; $100, three years. Foreign subscribers must add $7.00 per year to the price of subscription. Replacement copies for damaged or misrouted issues will be sent free of charge up to six months from the date of original publication. Thereafter, back copies are available for the current cover price plus postage and handling.*

All subscription orders, single-copy orders, and change-of-address information must be sent in writing *to the* Dædalus *Business Office, 136 Irving Street, Suite 100, Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A. (Telephone: 617-491-2600).*

Printed in the United States of America.
Printing Office: 2901 Byrdhill Road, Richmond, VA 23228.

U.S.A. newsstand distribution by Eastern News Distributors, Inc., 2020 Superior Street, Sandusky, OH 44870 (Telephone: 800-221-3148).

Second-class postage paid at Boston, MA, and at additional mailing offices.

Postmaster: Send address changes to DÆDALUS,
136 Irving Street, Suite 100, Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.

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Preface to the Issue "Europe Through a Glass Darkly"

THREE DECADES AGO, IN THE WINTER OF 1964, *Dædalus* published the first of what, with the passage of time, became a collection of in-depth studies of contemporary Europe. In the beginning, it seemed reasonable to dwell principally on the countries of the European Common Market, to give attention also to the United Kingdom, then trying, unsuccessfully, to gain admission to a community it might once have helped found, that it had in very different circumstances spurned. The 1964 issue, entitled "A New Europe?," contained the all-important question mark, which was neither an afterthought nor a hedging of bets. It reflected the uncertainties felt by many West Europeans and Americans at the time about the meaning of developments that were giving Western Europe a new face, obliterating the destruction that had seemed so pervasive only two decades previously.

While almost as many years had elapsed at that point as separated World War I from World War II, the differences between the two postwars could not have been greater. If many were agreeably surprised and elated by the economic prosperity and its attendant social and political transformations, they expressed their pleasure in phrases symbolic of a new optimism. Talk of a *miracolo italiano*

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and of the *Wirtschaftswunder* suggested that the fascist and Nazi prewar and war experiences were increasingly distant, perhaps not wholly irrelevant, but no longer governing in the way they had been. Economic prosperity, thought to be the fuel that had sent these shattered economies into their remarkable take-off flight, was awarded the respect due an achievement not replicated on the other side of the Iron Curtain.

France and Great Britain, humbled and humiliated by what had occurred at Suez in 1956, managed to recover quickly from that shock, to move on to new enterprises that were substantially more popular with the electorate and significantly less hazardous. If the Fourth Republic had given way to the Fifth—a casualty of the ongoing war in Algeria—it meant the return of the man who more than any other symbolized French resistance in World War II, Charles de Gaulle. His new constitution, with its greatly expanded office of President, fundamentally changed a parliamentary system that had existed for the better part of a century. While no comparable constitutional changes had occurred in the United Kingdom, no one mistook its Tory leader, Harold Macmillan, for his ill-fated predecessor, Anthony Eden. Though Macmillan was unable to persuade the president of France to lift his veto on British membership in the European Common Market, he enjoyed other triumphs, those that gave him the inimitable sobriquet, MacWonder. Macmillan, like de Gaulle, could claim that his country had grown even more prosperous in the years since he had come into office.

It was the prosperity of Europe that defined the decade. While the building of the Berlin Wall might cause a certain amount of grief in Germany, and some fluttering elsewhere, no one imagined that it would be dismantled through interventions from the outside. Such tragedies—and they were so denominated, mostly, however, in political rhetorical exercises—were simply accepted. In the circumstances, a moderate optimism was possible. Anything more than that, given Europe's twentieth-century history, would have been thought a dangerous game to play with gods known to be jealous, unaccepting of human *hubris*. To prophesy a new Europe, to use an exclamation point rather than a question mark would have been thought a sign of presumption. In many of the essays, the understandable satisfaction with what seemed to be transpiring in Europe was joined with a wish to interpret and explain the favorable

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omens. There were mild forebodings, of course, and a tendency to avoid prophecy. My own essay in the 1964 volume expressed a mood characteristic of many of the others; I wrote in measured terms:

> Prophecy is difficult in any century; in the twentieth it appears to be a lost art. No one foresaw in 1953 the Europe of today. There is no reason to believe that a prophecy, registered now about what Europe will be a decade hence, will have any greater validity. This situation is created, in part, by the fact that Europe is not entirely the mistress in her own house. What the United States and the Soviet Union elect to do in the next ten years will influence Europe, and there is only a limited sense in which Europe can determine these actions. More important, however, is the fact that Europe remains undecided about many things and uncertain about what parts of a long and distinguished past can be maintained or revived. . . .Europe's rebuilding and decolonizing tasks have so preoccupied her, have required such vast expenditures of physical and psychic energy, that there has been little incentive to recognize that these were essentially finite operations, which would not indefinitely make important demands on her. In the decade now opening, new preoccupations will undoubtedly assert themselves. More thought, almost certainly, will be given to relations between Western and Eastern Europe. While the Soviet's policy in this matter will be enormously influential, it may be less governing than in the past. Relations between Europe and the states of the Iberian peninsula may change rather dramatically; this "underdeveloped" region of Europe is not necessarily destined to remain so. European-Soviet and European-American relations will almost certainly be modified, in part because of the policies pursued by the great powers, in part because of Europe's own growing consciousness of her own capabilities. It would be hazardous to guess what these changes will be, but it would be wrong to assume that existing relations define what they are likely to be, even in the immediate future. The question of European political unity will certainly continue to be debated. It is not impossible that it will be as unsettled a matter a decade from now as it is today.[1]

These, in retrospect, were safe prophecies. Is it at all significant that thirty years later, more than four years after the dismantling of the despised Berlin Wall, two years after the virtual extinction of communism in the Soviet Union, and, more surprisingly, the disintegration of the influence exercised by the Kremlin in great parts of

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the world, there is no equal delight in what appears to be transpiring in Europe, no wish to prophesy in even a modest way what may be impending? Nineteen ninety-four is not a good year for prophecy. Nor, for that matter, was 1992, 1989, or even 1987. The last was the year when Paul Kennedy, in his best-selling "Decline and Fall of the Great Powers," sought to cover his tracks as best he could, realizing that his many observations on both the Soviet Union and the United States might not enjoy a very long life. Others who wrote at the time, or since, less cautious by nature, more persuaded that they had seen the future, took too many risks; many of their works were remaindered within months of their publication. They described a world that disappeared, principally in Eastern and Central Europe and in the former communist states, but also, and scarcely less significantly, in the West.

Nineteen ninety-two was not destined to be the year that Jacques Delors expected and hoped for. Margaret Thatcher, perhaps the most prominent Western leader since Charles de Gaulle, and scarcely less controversial, won an unprecedented fourth term in office, only to be expelled from Number 10 Downing Street within a short time of her victory by rebellion in her own Conservative Party ranks. Many felt she had remained too long for any good that she was doing. Helmut Kohl, favorably compared with other strong and determined leaders of the Federal Republic, managed to unite Germany, despite the misgivings of some both at home and abroad, but then discovered that unification created almost as many problems as it resolved. He had not adequately prepared the country for the "sacrifices" they were being asked to make. François Mitterrand always *malin,* showed that he could survive the catastrophic defeat his own Socialist Party suffered in the parliamentary elections without himself losing power or being humiliated, but even in his own constitutional preserve—foreign affairs—his influence in the world seemed negligible. The financial scandals in Italy did more than destroy parties that had governed nationally, in the provinces and the cities from almost the moment of the Republic's establishment. While talk of the need for a Second Republic was rife, the new parties and the old, rechristened, and purportedly chastened, sought desperately to prove themselves clean, determined, competent.

In these circumstances, a *Dædalus* issue entitled "Europe Through a Glass Darkly" seems almost an exercise in vanity, an effort to take

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aim at what is incontestably a moving target, to give it some sort of permanence, all the while admitting that the target's location is obscure, and that the sighting is less than perfect. Is this, then, the principal message of an issue whose publication has been several times postponed, whose companion volume, "After Communism: What?," is scheduled to be published in the summer? Are we to conclude that events in the former Soviet Union are now so uncertain, greatly exacerbated by the results of the recent elections, and that the prospects of nationalist revival both there and in many other parts of Europe are now so great that no prudent individual would think to wager on the future? We have no idea what the next Russia will look like; if three of the former communist states of Central and Eastern Europe appear to be more stable, more secure in their economies, it is by no means obvious that their good fortune will soon extend to others. Is this the explanation of the uncertainty, or does it reveal deeper issues that reflect as much on events in Western Europe as on any occurring in the former communist countries?

Has there been a sea change in Europe, independent of what has happened in the former communist lands, independent of the economic recession that has caused so much legitimate concern throughout the European Union (EU)? Has the Yugoslav tragedy, for example, given Europeans a new sense of their own impotence? Has it indicated in the most stark terms the extent of their earlier military dependence on the United States? Has it, even more seriously, suggested that even when they have the military capability to act, they lack the will, and that this is as much a function of the character of public opinion in their democracies as it is of inadequate and feckless political leadership at the top? Is the failure of the EU, or, for that matter, any single European state to fashion a program of substantial economic aid to Russia, in collaboration with the United States, evidence of the intellectual poverty on both sides of the Atlantic, or does it simply testify to the fact that all are experiencing "hard times" at home?

If this journal carried an index, the one that would appear with this issue would be interesting for all sorts of reasons. To begin with, and perhaps not surprisingly, the United Kingdom figures scarcely in this study. France and Italy figure, of course, but not as much as Germany. The United States, while present, is less conspic-

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uous than it would have been a decade ago. Is this simply to be ascribed to accident, to the interests of the Editor, of those he chose to consult with? Or are there other more profound reasons for the emphases given, for the fact that this is no longer the tale of two rival powers, with the others caught between them, managing to maintain a quite happy and prosperous existence? The distance from 1964 is striking.

If it is increasingly difficult to imagine what Russia will look like in the year 2000, or even in the year 1995, and if such uncertainty cannot fail to influence what is now written about that disordered republic, the same kinds of restraint operate in respect to much of the rest of Europe. This is not to say that "revolutionary" developments are envisaged in these more stable democracies, that there is not today some residual belief that Europe will soon manage to climb out of its recession—that one or more are not already doing so — but this does not conceal the more important fact that many of the institutions of Western Europe, as they evolved in the last several decades—with their promise of economic growth, something approximating full employment, generous social welfare benefits, all to be realized in a political community increasingly integrated in its basic policies and therefore substantially more powerful—are no longer believed. This is the measure of the change in the last years.

One starts with the European Community (EC) itself, now the EU. While no one imagines that any of the present members are likely soon to abandon it, forsaking the very real economic benefits that accrue to membership, it is not at all certain that the Union can move forward to undertake the kinds of economic, military, and foreign policy initiatives that are so obviously needed, that may indeed be even more imperative in the years immediately ahead. While it is possible that changes will be made in the decision-making procedures in the Community, these are not likely by themselves to make individual member states— even if they number only the four principals—prepared to add substantially to their defense budgets, and indeed risk their military forces in engagements of a kind they have not been required to consider for many years.

In short, it is not only that the four may not agree on what is necessary—the Yugoslav tragedy suggests that this is the case to-

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day—but that none may be prepared to risk a policy that only one or two avidly supports. The failure of monetary union, as first envisaged at Maastricht, may be a harbinger of a larger and much more consequential failure. While there are some who argue that the EC has always had its ups and downs, and has always recovered in the end, moving forward to realize many of the bold intentions of its original "fathers," earlier successes do not guarantee new ones. Indeed, it may be necessary to redraw the road map looking to European union, developed originally in the 1950s, and perhaps not adequately changed in the years since.

To suggest this is to say something more than that the European administrative institutions of Brussels, and indeed those of the European Parliament at Strasbourg, may have to be substantially altered. It is to suggest that the impulse for reform can come only from individual member states, that they may prove to be as divided on such issues as they are on what to do to help Russia, Ukraine, or the Baltic states. The "crisis" of the Union, if it may so be denominated, does not, however, arise simply from events that have transpired in the former communist world. It derives from a new uncertainty in Great Britain, certainly, but in France and Germany as well, about what steps need now to be taken to achieve greater unity, or indeed whether such unity is as important as was once imagined.

The existence of a German state with a substantially larger population than the other principal states of Europe, boasting an economic strength and promise that dwarfs anything the United Kingdom is likely ever to achieve, is recognized to be part of the English problem. So far, because of the Franco-German understanding, certainly one of the more remarkable developments of the post-World War II years, the French envy of Germany has been contained, at least in public. Whether it will be in the future is less certain. In conditions where even the principal members of the Union see the world differently, but also where one or more may be increasingly disinclined to follow the lead of one of their number, the possibilities for inaction are massively increased. It was one thing for Europe to exaggerate its weaknesses in the decades after World War II, to accept certain kinds of dependence upon the United States, and indeed to see the economic and political advantages of such dependence. It is a quite another matter to imagine

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such an unequal relation in the future, in this instance with one of the European nation-states able to have a preponderant voice in certain crucial spheres, to call the tune in effect.

All this emphasizes the existence of a number of conditions in Western Europe today that are novel, almost as much so as anything occurring in Central and Eastern Europe. This may seem an outlandish and exaggerated statement, but it needs at least to be considered. First, the "political class" in all of Western Europe, as indeed in the United States, is undergoing a generational change. The leaders who knew World War II, either by participating actively in it or by being trained in political life by those who had done so, are gradually leaving the stage, to be replaced by a new generation. This is obvious in Italy. It is likely soon to occur in Germany, whatever the results of the 1994 national elections. In France, though many of yesterday's men continue to contend for power—wishing mightily to replace the "old man" who must finally soon go—it is certain to be the last curtain call for many of them. A new generation, scarcely known outside of France, must soon take over.

In the United Kingdom, a more bizarre condition obtains. The Labour Party, today the official opposition, has a unique distinction; for the only time in this century its principal members, were they to form a government, would have had no recent experience of ministerial power. When the Labour Party formed its first government in 1924 some of its members had served in the wartime coalition governments; the long years of Margaret Thatcher, followed by John Major's unexpected victory, have denied that experience to the generation now seeking office. This, obviously, need not be a handicap; indeed some would argue, as in the case of Italy, that a clean sweep is desirable, that it would bring new ideas to the fore. What makes the situation worrying is that the new men—there are surprisingly few women—have not in these last years developed coherent policies in the domestic field or in the foreign that give promise of concrete change.

Many of them are properly skittish, worrying about an electorate clearly disenchanted with those who now hold power. The failure, however, to coalesce around a few principles, to indicate the directions that a Labour Government would take, is serious. Because the electorate has given no clear indications of directions it would wish a new government to take, there is an understandable reluctance to

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express ideas that would not win favor. In these circumstances, appeals to law and order and to any number of other such admittedly serious domestic questions that are obviously agitating the public substitute for a more considered discussion of economic growth, defense, foreign policy, and social welfare. These are too dangerous to touch; they do not lend themselves to the kinds of rhetorical excesses that now make for effective sound bites in televised election campaign encounters.

What, then, makes the future of Europe, of the EU itself, so uncertain, which is not to say that it is an endangered institution? First, the individual member states are themselves divided, cautious on matters like Yugoslavia, of course, but indecisive about many more fundamental issues. If the United States is indeed making a calculated but covert retreat from Europe, finding its own domestic problems more urgent and preoccupying, a comparable though not identical provincialism is today afflicting the old and very comfortable West European world that seemed so secure until recently. It is not only the sheer magnitude of the problems in Russia and elsewhere in the world that defeats these European states, that makes them unwilling to risk themselves in formulating policies that would require them to make substantial financial and other commitments. Four decades of tutelage to a power across the Atlantic, however limited and partial, has not been the best preparation for coping with a harsh contemporary reality, increasingly evident in Europe, but also in Asia, Africa, and elsewhere. The reluctance to be liberated from all the comfortable and beguiling myths of yesterday, the security blankets so fastidiously fashioned to create a society without pain or fear, are impediments to political innovation today.

The United States dominated the European scene for much too long, liberating Europe of the need to perceive crucial issues independently of what was being said or thought in Washington. While certain European leaders, like Charles de Gaulle, resisted the tutelage, and indeed gained some of his renown through that fact alone, the greater number, even when they differed with the American government, spoke softly, sotto voce. Now, when there is no longer in the federal government the clear directives that issued regularly in earlier periods—they have not existed for a number of years—the Europeans are at sea. If the United States lacks a Russian policy

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that can claim to have consistency and coherence, the same must be said of all the states of the EU. They, together and separately, wait for something "good" to happen, fearing always that it will not, unable to prepare politically for that contingency.

Why the hesitation? Because the EU, and those who would join it, are still living too much in the past, not so much enthusiasts of a mythic past, a glorious world that existed before 1914 when trade moved relatively freely and passports were unknown, at least in the civilized West, but in the more antiseptic and comfortable post-World War II Europe of material abundance and social protection. Now, when both are threatened, when trade can no longer be limited to the relatively safe markets of the EU, when individual nation-states can no longer afford the welfare policies that marked them as advanced and civilized, solicitous of their citizens' welfare, the need for a new political vocabulary, less rhetorical and less self-serving, is urgent. Yet, it is precisely this that is missing. All the technological advances, the provision of unprecedented creature comforts for millions who rose as workers and peasants to middle-class status, symbolized in high wages and salaries, not to speak of guaranteed vacations, have not made the world outside Europe a less dangerous place. Indeed, within Europe itself, even in the more prosperous segments, there is new preoccupation with whether what was once thought to be inevitable progress is in fact likely to continue.

If Europe has lacked a flag capable of touching men and women of different national and ethnic groups, it took economic progress to be its substitute faith. In these circumstances, it gave too little credence to the proposition that most of the world, still very poor, would not permanently abide the inequality. To relate to that world, but also to the world of the rich, a much larger one, as conspicuous in Asia as in North America, has become a very difficult and complex matter. How to make an adventure of the problems increasingly seen to be characteristic of the modern world, with its rationality threatened by superstition, its cosmopolitanism endangered by all manner of ill-sorted ethnic and racial parochialisms, imposes silence on many who appreciate the complexity of the problems and have no solutions. It also silences those who have no interest to disconcert the public, who imagine that their own success depends on their not doing so. In these circumstances, there is

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much noise emanating from many quarters, but also very eerie silences, and it is not always clear whether the former are in fact more dangerous than the latter.

In this situation, where the voices from both the United States and the former Soviet Union are scarcely less uncertain, conditions exist that were conspicuously absent three decades ago. Many argue that Europe is returning to the decade of the 1920s—that the same indecision that allowed Hitler to come to power, with the world economic recession swallowing all hopes of continued prosperity—is present again today with right-wing movements gaining popularity in many parts of Europe, and unemployment a seemingly insoluble problem, not least in those countries where it was thought to have been resolved once and for all. The unemployment figures in France, even more than those of Germany—where the expenses of unification can be taken as an excuse to explain what went wrong—refute the optimism that once existed about the work of experts, able to fine-tune monetary and trade policy. Yet, if there is much that is superficially redolent of the 1920s, the more interesting question has to do with why the end of the Cold War, which ought to have been an intellectually liberating experience, much as the end of the two world wars were, has been so strangely static and sterile. It is as if the whole of the Atlantic world, and not only the former Marxist territories, are hopelessly bewildered. The easy explanation for the condition is that the problems of these societies have never been greater. The more terrifying possibility is that they are not being correctly perceived, that slogans too frequently substitute for policy, and that neither governments nor their oppositions offer viable solutions for the muddles that are seen to exist.

This issue was not an easy one to prepare. A second part of the diptych, more especially concentrating on Central and Eastern Europe—the former communist Europe—will be offered in the summer 1994 issue of *Dædalus*. It will seek to complement the story contained in these pages, that appears to lack a precise moral foundation, so seemingly tentative and ambiguous. Thanks are due to the Ford Foundation and also to the Robert Bosch Stiftung GmbH for providing the funds that made this issue possible. Their patience in waiting for the issue to appear is much appreciated. The planning sessions proceeded over many years, not least because events moved so rapidly and developed in so many unexpected

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ways. They allowed us to bring together authors and others in London and Paris as well as in New York and Cambridge. We are grateful to Chatham House for making their facilities available to us, and also to the Bibliothèque Nationale, which acted as our host in Paris. Most importantly, a debt is owed to authors and to those who attended the planning sessions. They made the task of zeroing in on a moving target somewhat easier.

S.R.G.

ENDNOTE

[1]Stephen R. Graubard, "A New Europe?," *Dædalus* 93 (1) (Winter 1964): 563 – 64.

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Stanley Hoffmann

Europe's Identity Crisis Revisited

I

ALMOST THIRTY YEARS AGO, I WROTE AN ESSAY for this journal about Western Europe which began by calling it prosperous and disunited. I then stated: "Europe today has no clear identity, no profile other than that which a process of industrialization and a process of economic integration have given it. Europe today has no sense of direction and purpose."[1] In 1994, this judgment remains valid, even though so much has happened in the past ten years alone: the *relance* of the mid-1980s, the end of the Cold War and of Europe's division into two armed camps, and the longest recession since the Great Depression. In 1964, my opening paragraph ended bravely: "This essay laments its absence" (i.e., the absence of a sense of direction and purpose) "and calls for its rebirth." I am more sober now: I only propose an analysis.

It is ironic that the crisis of the European Community (EC, now called the European Union [EU]) appears to have begun immediately after the signing of the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, which seemed to promise a major leap forwards. A monetary union, with a single central bank and a single currency, was going, within less than ten years, to crown the enterprise of economic integration begun in 1957 and expanded by the "1992" program of the mid-1980s (the so-called Single Act). The Community's jurisdiction was going to extend to areas beyond the economic realm: social affairs, police matters, immigration—areas close to the core of domestic sovereignty—as well as to diplomacy and defense. A year and a half later, deep pessimism prevails. The French nation en-

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dorsed the treaty by the most niggardly of margins. The Danes first said no, and then yes only after having obtained from their partners exceptions that almost amount to exempting Denmark from the Maastricht stipulations. The European Monetary System (EMS) established by a Franco-German initiative in the late 1970s, and only recently joined by the British, was badly shaken by a colossal crisis in September 1992, which drove the British out, and almost wrecked by a second onslaught in July 1993, which obliged the members to enlarge enormously the margins within which their currencies are allowed to fluctuate. The date of the future monetary union is uncertain, and who will be in it is also in doubt. As for diplomacy and defense, the Community's fiasco in Yugoslavia has been deeply demoralizing. What went wrong?

Two suggested explanations can be rejected outright. The lofty and persistent chorus of European Federalists puts much of the blame on the governments that failed, in Maastricht, to reform the institutions of the Community in a direction that should have been more democratic and more federal. It is true that the treaty, while marginally increasing the powers of the elected European Parliament, consolidated the preeminent position of the Council—composed of governmental representatives—especially because many of the new areas of the EU's jurisdiction shall be dealt with only by unanimity. But the Federalist answer raises a fundamental question. Why have the governments been so timid, why—more than twenty years after the disappearance from the scene of the arch anti-Federalist, General de Gaulle, and three years after the removal from power of that other fierce foe of "supranationality," Margaret Thatcher—does the progress toward more effective and powerful central institutions remain so slow and halting, despite the efforts of a European Court of Justice that has sometimes sounded as if it wanted to imitate the American Supreme Court in the early decades of the United States' existence? The Supreme Court succeeded because it was interpreting a Federal Constitution; the European Court of Justice's attempt to blow Federalist air into the weak lungs of a community based not on a constitution but on a series of treaties could not, by itself, suffice.

The second explanation that does not take us very far is that the current crisis is, as the French would say, *conjoncturelle*. Recession, so goes the argument, is always bad for the Community: remember

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the years of the oil shocks, during which the governments tried to find national solutions to their countries' problems and "Europessimism" became fashionable. It is true that despite the creation of a single market for goods, capital, services, and (more or less) people, the same causes have tended to produce the same effects. The "convergence criteria" set at Maastricht to prepare for monetary union are promises for the future; until now, state policies have diverged sufficiently to produce a broad spectrum of deficits, inflation rates, and interest rates. It is also true that matters have been made worse at a crucial moment by the unanticipated costs of Germany's unification—the combination of an industrial and ecological disaster whose proportions exceeded all fears, and of imprudent political decisions about the rate of exchange between the Western and Eastern mark and about financing the rehabilitation of the East by loans rather than by taxes. The independent Bundesbank's decision to combat the inflationary implications of these policies by high interest rates has wreaked havoc on the economies of the countries whose currencies are tied to Germany's, and thus has aggravated the recession. It is also true that the Yugoslav tragedy, which the Community could not prevent or resolve, has proved too complex and too burdensome for the United States and the United Nations as well.

Recessions eventually end. The absorption of Eastern Germany into the new Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is under way (and the German government has seen the need for greater fiscal rigor) and the ferocity of ethnic conflict in Yugoslavia is not likely to be reproduced elsewhere (foretold disasters in the rest of the Balkans have not occurred—so far—and Serbian bellicosity may well have been dented, if not daunted, by the costs of the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and of international sanctions). There have been other setbacks and crises in the history of the Community, but its march has always resumed; no crisis ever led to an unraveling.

There is some truth in that argument. The Community overcame the paralysis caused by the conflict between de Gaulle and the "Europeans," it came out of the economic troubles of the 1970s and the long battle over Britain's terms of membership, and it may well triumph over the new sources of division and despair. Nobody wants to undo what has been achieved: insofar as it is a construction built on common interests—let us call them peace and prosper-

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ity (among the partners)—there are very few voices that express the thought that each member, or even any one of them, would be better off if the edifice collapsed. The EMS did unravel, but if the key members make an effort to coordinate their economic policies and to adopt the same priorities—the fight against unemployment and recession rather than, as in the Bundesbank's case, high interest rates to prevent inflation, and, as in France's case since the mid-1980s, financial rigor and a strong currency—the EMS might be restored and the march toward monetary union might resume.

However, *conjoncturel* factors do not explain everything. The failure to coordinate economic policies predates the recession and explains why a monetary system that tried to preserve narrow margins of fluctuation among currencies, and whose dominant currency was ruled by a *national* central bank intent on following its understanding of a purely national interest, was bound to run into storms once the national situations and policy priorities began to diverge significantly. Even in less troubled times, an attempt by several of the members (such as Italy) to meet the "criteria of convergence" would have imposed enormous strains upon their habits and practices. And while Yugoslavia may well be exceptional, the European performance in the Gulf crisis was not much more edifying. In those two instances, as in the days that followed the loosening of the EMS, the spokesmen for the governments have congratulated themselves on the Community's ability to avoid fatal splits. But if the criterion of success becomes the ability to put in common a good face on retreats and fiascoes, then the European ambition must have fallen rather low.

II

We must look deeper than the circumstances of the late 1980s and early 1990s, to a number of factors that would hamper the Community's march even if *la conjoncture* improved. They can be divided into two groups: some concern Western Europe's relations with the rest of the world, some concern its internal situation. In both categories, thirty years ago, Western Europe's relation to American society and to America's world role was the heart of the matter. Today, this relation is far less central, although it remains important.

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In the first group, we need to distinguish between two kinds of problems: issues of foreign economic and financial policy, a domain which is either predominantly (trade) or largely (money) within the Union's jurisdiction, and issues of diplomacy and security which are still essentially national, despite the halting "European political cooperation" initiated in the 1970s and the promise of Maastricht (but even after the treaty enters into force, unanimity will be the rule here).

The monetary dramas of 1992–1993 have taught two lessons—both of which are damaging to the Union. The first is that as long as there is no single central bank and currency, a large number of private individual and corporate investors (what the French call "speculators" and Americans "the market") will play the game of attacking those currencies they deem overvalued, and they have financial resources far superior to those the national central banks can provide to defend the threatened currencies. These speculative runs point simultaneously to the need for a single currency and to the enormous difficulty of getting one. They undermine the transitory system—the EMS—that is the preliminary and prerequisite to the final monetary union, and they aggravate the distortions among the members' financial situations. The only ways in which the governments can try to thwart the "speculators" are by widening the margins of fluctuations (which defeats the very purpose of the EMS) or by revaluing undervalued currencies and devaluing overvalued ones. But the political costs, and the feared economic ones, of such manipulations deter democratically elected governments. Moreover, when faced with private capital's offensive against public currencies, the elites of the Union's nations have reacted divergently (and predictably) along familiar national lines. In the United Kingdom (as in the United States) currency tends to be seen as a commodity like any other, whose value it is the function of the market to determine: paper barriers are not going to prevail over the wishes of private actors (especially when they seem encouraged by their governments).[2] In Germany, and even more in France, currency is seen as the symbol, instrument, and attribute of the sovereign state, and not as an ordinary good. But until there is a united Europe, Germany's way of protecting that instrument is shaped by the Bundesbank's definition of the German national interest (and therefore it defended the franc but not the pound and

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the lira in September 1992, and limited its defense of the franc in July 1993), and France's itch to get its partners to agree on sets of regulations and controls that could restrict the operations of outside speculators is not shared by anyone else. Thus, it is not just the *conjoncture* of 1992–1993 that puts the EU at a disadvantage in this realm, by comparison with the United States or Japan. It is its very unfinished nature, its being a halfway house between a group of formally independent states and a genuine union or federation; and the storms to which it is therefore exposed keep it in this unhappy position.

The divergences among the members are just as apparent in trade policy. The difficulties that emerged during GATT's interminable Uruguay Round may have been made more intense, but they have not been created by the recession. What happened is familiar. In the case of agriculture, as in the case of "cultural services" (movies and television programs), the Community had painfully succeeded in putting together policies that reflected, in the former instance, France's attachment to the original Common Agricultural Policy (which had done so much to boost France's export capacity) and, in the latter instance, France's resistance to the "invasion" of American programs. But when the United States began to exert very strong pressure on both fronts, the surface consensus of the EU cracked and divergent combinations of foreign policy traditions and national policy dispositions reasserted themselves: the French being more protectionist, statist, and anti-American; the British being at the completely opposite end; and the Germans riding the middle line, somewhat closer to the British (and to the Americans) while trying not to break up with the French. The split was reflected even in the EU Commission, where French President Jacques Delors and the British commissioner in charge of external trade, Sir Leon Brittan, were not on the same wavelength at all. The French, at the end, skillfully retreated from the brink just enough to get their partners to support most of their demands, but the compromises to which the United States agreed in December 1993 do not resolve the issues once and for all: the showdown was postponed, and surface consensus within the EU was thus restored, for the time being.

Differing reactions to the pulls and pushes of the outside world—in this instance the United States—had already divided the Commu-

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nity in the 1960s. This is precisely what we find when we turn to the realm of diplomacy and defense. Even though the Community set up by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 had no formal powers in those areas, membership in the EC became a major component of each participant's definition of its national interest. Here, as in NATO, each one, and especially the main actors—France, Germany, England, and Italy—had worked out a specific position during the Cold War, around which grew not only a rationale (partly public, partly sotto voce) but what might be called a cobweb of interests and relationships (hence the remarkable continuity of these positions, despite changes of governments). But the basis for these calculations and policies was the situation in which the West European states found themselves during the Cold War: a divided Europe with a formidable Soviet threat and the necessity of American protection. On this basis the French devised a policy that tried to combine the maximum of possible independence and the development of a European entity that would "contain" West Germany, as did NATO, but also would become capable of resisting American supremacy. France would offset the FRG's economic dynamism with its independent nuclear force and its unique capacity to lead the Community, given the inhibitions that handicapped Bonn in this respect: Germany's past and Germany's division. The Germans saw in the Community a way back to respectability, an avenue of influence, and a provider of support for Germany's legitimate national aspirations. The British, latecomers, also endorsed it as a field of influence (now that decolonization was over and the Commonwealth had faded) and as an instrument for the containment both of Germany *and* of France's anti-American thrusts and leadership ambitions. For Italy it was a highly desirable alternative to the failed nationalism of fascism and, along with NATO, a way of keeping out of power a Communist Party whose own gradual embrace of European integration was deemed incompatible with its support of Soviet policies.

All these calculations have been put in question by the shock of 1989 and the end of the Cold War. To be more precise, the situation in which they grew has been wiped away. The cobwebs are still there but the walls on which they hung are not. At the heart of the matter is the change in the relative power and situation of France and Germany. Despite its current difficulties, the FRG is the

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main beneficiary of the recent events: it has regained unity and full sovereignty, its main potential enemy, the Soviet Union, has disintegrated, its need for American protection has shrunk, and, at a time when economic clout matters at least as much as military might, it is the predominant economic and financial power in Europe. The weight of the past gets lighter as the past recedes. And while its political elites remain committed to European unity as insurance against the temptations of adventurism and as reassurance toward the rest of Europe, the FRG now has the opportunity to become the Union's leader and no longer needs to be in almost all circumstances its main source of funds for aid to its weaker members and poorer regions. Europe is less a willingly chosen cage and more a tool for influence and for the securing of a favorable environment.

The shocks that have benefited Germany have damaged France's position. Today, for the satisfaction of their national interests, the French need Germany and Brussels far more than before; the would-be leader has become a quasi-dependent. To be sure, constitutional and moral inhibitions curtail Germany's involvement in military operations outside of NATO's domain, but in these areas France's nuclear advantage is almost useless, and its non-nuclear forces have been sacrificed to the nuclear mirage. As a result—and this is the second transformation in France's position—the rather soft but broad consensus on the European policy described above has split and the gap is widening between those who cling to the Union as the best way to limit and supervise Germany's new influence — but from a position of weakness, no longer of strength—and those who, fearing that Germany would dominate the Union and would become a cage for France, would like to regain some of the independence they see as having been frittered away. Both sides remain convinced that America, the sole remaining superpower, is still, or indeed more than ever, a threat (as well as a now less indispensable protector), but one side still hopes to infuse the Union with the proper spirit of resistance, a calculation which the other side mocks as a pipe dream.

England is, of course, also concerned with containing the new German giant, whose advent it greeted with unconcealed dismay. But the present Union does not seem to the British any more capable of performing such a role than it does to the Séguins and

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the Chevènements of France. Both would like a much looser Europe, extending much farther East. But whereas the French doubters crave greater national independence as a way of resisting real and imaginary American encroachments, the British simply pursue with renewed vigor their old design of a loose European grouping that would be little more than a free trade area, incapable therefore of becoming a counterweight to the United States. If anything the end of the Cold War and the signs of America's temptation to turn inward have made the British more eager than ever to behave as the most faithful and privileged allies of the United States so as to prevent it from disengaging too much from a continent still teeming with dangers, both to the East and—because of Germany's new might—in its heart.

As for Italy, the embrace of European unity lost its anti-Communist function long ago, and its position has been affected less by the events of 1989 than by the domestic avalanche that threatens its political and economic elites. What this cascade of changes in situations, of forced new calculations, and of difficult and incomplete adjustments explains is the continuing difficulty of the states in the Union to agree on a common diplomacy and security policy. What could not be achieved when they were all together in the "Western" cauldron of the Cold War—because their dispositions toward their own pasts, toward the United States, and toward the Soviet Union diverged—is even harder to accomplish now that the lid is off, and the cauldron abandoned.

The disappointing performance of the Union in the two major post-1989 crises in which it nevertheless tried to speak with one voice — the Gulf war and Yugoslavia—is the result of both the divisions or divergent calculations mentioned above and of another phenomenon observed by several people,[3] namely the inadequacy of the Union in geopolitical enterprises. The Community, for many of its enthusiasts, including the disciples of Jean Monnet, was going to be an exemplary civilian power, a fine example of supernation building over an economic foundation. As a result, security was left to NATO (i.e., the United States) and diplomacy to the member states. The latter, either because their forces were tied to NATO, or, as in France's case, because their trump card was nuclear deterrence, or because of varieties of pacifism, lost the habit of external military action, except for limited operations to safeguard bits of an

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empire or a former empire, as in the Falklands, or in Chad. Large-scale military expeditions not caused by a direct threat to physical security have tended to be dismissed as belonging to a distant past.

This explains why, in the Gulf crisis of 1990–1991, the contribution of most of the Community's members was either symbolic or, in Germany's case, reluctant and predominantly financial. The two states that participated far more actively—England and France—saw in the crisis a way of reasserting their rival claims to "global middle power" status and also a wedge for reintroducing themselves into the old diplomatic game of Arab-Israeli negotiations. None of these calculations bore fruit. In the case of Yugoslavia, two facts are most striking: First, the unwillingness of *any* of the Union's members to intervene militarily except as a participant in a peace*keeping* or humanitarian operation[4]—an unwillingness whose first expression had been the early reluctance to take the breakup of Yugoslavia seriously enough. Second, the range of policies was wide. In the beginning, there was a gulf between France and Britain's preference for preserving a Yugoslav state and Germany's push for early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. Germany dragged its reluctant partners along: they joined Bonn in order to prevent a unilateral German recognition, which occurred anyhow. When Bosnia became the center of the drama there was still an ample gap between Britain's attitude of prudent (some would say disdainful) nonintervention and Germany's awkward combination of anti-Serb feelings and constitutional impotence, with France playing Hamlet in the middle. The Union's own distinctive contribution—Lord Owen—displayed in successive peace plans a bizarre mix of wishful thinking and resignation to the inevitable and a characteristic reluctance to envisage the military means needed to achieve political ends.

What the "external" part of this story shows is simple. With economic integration largely accomplished, two further tasks assumed increasing importance: monetary union, to consolidate the economic enterprise both within Western Europe and in the world, and a common defense and diplomatic policy so that the new economic giant would cease being a geopolitical dwarf. But the outside world's turbulence and the widely different reactions of the key states of the EU have made it impossible to overcome the obstacles. Not the world's turmoil but the same divisions have

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thwarted a third advance beyond economic integration: the reform of the EU's institutions. But before we examine this failure, we must turn to the internal part of the story.

III

The West European malaise and the crisis of the Union stem largely from the internal developments of the 1980s and early 1990s. One is, again, a factor of division; others are common to most of these nations.

If one examines the attitudes and statements of members of the political and cultural elites, one is struck by the way in which their relation to their country's past and to its future has changed over the past thirty years. In the early 1960s, the FRG was still uncertain about its future: the Wall had just been built, cementing the nation's division, and the superpowers' grip on the two halves of Europe was firmer than ever. The West Germans were still engaged in a painful exploration of their "unmasterable past." The need to repudiate it and to avoid anything that smacked of it was the lodestar of the new regime; the "embourgeoisement" of the new society and concentration on economic performance were methods of atonement as well as attempts to overcome the dangerous and delirious romanticism of the past. Today, the past is being "normalized": that is what the *Historikerstreit* of the late 1980s was about. Those who, like Habermas, vigorously opposed the attempt to put Nazism in perspective and to look at it as an episode in a continuous history were waging a noble but rearguard fight. The consternation produced by the first serious recession since the end of World War II and the material and psychological obstacles to the integration of the Eastern *Länder* should not obscure this fact: Germany's future in Europe and in the world is brighter than ever before, and the very challenge of that integration provides Germany with a *projet* that transcends economic performance.

In the early 1960s, especially after the end of the Algerian war, France under de Gaulle's exhortatory leadership was turning away from the past, toward a future that he described in grandiose terms. The view propagated by Gaullists, Communists, and other former *Résistants* that the nation had behaved, on the whole, admirably during World War II was rarely challenged, and as soon as the

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French pulled out of Algeria and the *pieds noirs* had settled on metropolitan soil a veil of silence and voluntary ignorance fell on the colonial past and on the bloody wars of decolonization. But since 1968 (despite the uninformed clichés spread by the American media) the French have been relentlessly exploring and scratching the wounds of the Occupation, putting the spotlight first on collaborationism, then on anti-Semitism; more recently, the Algerian war has ceased being taboo. But the presence of the past has not only taken the form of a confrontation with shame. There is also a wave of longing for the days of French grandeur. The heated debates on the French Revolution showed both sides of this fascination with the past: for some the Revolution, and especially its Jacobin paroxysm, was the forerunner of modern totalitarianism; for others the revolutionaries were, if not holy, at least to be admired for having created and tried out the ideology and institutions of *La République,* which the Third Republic was going to perfect. Republicanism, with its Rousseauistic emphasis on the general will and on the guiding role of the state, is widely presented as a very different and better formula than "Anglo-Saxon" liberalism. It is also a yardstick used to judge, and deplore, the performance of the Union. The past engages and fascinates; it is the future that appears dim.[5]

Across the Channel there has been less of a reversal, but this is only because postwar Britain has been more often bitterly savoring the memories of its past glories and "finest hour" than facing the future with confidence and a sense of direction. The Thatcher episode was an exception. She, like de Gaulle, tried to provide a seamless vision of grandeur linking the future to the past. But, unlike de Gaulle, her internal policies were too fiercely divisive and the results too mixed for the attempt to succeed. If in present-day France the invocation of the Republican past becomes an incentive to criticize a technocratic and bureaucratic Union, nostalgia for Britain's past is a weapon for resisting any increase in the Union's effective powers. British and French nationalism are essentially defensive, aimed at safeguarding whatever can be preserved of the past. If we leave aside the extreme Right in Germany, which rabidly displays an exaggerated version of the same nostalgia, the German elites are not "renationalized," partly because of the need not to

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repeat the past, but also because the Union today so largely satisfies German interests and endorses German policies.

If we move from elite attitudes to the evolution of societies, we find greater uniformity—but of a kind that contributes to the widespread unhappiness of the moment. In 1964 I wrote about "Americanization with a difference," placing emphasis on difference. Much has happened since. Many of the hopes of the early 1960s have turned out to be illusions. Technological progress did not usher in an age of ever-growing opulence and did not resolve the major social problems. Indeed, the spread of such progress to much of the rest of the world is one of the sources of today's industrial difficulties and of Western Europe's relative decline. The creation of elaborate procedures for the conciliation of interests (what has sometimes been called corporatism) neither succeeded in turning politics into a mere process of group adjustment nor survived the shrinking of the pie that was to be distributed by the state. Planning, the most celebrated perhaps of these procedures, has become both impossible (in an integrated and open Western Europe) and obsolete at the national level and unfeasible (because of a lack of power, resources, and will) at the Union level. The great dream of "mass education without any of its disadvantages—the raft of quality miraculously floating on an ocean of quantity"[6]—has turned into a nightmare: except for a very small elite, quality has declined and quantity has produced masses of young unemployed. The loss of illusions has reinforced a feature that had struck me in 1964: the absence of any new set of values underlying the conversion to the "functional necessities of a new kind of social order."[7] With these necessities now often under fire, the "solid bed of beliefs" provided in the United States by liberalism is even less visible, despite a brief moment of liberal euphoria during the days when communism fell and the single market rose. The bizarre "events" of 1968 had many aspects: one was a protest against the vacuum of beliefs, or, with regard to communism, against the ossification and sterilization of the creed. But the attempt to spread new values failed: it was a revolt, not a revolution. In 1964 I wrote that the European consensus was negative; I do not think that there is one today.

Many West Europeans, especially those who work for the Union and who often, as exceptions to what was just said, deeply believe

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in its mission have seen its vocation as the defense of West European distinctiveness, the preservation of those features of West European societies which, despite "Americanization" (industrialization in a capitalist framework) still distinguished them from America's society and polity. Union officials (especially if they are French) have often stressed the rural component of West European "civilization" as essential and specific: the relation to the land in countries with peasants is different from what it is in a nation of migrants with an agro-business of capitalist farmers. But that rural component is becoming a myth and a memory. The old-style peasants are vanishing, and it is the urban bourgeois and American-style farmers who have replaced them. The West Europeans have also been proud of pointing out that their cities had better management, better urban planning, and greater social cohesion than American ones. While much of this remains true, urban planning did not prevent, indeed it often promoted, the ugliness and aridity of sprawling and artificial suburbs. Social cohesion has been undermined by the combination of immigration (and fierce resistance to it), drugs, crime, and unemployment. The West Europeans now speak of urban "ghettoes," even when explosions there result from the hostile coexistence of different ethnic groups rather than from the misery and sense of injustice of a locally predominant one. The once tight weave of the West European nations' social cloth has stretched and loosened; each one now has to cope with the "exclusion" of large numbers of national and (often illegal) foreign misfits.

The West Europeans also liked to distinguish their welfare states, based on a mix of Socialist and Christian Democratic convictions, from America's laissez-faire society, especially in the matters of health care, labor practices, and unemployment benefits. Here too a rapprochement has occurred. In France after 1983 and in England after 1979 the role of the state in economic management was sharply reduced, and while not even Mrs. Thatcher dared to dismantle Britain's welfare legislation, everywhere the rising costs of social services, the economic cost of the laws that aimed at protecting labor from low salaries, exploitation, and arbitrary firings, and the successful competition in domestic and world markets of goods produced by countries with cheap labor are putting pressure on the governments to restore what is euphemistically called "flexibility" in the labor market and to trim the services provided by the state.

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This is made politically easier by another change that brings the European reality closer to America than to the supposedly distinctive "European model": for a variety of reasons, among which the recession is the major one, labor unions have either lost members massively, or lost combativeness.

In education the West European *projet* had been democratization, but without sacrificing quality in the training of future elites, without endangering what the *lycée,* the *Gymnasium,* and the British public school had provided, and without reducing primary education to the level to which American public schools had allegedly sunk. This does not appear, on the whole, to have been achieved, and while standards fell in primary and in much of secondary education, higher education, a major political battlefield, has been transformed by mass access, but in ways that keep it inferior to the American system of colleges and universities. As for the distinctiveness of West European culture, it has pretty much vanished in all the realms of popular culture. These many changes explain why there often is so much determination to defend what is left today of European specificity. French and Spanish peasants and French, Spanish, and Italian movie and television producers and directors take out their anger on the United States because the government and the business interests in the United States seek to hasten trends that are unfolding anyhow. The Union is too weak and divided to protect adequately what is left. But this leads some Europeans to wonder what the higher purpose of West European integration is if their societies do not have anything specific to protect and to promote.

The sense of a loss or lack of *projet* is reinforced by developments in domestic politics. Here some features that were visible thirty years ago that distinguished Western Europe from the United States are still present, but they too contribute to paralysis. During the past thirty years, the decline of parliaments has continued and bureaucracy, even when its economic interventionism has been toned down, remains the ordering power in the nations (in Italy and France the growth of regional governments has simply added new bureaucratic layers). Threatened groups such as British and French miners or French peasants have continued to display a capacity for anger, vitality, and a disdain for compromise unknown in the United States.

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Three new political characteristics interfere with the unification of Europe. The first is, to coin a phrase, the end of ideology. In 1964 communism, Social Democracy, and Christian Democracy were alive, if not well. We all know what has happened to communism, and the Christian Democrats and the Socialists have suffered heavily from the eroding and corrosive effects of power. Economic integration and the attempt to make the EMS function have put serious limits on the leeway of policymakers in the economic and financial arenas. With politics shifting from the enforcement of distinctive programs to the management of constraints, parties that began as programmatic movements lost their programs and their politicians sometimes lost their souls.

The margin of choice among competing partners appears paradoxically narrower than in the United States, whose two parties many Europeans had tended to deride as barely distinguishable. In countries where the state, even when weak, was seen as properly the guide of society, a notion that is far more controversial on this side of the Atlantic, the shift from creative leadership to prudent management was often seen as a fall. The original theory of West European integration had seen the decline of ideology and the prevalence of economic management as a boon for supranational unity: it would be based on a dynamic of interests because interests compromise, ideological passions divide. But managers are not innovators, and if there had not been the ideological drive that animated the Monnet group, or Jacques Delors, little would have been accomplished. Above all, leaders who are primarily managers find it hard to mobilize their publics.

Second, the failure of managerial politics to cope with unemployment and the host of social issues that accompany the recession, or with the relative decline of European industry which aggravates it, and the many scandals that the collusion between the management of state power and the business world has generated have driven many citizens into contempt for politics and politicians (a feature that is most prominent in Italy, but visible also in France, Spain, England, and Germany). It results in political fragmentation, votes for small parties, and above all a great deal of lassitude and skepticism toward the designs of politicians—such as Maastricht. Publics which had often seemed to ask and expect less from politicians than the "revolutions" promised by the latter (remember the French

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Socialists' slogan of 1981: *changer la vie*) nevertheless expected more and better than what their leaders delivered after they discovered that their promises could not be kept.

Third, new divisions complicate the task of politicians eager to proceed with European unification. In England the gap between the modern industrial and financial sector, boosted by Thatcherism, and the declining parts of the country, the gap between the affluent and the underprivileged, are dangerous for Tories addicted to trickle-down theories and puzzling for Socialists deprived of their old articles of faith. In Germany the many gaps and misunderstandings between the old FRG and the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) will take years to disappear.[8] In Italy we find not only the last supporters of the collapsing old system pitted against a (dis)array of reformers but a division between North and South. Comparable splits exist, of course, in Eastern and Central Europe between those who want their nations to embark on a "normal" course of capitalist free market development with liberal institutions and those who are buffeted by the storms of change, baffled by the new insecurities of employment and social services, and nostalgic about the protection that the state, however authoritarian, had provided for forty years. All these divisions oblige leaders to pay attention to the nation's social fabric first.

IV

What are the effects of these disruptive developments within the Union and in its external relations? It shows today a face that is both unfinished and unattractive; here we must again distinguish the inside from the external side of the faltering enterprise.

I do not mean to minimize what has been accomplished. For all its current tensions, Franco-German relations have been revolutionized, turned from hatred and war to reconciliation and friendship. Britain is a reluctant and ambivalent partner, but it is "in." Membership in the Union has been essential for the democratic progress of Spain and Greece. The "founding fathers" who saw the Union as indispensable for the peace and prosperity of its members have been vindicated. Brussels, for all the flaws of the institutional setup, is one of the last refuges of idealism on the continent. And yet, the glass remains half empty, or, to change the metaphor a bit, vinegar

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has been added to the wine. The Union's contribution to peace is being taken for granted almost half a century after the end of World War II, and what shocks its citizens is that such peace does not seem to be contagious. The Berlin Wall fell (certainly not thanks to the Community) but in a crucial respect Europe remains divided: ethnic conflicts among Europeans have been dampened in the West but they have exploded in the East after the removal of the Communist lid. And in the former Soviet Union the future is sufficiently ominous to put both internal and external peace in doubt. As for prosperity, the Europeans have learned that however much they integrate their economies, it ultimately depends on events beyond their borders and control: on the soundness of the American economy, on how tough competition with the Japanese juggernaut turns out to be, on how quickly the "relocation" of business from Europe to the Far East and Southeast Asia disrupts or demolishes traditional West European industries, on the whims of often anonymous "speculators." Maintaining prosperity is a Sisyphean task. Herein lies the drama: the original impulses to rule out new fratricidal wars, to offer new horizons during the painful days of decolonization, to provide an escape from excessive dependence on the "big brother" across the Atlantic, and to turn recovery into prosperity through cooperation have faded and have not been adequately replaced. There is a vast difference between Western Europe as a zone of peace and economic integration (this has been achieved) and Western Europe as a common enterprise with a bold program at home and abroad.

At home the failure is visible in two areas: institutions and policies. Institutionally the somewhat Byzantine setup of the Union is a compromise between the inadequate and the impossible. The inadequate is the notion of a strictly intergovernmental operation. To be sure, without the governments' consent, the 1992 program of economic unification could not have been launched, but without the supranational Commission's work and the switch to qualified majority vote in the council, this program could not have been carried out.[9] The impossible remains the leap to a federal system: none of the West European Great Powers (excluding Italy) is ready for it, and two of them, France and the United Kingdom, remain predominantly hostile. The rather empty debate about "subsidiarity" is a symptom of the reluctance to transfer power decisively from the

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states to the central institutions of the Union. The advantage of the compromise is that it allows these to have effective authority in some important areas: agriculture, foreign trade, opening markets, and promoting competition. The disadvantage is the famous "democratic deficit." The most dynamic of the "federating" institutions is the Commission, which is also the most bureaucratic and technocratic. The most democratic (because it is elected by the people) is a parliament with scant powers and a mode of election that is, in fact, national rather than European so that the most ambitious representatives prefer to sit in the national assemblies and complain about having too little to say about what happens in the Union.[10]

The German government has made it clear that in exchange for letting its partners share with the Bundesbank (the de facto ruler of the EMS) control of the future monetary union it would like the powers of the European Parliament to be increased. But the Fifth Republic (which has, so to speak, swallowed or converted its erstwhile foe François Mitterrand) does not want to recreate the Third or Fourth Republics in Strasbourg. And the British government, used to dominating a theoretically sovereign British Parliament thanks to the logic of a two-party system (or to an electoral law that crushes third parties), is just as unenthusiastic about transferring power to a splintered multinational parliament. The result of all this is a setup of limited efficiency and even more restricted legitimacy. There still is no European political process, if one means thereby a transnational set of parties and elections of European rather than of national delegates to a common assembly.

As for the policies ground out by these clumsy institutions, they suffer not only from the fact that the Monnet wager on European integration consisted in focusing energies on a utilitarian calculus of material rewards and on "a logic that places material gain at the apex of social values,"[11] but also from the priority given in recent years to a particular kind of economic approach. The only common programs are found in areas of redistribution (i.e., areas where difficult compromises must be recurrently negotiated between the rich and the poor members) and in agriculture, where the inevitable retreat from the wasteful excesses of the Common Agricultural Policy guarantees fights and unpopularity. In every other respect the activities center on *deregulation,* within a very loose framework (the mutual recognition of national standards): a process that

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ultimately empowers businesses but does little to build a European state.[12] As a paradoxical consequence, the Commission's regulations of deregulation are often denounced by the members as trivial, fussy, and intrusive, but its authority in important matters of economic, fiscal, and social policy, science, technology, and education remains minimal. Those who, like Monnet and Ernst Haas, believed in the expanding logic of functional integration, in the dynamic that would force the states to grant ever more powers to the central institutions in order to remedy such deficiencies and imbalances, underestimated the resistance of national bureaucracies, executives, and parliaments to such transfers. If Mrs. Thatcher was sufficiently enthusiastic about deregulation to accept (imprudently) that it proceed by majority rule it was because she understood that the task would keep Brussels busy without making it strong.

Thus, the face the Union shows to its members is unfinished. The face it presents to the outside is often unpleasant. Two issues matter here: immigration and the problem of Eastern Europe. Concerning the former there is indeed remarkable European distinctiveness if one compares the Union to the United States, a distinctiveness that is fiercely and systematically buttressed but is anything but admirable. It is as if, having gradually become used to seeing in the citizens of other EU nations persons who, while different from true nationals, are nevertheless not aliens, the inhabitants of each of the EU countries had decided to treat those from outside the magic circle with extra suspicion and severity—a tendency mightily reinforced but not created by the recession. The combination of the Schengen agreements on open borders and new national legislation, especially in Germany and France, is an ugly attempt by each member to push on others the burden of screening asylum seekers and a common policy of the lowest common denominator. Blocking immigration except in the rarest of cases (when asylum cannot be refused under international law), persecuting illegal immigrants with venomous vigor, and, in the French case, making the integration of legal ones more difficult, shows how governments have tried to defuse the arguments and to deflate the growth of xenophobic movements by adopting some of their recommendations and thus by legitimizing their existence — as long, of course, as they do not turn murderous. This is the politics of meanness (it is especially bizarre in Italy, where the Lombard League looks at non-Northern Italians as un-

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worthy foreigners). The opening of borders to foreign goods and services is accompanied by a closing of gates to people.

The prevalence of the politics of fear is evident not only in attitudes toward "invaders" from the poor countries of the Middle East or of North Africa or in fantasies about Islamic or Black hordes besieging a prosperous Europe (which reacts by arguing that the best way to prevent such onslaughts is to help the countries of the Third World keep their peoples at home through a policy of aid to development, an argument that happens to be accompanied by little aid). It is also visible in the timidity with which the Union and most of its members have faced the opportunity provided by the collapse of communism east of the old Iron Curtain. There are, of course, good reasons why Prague, Warsaw, and Budapest could not join the EU at once or quickly. But the Union has behaved as if it was more anxious to protect the fortress of Western Europe from the economic and ethnic turmoil of the East than it was to provide, through close association leading to guaranteed membership if stipulated conditions are met, a safety net for these countries. It is as if the peace and relative prosperity achieved in the West were too precious to be exposed to the turbulence in the East: self-protection is more important than propagation, quarantine than help.[13] The argument that the Union had to choose between "deepening" and "expanding" is specious: so far there has been neither, and a bold expansion might have obliged the members to face sooner the reform of the institutional setup (already too cumbersome for twelve) which Maastricht postponed to 1996, just as the expansions of the 1970s and early 1980s (from the Six to the Twelve) led to the shift to majority vote in the Single Act.

Especially at a time of domestic unhappiness and strife there is no hope for a popular push toward greater unity, for a move from below toward a Union both deeper and wider. As in other historical cases it is from the top that the initiatives will have to come. If there ever should be a European "nation of nations" and a Federal European state above the states that have already lost many of their powers, either through formal transfer to Brussels or through devolutions to "the market" or through simple impotence, it is the elites and the governments that will have to take the decisive steps: exactly what happened in the 1950s and in the mid-1980s. But what is lacking currently is elites and leaders with a daring vision.

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The convergence of Monnet, Schuman, Adenauer, and de Gasperi was exceptional. What obstructed progress in the 1960s was not the absence of a vision; it was the reluctance of other leaders to accept de Gaulle's vision. A less grandiose but uplifting convergence around the vision of "1992" brought together Delors, Thatcher, Kohl, and Mitterrand. Today, the French President merely survives, Kohl has his hands full with the unexpected or perverse effects of his own vision for Germany in 1989, Britain acts as a brake, and Delors by himself can do little. Precisely because of the negative trends and factors on which this essay has dwelled, it would take the convergence of exceptionally bold leaders to transcend the current malaise, timidity, divisions, and retreats. But these same trends and factors make it difficult to see where such leaders would come from and who they would be.

Meanwhile, Western Europe suffers, paradoxically, both from the legacy of the postwar habit of dependence on American leadership in geopolitical affairs and from the decline of an American predominance which had assuredly been a factor of division (between Gaullists and Atlanticists) but also a goad toward a European entity capable of talking back to the United States. And it remains torn by disjunctions it cannot overcome: between politics, which is still national, and economics, national no longer; between economics, which is becoming common, and diplomacy and defense, where the Union still falters; between a settled West and an unsettled East. In 1964 I wondered about Western Europe's spiritual vitality. I still do.

ENDNOTES

[1]Stanley Hoffmann, "Europe's Identity Crisis," *Dædalus* 93 (4) (Fall 1964): 1244.

[2]On US official skepticism toward European Monetary Union, see Mark N. Nelson, "Transatlantic Travails," *Foreign Policy* (92) (Fall 1993): 75–91.

[3]See Michael Brenner, "EC: Confidence Lost," *Foreign Policy* (91) (Summer 1993): 24 – 43, and Pierre Hassner, "Beyond Nationalism and Internationalism," *Survival* 35 (2) (Summer 1993): 49– 65.

[4]Indeed, such participation then became a major argument for *not* intervening as peace *enforcers* against any party or as champions of collective self-defense against an aggressor.

[5]No French leader over the last ten years has succeeded in articulating a convincing conception of it.

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[6]Hoffmann, "Europe's Identity Crisis," 1267.

[7]Ibid., 1260.

[8]See Fritz Stern, "Freedom and Its Discontents," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (4) (September-October 1993): 108–125.

[9]Cf. Robert Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann, eds., *The New European Community* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991).

[10]Cf. Stanley Hoffmann, "Goodbye to a United Europe?," *New York Review of Books* XLI (10) (27 May 1993): 27–31.

[11]Brenner, "EC: Confidence Lost," 26.

[12]One could argue that it takes away regulatory powers from the member states, without any real transfer to Brussels.

[13]A comparable timidity is being shown in dealing with the internal and interstate turmoil of the former Soviet Union, except for Germany's economic help to Russia. Cf. Robert Legvold's thoughtful and alarming paper, "Western Europe and the Post-Soviet Challenge" (unpublished).

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Will the old nations, with their centuries-old concern for national sovereignty, survive? Is the passion with which the public supports national athletic teams a symbol of a nationalism which raises still another insurmountable obstacle to block federation? Yes and no. I believe that consciousness of the nation remains infinitely stronger than a sense of Europe. I do not perceive any European nationalism beyond an aspiration to a degree of autonomy in relation to the United States and, especially, to the rejection of the bloody quarrels of the past. Will this reasonable desire be enough to give birth to a European federation? In terms of the next twenty years, I do not think so, and I am not even sure it would be desirable, because on this point General de Gaulle seems to me absolutely right: to exist as a political unit, Europe would have to acquire the capacity to defend itself, or at least to acquire a relative autonomy in the Atlantic Alliance. Without this political will, Europe will have to settle for continued economic growth, with the Common Market tightening bonds with Great Britain and the other European nations in one way or another. Will the situation arouse the European nations to a massive effort to acquire a deterrent force in the next twenty years? What will be the relations among China, Russia and the United States?

Nobody seems to me to be in a position to answer these questions, yet it is these answers that will determine the ultimate significance of the European undertaking. The old nations still live in the hearts of men, and love of the European nation is not yet born—assuming that it ever will be. But the federation of the Old Continent is held in check less by the survival of nationalism, large or small, than by another cause, simpler and often unrecognized: the present mixture of cooperation and integration in Europe and within the Atlantic Alliance is sufficient to assure the achievement of prosperity and security. It is not sufficient to create a European state.

Raymond Aron

From "Old Nations, New Europe"
Dædalus 93 (1) (Winter 1964)

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Philip R. Schlesinger

Europe's Contradictory Communicative Space

INTRODUCTION

THE POLITICS OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY HAS become a major issue in today's Europe. Any understanding of the European political scene must recognize the crucial role played by nationhood as a focus of collective loyalty. However, as nationhood and statehood in Europe do not invariably coincide, the growing salience of the national question offers an inherent challenge to the existing state system and to the stability of our geopolitical image of the continent. Culture and polity in Europe are not congruent with one another and, at a time of uncertainty, culture takes center stage as a battleground for the elaboration of identity politics.

The upsurge of nationalist consciousness in Europe has been notable since the definitive collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989–1990. Subsequently, Germany has reunified, the Soviet Union has disintegrated into the fissiparous Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Yugoslavia has become the bloody cockpit of the continent, and Czechoslovakia has bifurcated. In Western Europe, neo-Nazi nationalism has made a telling (and chilling) reentry into the political scene in several states. Strongly decentralist—if not actually secessionist—tendencies are noticeable elsewhere, perhaps most prominently in Belgium and Spain, but also in various forms in Italy and in the United Kingdom. Unquestionably, the post-Cold War period has produced a general crisis of political identity in Europe. The unmistakable cultural expression of this crisis has been an accentuated concern with the nation as the locus and focus of collective sentiment and interest.

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In Europe, as elsewhere in the world, the Cold War provided antinomian categories for thinking about collectivities: West versus East; the free world versus communist totalitarianism; capitalism versus communism. These were political categorizations, but they also functioned as articulated symbolic forms that expressed cultural differences rooted in a wide range of divergent social, economic, political, and ideological practices. Cold War thinking was a way of ordering and simplifying European complexity into "us versus them."

Now that this era is past, the diversity of culture, language, and ethnicity that was hidden from view has reemerged into the unfeeling light of day. From two opposed blocs, leavened with a scattering of neutrals, the European political scene has taken on a much more intricate aspect. The Cold War and its politico-economic and military blocs obscured the fact that the continent is still a mosaic of nationalities, not all of which have their own states.

National identity politics in today's Europe is unavoidably shaped by its encounter with the supranational level. "Europe" is plainly not a single politico-cultural space; nor is "Europeanness" an unambiguous attribute.[1] Bearing this in mind, my purpose here is to make conceptual and analytical points as part of an argument about the *potential* for the construction of a European common communicative space via the media. This requires us to address the linked questions of the construction of a common cultural identity and of a public sphere. In this connection, it seems particularly appropriate to lay most emphasis upon the expectations that have centered on television as the principal contemporary medium for the diffusion of popular culture, a medium to which enormous political and cultural power are commonly ascribed.

In thinking about whether—if at all—media might construct Europeanness, it is important to note that Europe's geocultural scope is far from clear. Although (thinking westerly) there might be little dispute that the continent begins at the Atlantic coastlines, there is far less agreement about precisely where it ends. In General de Gaulle's celebrated formula, the Urals offered the other extreme, but that trope does not seem to command widespread agreement today. At the heart of the debate about Europeanness are questions about what kinds of political, economic, and cultural attributes both individuals and collectivities require in order to make a claim to "belong" to Europe. For example, it is becoming increasingly

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evident inside some member states of the European Community (EC) that people of color and non-Christians are viewed as "outsiders" who should be rejected.

Such considerations make the attempt— even the aspiration— to construct a European identity vitally important. To state the options rather starkly, the present debate over Europeanness may be seen as crystallizing a wider struggle between secular, civic, and inclusive pluralist conceptions of collective identity and alternative images of community rooted in ethno-nationalist exclusivism, blood, and religious faith.

CONSTRUCTING "EUROPEANNESS"

Collective identities are relatively fluid constructions rather than eternal essences. Their social making is an active, dialectical process that involves the continual construction and reconstruction of a sense of themselves by self-identifying communities using the signs provided by their cultures. The construction of a collective identity also generally involves active strategies of inclusion and exclusion whereby the boundaries of a given collectivity are policed. Hence, collective identities may be sustained not only by the auto-identification of a group but also by hetero-identification. Both how we define the other and how the other simultaneously defines us are part of the unavoidable game of identity politics. *We* are defined, in part at least, by being different from how *they* are. And *their* difference from *us* depends upon our being what we think we are. Collectivities are therefore sustained and propelled by their reflexivity.

The process sketched out above extends through time, deploying both collective memory and collective amnesia. The struggles over various versions of history at any given moment become crucial for the eventual self-understanding of a collectivity's formation. What is understood to be either typically national or ethnic about a given group is usually drawn from a highly selective account.[2] Analogously, the same process also extends through space. Since the nation-state became the "normal" political form in Europe some two centuries ago, this has been paradigmatically conceived in nationalist thought as a self-determining collectivity located in a specific national territory endowed with meanings.[3]

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In the EC (which since November 8, 1993, but without fanfare, has also slipped into calling itself the European Union [EU][4]) we are witnessing a contemporary attempt to move from an integrated market to a political formation, in effect an effort to devise a supranational form of state. Although this development process is uncertain and full of reversals, its ultimate logic (if successful) would be to create a new instance of political legitimacy. Given Europe's diversity, and its historical legacy of conflicting nationalisms, such an entity could not readily be built upon the classic, simplifying, nationalist criteria of ethnicity, consanguinity, language, or religion. The uneven process towards ratification of the Maastricht agreement in 1992–1993 made it quite apparent that the road is not without obstacles. So if there is a plausible story of emergent Europeanness to be told, it will probably have to be rooted in a gradualist saga of growing together through institutional sedimentation, the patient outcome of the *longue durée* rather than the quick-fire product of technocratic rationalism.

The present difficulty in imagining the EC/EU as a coherent, identity-conferring area of common political culture is underlined by bearing in mind an important comparative point. The historical conditions of nation-building in the Old World differ profoundly from those in the New World. The United States is an inorganic nation, juridically defined and based in successive waves of diverse immigration.[5] As has pertinently been observed, unlike Europe, ethno-national identity in the United States has not provided a basis for war between constituent groups, a feature that has produced a significant difference in how ethnicity is interpreted: "Being based, however imperfectly, on individual rather than group rights and on the idea of the melting pot, the USA is often inclined to underestimate the elemental force of ethnic issues elsewhere although it is a source of regular conflict."[6]

In Europe, growing ethno-national conflict, racism, and anti-Semitism have become increasingly central to the political agenda. In the 1990s, fears of mass migratory movements from North Africa and Eastern Europe have fueled the development of a "Fortress Europe" centered on the EC and buttressed by strengthened internal policing. Precisely how that policing is conducted relates centrally to questions of culture, because plainly racial and ethnic discrimination are integral to its practices. And that, in turn, in-

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vokes cultural conceptions of (acceptable) similarity and (unacceptable) difference as criteria for whom to allow over the drawbridge and whom to repel.

The immediate enlargement of the EC looks set to reinforce its standing as the most affluent part of the continent, if—as it would appear—candidates from among the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) eventually join. At the same time, the EC still functions as a lodestar for the aspirations of many of the postcommunist states, where the democratic model, civic and political pluralism, and the market are seen as the embodiments of contemporary Europeanness.

It is in this context that I wish to discuss current arguments about the possibility of a "European audiovisual space" and its relations to the public sphere.

IMAGINING A EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL SPACE

During what was later found to be the concluding phase of the Cold War, EC policymakers turned their attention to creating a common culture among the twelve states of the EC. By considering this exemplary instance of a rationalist approach to cultural management, we are given considerable insight into the sources of continuing cultural difference in Western Europe and the evident absence of any shortcut in surmounting these.

In the mid-1980s, the European Commission, the EC's Brussels-based bureaucracy, had begun to consider the question of culture. This reflected a growing awareness that European integration might need something more than just a single economic space occupied by the member states. In signaling this change of approach, one of the EC's founding fathers, Jean Monnet, was invoked as saying, "If we were beginning the European Community all over again, we should begin with culture."[7]

The European Commission's Green Paper, *Television without Frontiers,* published in 1984, set the context as follows:

> Information is a decisive, perhaps the only decisive factor in European unification. . . .European unification will only be achieved if Europeans want it. Europeans will only want it if there is such a thing as European identity. A European identity will only develop if Europe-

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> ans are adequately informed. At present, information via the mass media is controlled at [the] national level.[8]

This perspective has had an enduring impact upon subsequent thinking and debate. First, it assumes, simplistically, that there is a strong, unilinear, and homogenizing causal connection between media consumption and collective identity formation. Second, the national level of media production and distribution is seen as an obstacle to be transcended in the interests of forging Europeanness. And finally, the desired shaping of a new cultural identity is linked to the transnational distribution of information, that is, to the formation of a European public sphere.[9]

Underlying *Television without Frontiers* were assumptions directly derived from the Western European experience of public service broadcasting. In the early and mid-1980s, before the deregulatory trend in broadcasting became predominant, it was still possible to think of radio and television as the cultural arms of nation-building and as providing a public forum for the elaboration of divergent, party-based projects within a political community composed of citizens. However, increasingly, since the latter part of the 1980s this public culturalist model has been widely supplanted by an individualizing economistic conception of audiences as consumers and of programming as, above all, a commodity.

It is a nice irony that in order to legitimize the project of forging a supranational identity the EC technocracy chose a model whose political prospects on the national level were actually waning, although they could not have seen this clearly at the time. The project of building a European culture through television was simply extended from one political level to another without any serious consideration of what might be involved in moving from a national community defined by the boundaries of a single state to an international community defined by integrationist political economics. Characteristically, the role of audiovisual media in constructing a European identity has been officially defined by counterposition to a culturally invasive other, namely the United States. In keeping with this, at the *Assises de l'Audiovisuel* held in Paris during October 1989, the president of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, issued a series of interrogatives:

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> I would simply like to pose a question to our American friends: do we have the right to exist? Have we the right to preserve our traditions, our heritage, our languages? How will a country of ten million inhabitants be able to maintain its language—the very linchpin of culture—faced with the universality which satellites offer? Doesn't the defence of freedom, elsewhere so loftily proclaimed, include the effort of each country, or each ensemble of countries, to use the audiovisual sphere to ensure the protection of their identity?[10]

By the end of the decade, the EC's television directive, *Television without Frontiers,* was enacted with the goal of ensuring that equality of access to the market applied to television broadcasting across national frontiers; it was first implemented in October 1991. As we have seen, there was a cultural logic to this. But even more importantly, there was an underlying industrial logic. The purpose of opening up the market was to create greater opportunities for European audiovisual production in a global market. Creating the internal market was coupled with an attempt to impose a quota on importation from the external market. The directive's ARTICLE 4 stipulates that "Member States shall ensure where practicable and by appropriate means, that broadcasters reserve for European works. . .a majority proportion of their transmission time. . . ." These words are echoed in the "cultural objectives" of the Council of Europe's subsequent *European Convention on Transfrontier Television,* published in January 1990, which equally aimed to ensure that member states did not create national restrictions against the reception and retransmission of programs from other member states.[11] The official conception of what constitutes European audiovisual production in Europe includes programs and films produced in EC member states, by signatories to the Council of Europe Convention, or in countries belonging to EFTA.

Although the EC context in some measure has begun to affect the scope for autonomous media policy-making at the level of the nation-state, Western Europe is still far from having homogeneous media systems. Media institutions remain nationally specific, strongly influenced in their internal regulatory regimes by domestic political determinants.[12] Moreover, nation-states still remain the most significant spaces for political communication.[13]

But that is not to deny the existence of internationalizing tendencies in European television (as, indeed, has also increasingly been

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the case in the press, particularly in the shape of transnational ownership). The reconstruction of domestic audiovisual markets has been driven to a considerable extent by the rise first of advertising and then subscription-financed private television during the past decade. The proliferation of distribution systems, including satellite and cable, has increased the total European demand for programs enormously.

However, there are problems in generalizing about the patterns of media consumption across the EC. For instance, there is low newspaper readership in some Latin countries compared with Northern Europe; consumption of media is clustered around nine language areas; and only in the smaller countries bordering larger neighbors with the same language is there significant transborder media consumption.[14] Both the EC and the much broader regional grouping, the Council of Europe, have seen the elaboration of a European audiovisual space as a matter of policy. What is noticeable, though, is the extent to which cross-border media developments, whether in television, newspapers, or magazines, have actually been the product of private corporate initiative rather than governmental action. The European mediascape is traversed by such actors as Murdoch's News International, the Luxembourg-based CLT, Germany's Bertelsmann, and Italy's Fininvest. The process of transnationalization and economic integration resulting from the private actions of enterprises must be weighed alongside those of national governments and Euro-bureaucracies.[15]

The development of European television programming has been encouraged via regulatory measures and conventions. The production and distribution of audiovisual products have been stimulated by means of a number of EC-funded ventures. The best known of these is the MEDIA program, which has sought to strengthen the EC's internal market across the component national boundaries. Parallel measures have been undertaken by the Council of Europe in its audiovisual EUREKA project. These promotional efforts have undeniably had some impact in developing a European audiovisual market by stimulating new production and in enhancing cross-national collaboration. The EC's 1991–1995 MEDIA program cost some $280 million.[16] But such support for production is dwarfed by what is spent by European countries on programs imported from the United States. In 1992, the EC member states spent a combined

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total of $3.7 billion on audiovisual imports, which far outweighed the $288 million spent on European productions in the United States.[17]

The scale of imports of television programs and films from the United States has been a cause of official concern. The very popularity of the US product (hardly something new, given the historic global dominance of Hollywood) has been represented as a danger of Americanization. Ever since World War I, for instance, American popular culture has been seen in official circles and by cultural elites in the United Kingdom as constituting a threat to the *national* culture.[18] In recent years, this line of argument has been most clearly articulated in France, where the issue has been supercharged by the perception that American popular culture played a role in the global clash between *la Francophonie* and the Anglo-Saxons.[19] Now, transposed to a supranational level, in official thinking Americanization is represented as a threat to *European* culture.[20]

It is not surprising, therefore, as so emphatically signaled by Jacques Delors, that the forging of a common European culture through television and cinematic production should be conceived of as a form of cultural defense. Nor is it unusual to encounter military metaphors in this context, and not just in official circles. Speaking for the creative community, the celebrated German film director, Wim Wenders, has opined that "Europe will become a Third World continent because we will not have anything to say on the most important medium. . . .There is a war going on and the Americans have been planning it for a long time. The most powerful tools are images and sound."[21]

This rhetoric of cultural war connects to the other major logic of the European audiovisual space, namely the industrial and commercial goal of creating a European market capable of stimulating the production of both hardware and software, thereby also confronting the Japanese challenge in media technologies.

The integrationist model of audiovisual space, however, has a notable defect. In the effort to rationalize the management of culture, the refractoriness of national television audiences has been underestimated. Television programs (and films) produced in Europe tend to be so nationally specific as to offer limited scope for audience identification elsewhere on the continent. On the whole, with the exception of productions in the English language, televi-

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sion and film productions do not travel extensively outside their language area. There is no *European* market as such, rather there is "merely a collection of distinct domestic markets" and major European producers are primarily concerned with strengthening their positions within their national markets.[22] Given preferences both for national style and content in television programs and a widespread lack of popular interest in the products of other European countries, we are faced with a somewhat paradoxical outcome. To the extent that it exists at all, the real common currency of the European audiovisual space is actually the output of the *American* television and film industries. The United States produces—and has long produced—the moving images that most easily traverse European national barriers. Although the American product does not dominate the prime-time television schedules, it does have an unrivaled ability to enter every national market, and Hollywood unquestionably dominates the European box office.[23] An instructive insight into Europe's current problems in creating a cinema with transnational mass audience appeal was afforded by the general indifference that greeted the annual European Film Academy awards in December 1993. Compared to the razzmatazz that surrounds Hollywood's Oscar ceremonies, Felix, the European equivalent, received scant attention in his sixth year.[24]

American film and television producers have for several generations addressed an ethnically diverse nation through a common language. Until very recently, the acquisition of US citizenship has gone hand in hand with acquiring linguistic competence in English. Europe, by contrast, has had—and still retains—a durable, highly differentiated linguistic order, wherein the possession of linguistic competencies is integral to distinct and highly articulated cultural identities.[25]

The European linguistic order persists because, characteristically, the development of official languages in Europe has been intimately connected with the creation of state-supported central media of linguistic communication. The educational system, naturally, has been central to this, but so too have the mass media. Officially adopted languages are protected and linguistic competence is largely coterminous with citizenship. It has been observed that the "robustness of European states and their languages makes it extremely unlikely that further political integration will be accompanied by

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language unification."[26] A relevant factor is language competition in the EC, with English and French the de facto languages, and with a long-standing background of rivalry between French and German. Undoubtedly, though, English is the "first second language," and the current state of foreign language competence among young Europeans shows that "English is paramount as the medium of wider communication in the EC" and looks set to serve the needs of international communication. That is not to exclude the likely regional importance of German and French.[27] Nor is it to ignore the continuing resilience of the other official national languages of state, alongside the efforts to upgrade the linguistic status of nations without states (the Catalans in Spain being the most notable instance) as well as attempts to foster lesser used languages by means of broadcasting.[28]

Linguistic and sociocultural differences substantially account for the failure to create a pan-European televisual market via direct broadcast satellite.[29] The initial pan-European aspirations of satellite operators have decanted into distributing television programming either by national markets or by homogeneous language areas, notably the English, German, and French.[30] The vast bulk of the European audience prefers programs in its own language and looks for affinities of outlook and life-style. To consume in another language runs against the line of least resistance, and even in the smaller European states national programming tends to be of higher quality than overseas material. Moreover, although English is the most widely-spoken second language, it is not a lingua franca.[31]

Much official thinking about the European audiovisual space, therefore, has been prone to what I have elsewhere labeled the "fallacy of distribution," according to which it is supposed that making available the same cultural product leads to an identity of interpretation on the part of those who consume it.[32] But this is to ignore the context of reception of culture, and, not least, the syncretic capacities of any given collectivity.[33] In the interpretation of audiovisual culture nationality is noticeably important, not to speak of the differences within nations based upon factors such as class, gender, and ethnicity.[34] Those cultural forms that are least nationally bound in their appeal—notably music and sport—are the ones most likely to succeed at the pan-European level.[35]

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The idea of a European audiovisual space was first formulated when ideological contention during the Cold War offered the EC a clear sense of collective purpose. Any reformulation of this project will have to take account of the eastward expansion of the European space, and of the additional communicative complexity—not least in terms of the politics of nationalism—that this has engendered. Besides, although the EU has now slipped quietly into existence as a result of the final ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, its future coherence is still an open question.

ENVISAGING A EUROPEAN PUBLIC SPHERE

While there is now increasing recognition of the problems faced by constructing European identity through television, the rhetoric about creating an audiovisual space has been paralleled by arguments—albeit much less prominently aired—about the difficulties posed by the creation of a European public sphere. Whereas the notion of cultural space tends to derive from Latin European thinking, current debate about the public sphere has a much more Anglo-American, German, and Nordic tone.

A common starting point in discussions about democracy and the media has been Jürgen Habermas' classic account of the formation of the bourgeois public sphere.[36] From the late eighteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century a space emerged in which private individuals could debate the regulation of civil society and the conduct of the state. The commercialization of the press and the advent of organized corporate interests in the economy, Habermas contends, has led to the refeudalization of the public sphere and the loss of its critical function.

Contemporary debate has been reconstructive, attempting to develop the analysis beyond Habermas' original formulation: it has sought to make the concept of the public sphere relevant to the profound reshaping of the media landscape that has occurred in the past two decades.[37] The public sphere is used as a concept to be employed in normative criticism of the present organization of the media and its consequences for democracy. A major concern has been with the participation of citizens in political life since they lack access to adequate information about the actions of government.

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Contrast this with the argument about a European audiovisual space. The central logic of this proposal concerns cultural (and industrial) defense against the supposed impact of (mainly) US cultural products. Given its roots in pre-World War II anxieties about the dominance of Hollywood in Europe, the focus of such concern has been with controlling the inflow of *entertainment.* By comparison, the arguments concerning the possibility of a European public sphere have primarily focused upon the role of *information.* Of course, to counterpose the two — entertainment and information—as if they could be conceived of as hermetically sealed from one another, is merely an analytical exercise. But it does reflect the dominant rhetorics in each debate.

Arguments about the public sphere tend, in general, to assume that the role of information is to assist the conduct of the citizen within the *national*, democratic polity; it presupposes the political form of the sovereign state. However, as the EC's policymakers have begun to think about the *Community's* media space, public sphere questions have come onto the agenda in an evaluation of the pluralism of the structures of mass communication in individual member states and the kinds of action needed to ensure a diversity of media.[38]

Particular attention has been given to the role of public service broadcasting in providing a forum for a range of views and interests to be articulated, a diversity of cultural forms to be represented, and thus, a framework for the national culture to be reproduced in ways accessible to the generality of citizens.[39] By contrast, the press is not seen as even potentially capable of performing such a role. Attention has been drawn to the internal differentiation in the national press whereby readers addressed by elite or quality newspapers receive a radically different account of the world from those who read the mass or popular (tabloid) newspapers.[40] However, whether concerned with the press or with broadcasting, well-substantiated developments such as the concentration of media ownership and control, restriction of new entries into the market by cost, the weight of advertising in the construction of public opinion, the attrition of public-sector broadcasting, the internationalizing and centralizing tendencies of media production and distribution, and the professionalization of relations between news sources and me-

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dia are variously presented as evidence of the shortcomings of the present system.[41]

The changing institutional structure of the EC has begun to provoke thinking about whether a European public sphere might be emerging, albeit one that because of its heterogeneity cannot model itself upon the classical conception of the nation-state. It has been suggested that in such a new conception of the public sphere, "participation in the life of public institutions takes precedence over nationality; that, whatever the citizen's cultural or national identity, his or her insertion in public political space is elective and not 'native'. . . ."[42] Whatever the eventual form of such a political community, there is a case for recognizing that the emergence of the supranational dimension poses a different kind of challenge to communicative practices from that of cultural defense alone.

The simple establishment of an audiovisual space, a minimal common currency of the moving image produced by Europeans and addressed to European audiences, is only a one-dimensional vision of a putative European public sphere. Making commonly available a range of audiovisual products might begin to create some of the preconditions of a fully articulated public sphere. However, this provision does not necessarily relate to the *critical* function of the media whereby political conduct is appraised by the citizen, supported in his or her judgment by a flow of accurate information.

Once we start to consider the role of media in European democratic participation, echoes of other debates about cultural identity and about the flow of news make themselves heard. The arguments of the 1970s and early 1980s that centered on the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) espousal of a New World Information and Communication Order may quite easily be reformulated in terms of a debate about the nature and scope of an international public sphere. The question was frequently posed in terms of a conception of media imperialism that decried the unequal flow of news and entertainment from the metropoles of the First World to the subordinate cultures of the Second and Third Worlds. Arguments were focused upon defending the authenticity of national culture and the exercise of control over its production by nations (actually the ruling elites of states quite capable of suppressing cultural diversity internally). As I have noted elsewhere, there is not a little irony in the transposition of this

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argument into the transatlantic context as part of the case for the construction of a European audiovisual space.[43] The shift was initially signaled in July 1982 by the French Minister of Culture, Jack Lang, speaking at the World Conference on Cultural Policies in Mexico City, when he remarked that "Cultural and artistic creation. . .is today a victim of a system of multinational financial domination against which we must organise ourselves." He went on to call for "cultural resistance against this domination. . .this financial and intellectual imperialism."[44]

Over a decade later, it is in the First World that the rhetoric of anti-imperialism and the defense of cultural identity have been articulated with considerable force. Europe and the United States argued over the character of audiovisual goods during the GATT Uruguay Round negotiations concluded in December 1993. Such was the importance of the issue that it almost proved to be a stumbling block to the final agreement and had to be set aside for future resolution when neither side would give way.

The United States, unsurprisingly, sings a quite different song, namely that of free trade. Films and television are the largest dollar export after aircraft in the United States. It is hardly surprising that the US lobby, led by the Motion Picture Association of America, wishes to remove Europe's trade barriers on audiovisual services. The main argument is that movies and programs are commercial products just like any other, and thus ARTICLE 4 of the EC's *Television Without Frontiers* directive is anticompetitive. Moreover, European countries have been accused of censorship by excluding the US product, and the sovereignty of the consumer has been invoked for good measure. This, it should be said, in television markets where US films and television programs are ubiquitous—taking an average share of 80 percent in the European market[45]—and at European box offices where the national film industries' outputs are consequently uniformly dwarfed, if not utterly marginalized, by American imports.[46]

However, ARTICLE 4 is not a juridically enforceable quota, rather it represents a political aspiration, to be attained where practicable. The European position is that films and television programs are cultural artifacts and are not thought to be the same as other traded commodities. Consequently it has been argued that a principle of cultural exclusion should apply to the audiovisual sector, which is

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officially represented as being at the center of European cultural and democratic life.[47] The Europeans argue their case against the background of a 25 percent decrease in film production since 1980, and with an increasing proportion of such output dependent upon coproduction deals.[48]

Interestingly, as in the case of cultural identity, arguments about a potential European public sphere keep coming back to television. And there is a good reason for this: television has a communicative potential that is lacked by the press. Newspapers, with few exceptions, are tied to national markets. It is true that a new kind of international press has been developing in recent years, with papers such as *The European, The Financial Times, The International Herald Tribune*, and *The Wall Street Journal* consciously addressing international political and economic elites in the nearest thing we have to a European lingua franca, namely English. In recent years, sections of the quality press have also begun to produce European supplements, compiled from reports and features selected from like-minded newspapers across the continent; this has been complemented by cross-national syndication on a rather modest scale.

The consolidation of this kind of press signifies the emergent presence of a transnational domain of elites and decisionmakers, which is becoming increasingly visible as processes of globalization shift certain powers away from the national level and create new *couches* of professionals.[49] However, this kind of formation can hardly be considered a full-fledged public sphere, given that the costs of entry for participants are rather high in terms of the requisite cultural and economic capital.[50] Arguments about the class-based structure of the press, and the corresponding market segmentation, are relevant not only at the national level but also at the transnational level.

It might be suggested that the complex of administrative arrangements that constitutes the EC could provide the core of a public sphere. Of course, this presupposes an eventual territorial stability, which is certainly not in prospect this century given the queue of would-be accessions. It could also be imagined that the pilgrimage of functionaries through the organs of the nascent Eurostate may eventually confer loyalties upon an administrative group that might supersede those of their nation-state of origin, and moreover, that

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a single common language will eventually take clear precedence. To think this, however, is to envisage a long, drawn out, and linear process.[51] In that process, there can be little doubt, media would play a role, perhaps not least by representing the EC's political dimension. Such a role, however, needs to be a popular one, serving the wider European public that lies beyond the transnationalizing elites that might eventually cohere into a European ruling class.

Arguably, the EC's so-called democratic deficit has produced correlative problems in its representation through journalism. Since the early 1980s, European public service broadcasters grouped in the European Broadcasting Union have made a number of attempts to develop pan-European programming.[52] From the beginning of the last decade, the idea of a European television news program has been under consideration. With the limitations of satellite-borne transnational commercial services becoming increasingly clear—not least their tendency to be directed to particular language markets—a public service journalistic project has assumed greater attraction for the EC's bureaucracy. Advocates of the development of the European public sphere see this as a way to bring greater transparency and accountability to an institutional domain characterized by a mixture of technocracy and political brokerage which is presently beyond any serious democratic control. In such circumstances, "the establishment of a critical journalism must take the very unstable character of the European dimension and the unclarified legitimacy of the European institutions as its point of departure."[53]

Euronews was launched in January 1993 in an attempt to reach a broader public. This project, supported by a consortium of European public service broadcasters and the European Parliament, currently dominates the international news agenda and reflects the desire to produce a European perspective. The race has become especially heated since the Gulf War in 1991, when CNN's success marked out new territory subsequently also entered by the BBC's World Television News. Although global in reach, both are firmly rooted in their national bases, which obviously helps give them their distinctive corporate journalistic identities. In contrast with Euronews, both are monolingual channels, broadcasting solely in English.

Euronews operates in five languages—English, French, German, Italian, and Spanish—using off-screen commentary and subtitling.

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This necessary concession to Europe's linguistic diversity privileges only the main language groups, thus emphasizing the very barriers that it attempts to surmount. And the stylistic constraints and limited resources have led to a rather characterless journalism, heavily tied to pictures rather than analysis, with little that is characteristically European about its news agenda.[54]

National broadcast news still tends to be the preferred form in Europe, speaking with an institutional, public service voice and having the signal advantage of addressing a bounded community. The gradual and uneven emergence of the multichannel universe in various parts of Europe is putting this privileged news broadcasting form under pressure to change. For instance, those who could receive CNN during the Gulf War tended to use it as a supplement to national broadcasts. To the extent that transnational news broadcasting becomes routinely more important, national television journalism will have to change its form and content. It has been suggested, taking CNN as the likely competitor, with news values stressing entertainment, immediacy, and strong emotional and visual stories, that the future role for public service news may be to provide more background and analysis of the news agenda.[55]

It remains an open question how a *European* public service news channel will compete with *national* public service programming. A European news agenda will have to be established as a serious part of the news-consuming habits of European audiences. Without this, we could not meaningfully talk of an enlargement of the public sphere. Euronews targets upper and middle-class younger audiences who have an interest in international affairs, an elite market sector already served in some measure by the press.

Whatever the failures to date, the attempt to create some audiovisual framework for achieving a European mode of address seems destined to continue, if the EU does indeed develop further as a form of state organization, whether federal or confederal. To the extent that the integration process is maintained (however contradictorily) there will still be a problem of collective representation to be solved at the European level, and some means of political communication will be necessary. The question of communicating Europeanness will remain on the agenda.

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EUROPE'S EXPANDED COMMUNICATIVE SPACE

The argument would be incomplete if it did not consider the implications of media developments in Central and Eastern Europe. These point to further practical and conceptual difficulties for the construction of a European public sphere and an overarching cultural identity.

The demise of the blocs has meant that the former divergent processes of supranational integration have been superseded without a single, new framework succeeding them. *Perhaps* the EU will become the centerpiece of a new order, but it will have to deal imaginatively with the difficult question of national and ethnic diversity within its existing boundaries. These complexities can only become much more ramified with further geopolitical extension.

The mediascape of East Central Europe is still highly volatile. However, some quite general issues and dilemmas can be identified which are likely to shape its evolution. These emergent features will also very likely affect the longer-term development of any prospective wider European communicative space.

The most fundamental shift in East Central Europe lies in the wide-scale collapse of a system of Communist Party-state media control and its replacement by postcommunist regimes. This has led to both change and continuity. The change is perhaps most evident in the case of print media, where the end of party-state rule has ushered in the privatization of the press and its large-scale commercialization. In the former Soviet bloc, a lack of domestic capital has led to an influx of foreign capital. Where it has been judged to be profitable, a rapid growth of transnational ownership and control by mainly Western European media corporations has occurred. However, the extent of the penetration of foreign capital has varied significantly, in part determined by the extent to which governments have seen foreign ownership as desirable or as a threat to the national culture.[56] Where the press has been marketized and commercialized there has been a consequent loss of direct political control.[57]

Because of this, the role of the audiovisual media has become even more important to the political classes of the postcommunist regimes—and given the significant collapse of film production in East Central Europe, television has assumed added prominence.[58]

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Here, continuity with the past in modes of control is much more evident, even though there has been a formal shift from party-state controlled broadcasting to a public service model inspired by West European practice. Ironically, just as it is being adopted in the postcommunist states, the very survival of classical public service broadcasting is in question in Western Europe (not least in the case of the once iconic BBC) in an audiovisual environment increasingly reshaped to favor the commercial imperative. Given the weak economic condition of East Central Europe, we may reasonably wonder whether public service goals will survive the fiscal crisis of the state and global media competition.

The new regulatory bodies for radio and television are, in general, directly dependent upon political patronage, and the control of appointments extends to key managerial positions (a practice by no means unknown in several West European countries).[59] The kinds of struggle that may ensue over the political direction of broadcasting were most publicly exemplified in Hungary's media war, in which the presidents of Hungarian Radio and Television were unconstitutionally, and very controversially, ousted by the ruling party for taking public service autonomy too seriously.[60]

For the foreseeable future, however, even where privatization of the audiovisual sector is occurring, television and to a lesser extent radio are seen by East Central European politicians as central to the building of the postcommunist state and the maintenance of the national culture. Once again the profound belief in televisual power and its connection with *national* space is exemplified. The potentially intimate connection between the political uses of audiovisual space and national identity may be aptly illustrated by three cases: the unification of Germany, the collapse of Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia's "velvet divorce."

In Germany there has been a substantial extension of *national* media space via the incorporation of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) into the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). Existing media structures were rapidly dismantled resulting in what some have seen as a media *Anschluss*. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, the East German press was substantially bought up by major West German publishing houses. Although East German broadcasters had begun to generate their own reforms both in programming and structures, there appears to have

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been a conscious intention to extinguish the remnants of East German distinctiveness.[61]

Whereas the German case has involved an extension and relative homogenization of media space, powered by the nation-state principle, the cases of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia are marked by contraction and fragmentation, but still are restructuring according to the selfsame principle.

The postcommunist Czecho-Slovak Federal Republic that emerged in November 1989 inherited a centralist system of broadcasting perceived by Slovak politicians as a tool for the maintenance of the federation. Under nationalist pressure, there was a two step disintegration of federal audiovisual space. First, in March 1991, national broadcasting organizations for the Czech lands and Slovakia were established alongside the federal system. Later, following the parliamentary elections of June 1992, the federal media were dissolved, preceding by a matter of weeks the breakup of the federation.[62]

In the Yugoslav case, the gradual disintegration of the federal system in the mid-1980s led to the development of media nationalism within the republics. Decentralization resulted in the monopolization of the media within each emergent nation-state. Prior to the breakup of the federation, television output in Croatia and Serbia became increasingly indigenous, whereas Slovenia increased its imports from the United States and Western Europe. In 1990, an attempt was made to counter the nationalistic news values in the different republics by setting up YUTEL, a Yugoslav news service produced in Sarajevo. This was rejected or marginalized by the Serbs and Croats as part of the media war between the republics.[63] The nationalization of media proved to be a prelude to the breakup of the Yugoslav state. Subsequently, the outbreak of civil war has led to the mobilization of the media as part of the war effort.[64]

A FINAL WORD

By focusing on the audiovisual media, this essay has explored the contradictory face of a Europe conceived as a single communicative space. One of the most striking features of contemporary European politics is the upsurge of nationalism, or, at the very least, an enhanced concern with the defense of national identities. Alongside this, the transcendent domain of Europeanness (whether imagined

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in terms of cultural identity or as a public sphere) carries little weight when compared with the attractive power of the nation as a communicative community—and overwhelmingly, it would seem, of the nation communicating most intensely with itself.

The need for a European communicative space constituted by means of television, and (to a much lesser extent) the cinema, has been argued for defensively—European cultural identity versus Americanization. The European communicative space is inherently contradictory. The Europeanizing ambition confronts national resistances and to the extent that a common European audiovisual idiom exists, it is actually American. There is little evidence that a quick, technorationalistic fix is available to solve the continental problem of cultural identity. Nor, indeed, should we expect too much of the identity-conferring potential of audiovisual media in a transnational context. Instead, we shall have to look to the longer term sedimentation of routine institutional practices carried across the boundaries of the nation-states of Europe, and to the sense of a common fate that might evolve through such activities as transborder travel, study abroad, and the cultural dimensions of economic exchange.

A viable common culture in Europe will require the active engagement of millions of citizens made aware of their commonality through extensive political democratization. Under those conditions a wider communicative space might actually become meaningful.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

My thanks to Gillian Doyle and Richard Paterson for their willingness to discuss the arguments, and to Nick Pettigrew for his assistance.

ENDNOTES

[1]The present essay relates to themes I have developed over a number of years. For related work, see Philip Schlesinger, *Media, State and Nation: Political Violence and Collective Identities* (London: Sage, 1991), pt. III; "Media, the Political Order and National Identity," *Media, Culture and Society* 13 (3) (1991): 297–308; "'Europeanness'—A New Cultural Battlefield?," *Innovation in Social Science Research* 5 (2) (1992): 11–23; and "Wishful Thinking: Cultural Politics, Media,

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and Collective Identities in Europe," *Journal of Communication* 43 (2) (1993): 6–17.

[2]On this question see James Fentress and Chris Wickham, *Social Memory: New Perspectives on the Past* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992); Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Gérard Namer, *Mémoire et Société* (Paris: Meridiens Klincksieck, 1987); and Tony Judt, "The Past is Another Country: Myth and Memory in Postwar Europe," *Dædalus* 121 (4) (1992): 83–118.

[3]Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London: Hutchinson, 1985).

[4]In what follows, I shall generally continue to make reference to the European Community as this was the pertinent designation for virtually all of the period considered.

[5]György Csepeli, "An Inorganic Nation," *Annales Universitatis Scientiarum Budapestinesis de Rolando Eötvös Nominatae* (Separatum, Sectio Philosophica et Sociologica) 18 (1984): 131–44.

[6]Adam Roberts, "Foreword" to Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), xi.

[7]Commission of the European Communities, *Towards a European Television Policy* (Brussels: CEC, 1984), 10.

[8]Commission of the European Communities, *Television Without Frontiers: Green Paper on the Establishment of the Common Market for Broadcasting, Especially by Satellite and Cable* (COM 84 300 Final) (Brussels: CEC, 1984).

[9]See Richard Paterson, "Introduction: Collective Identity, Television and Europe," in Phillip Drummond, Richard Paterson, and Janet Willis, eds., *National Identity and Europe: The Television Revolution* (London: BFI Publishing, 1993), 1–8.

[10]Cited in Jean-Claude Burgelman and Caroline Pauwels, "Audiovisual Policy and Cultural Identity in Small European States: the Challenge of a Unified Market," *Media, Culture and Society* 14 (2) (1993): 176.

[11]Quotation from "Council Directive of 3 October 1989," *Official Journal of the European Communities* (L 298/23) (17 October 1989). Also see *European Convention on Transfrontier Television,* European Treaty Series No. 132 (Strasbourg: Council of Europe, January 1990). For the broader background see Wolfgang Hoffmann-Riem, "Trends in the Development of Broadcasting Law in Western Europe," *European Journal of Communication* 7 (2) (1992): 147–71.

[12]Jay G. Blumler, ed., *Television and the Public Interest: Vulnerable Values in West European Broadcasting* (London: Sage, 1992); Bernt Stubbe Østergaard, ed., *The Media in Western Europe: The Euromedia Handbook* (London: Sage, 1992); Ronald Pohoryles, Philip Schlesinger, and Ulf Wuggenig, eds., *Media Structures in a Changing Europe* (Vienna: ICCR, 1990).

[13]Dominique Wolton, *La Dernière Utopie: Naissance de l'Europe Démocratique* (Paris: Flammarion, 1993).

[14]Commission of the European Communities, *Study on Pluralism and Concentration in Media: Economic Evaluation* (Brussels: Booz-Allen and Hamilton, 6 February 1992).

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[15]See Alessandro Silj, "Domestic Markets and the European Market," in Alessandro Silj, ed., *The New Television in Europe* (London: John Libbey, 1992), 15–48.

[16]See Marco Mele, "Il mercato europeo dei programmi audiovisivi," in Claus-Dieter Rath, Howard H. Davis, François Garçon, Gianfranco Bettetini, and Aldo Grasso, eds., *Le Televisioni in Europa* (Turin: Edizioni della Fondazione Giovanni Agnelli, 1990), 331–61; "Free and Fair," *Broadcast*, 13 March 1992.

[17]David Gardner, "EC Agreement on Formula to Protect European Culture under Uruguay Round," *Financial Times*, 6/7 November 1993. See also François Godard, "GATT Real," *Television Business International*, November/December 1993, Table 1.

[18]For a pertinent historical account of recurrent difficult relations between Hollywood and British cinema see Margaret Dickinson and Sarah Street, *Cinema and State: The Film Industry and the British Government* 1927–84 (London: BFI Publishing, 1985).

[19]One might note in this regard the French attempt to forge a cultural alliance around the slogan of a "Latin audiovisual space" in the early 1980s. See Armand Mattelart, Xavier Delcourt, and Michèle Mattelart, *International Image Markets: In Search of an Alternative Perspective* (London: Comedia, 1984); and Dominique Wolton, *Éloge du grand public: Une théorie critique de la télévision* (Paris: Flammarion, 1990).

[20]This is a complicated topic and the views of governments and cultural elites have not coincided with the popular cultural consumption patterns in which "Americanness" has been syncretically transformed. See, for instance, Dick Hebdige, "Towards a Cartography of Taste, 1935–1962," in Dick Hebdige, *Hiding in the Light: On Images and Things* (London: Routledge, 1988).

[21]Quoted in John Carvel, "Plea for Europe's Film Industry," *The Guardian*, 14 October 1993.

[22]Silj, "Domestic Markets and the European Market," 16, 37.

[23]For evidence that domestic production dominates the prime-time schedules of most terrestrial broadcasters, see Chris Dziadul, "Ready for Primetime," *Television Business International*, May 1993, 52–61.

[24]Derek Malcolm, "Europe's Lost Picture Show," *The Guardian*, 1 December 1993.

[25]For a discussion of the linguistic question see Josep Gifreu and Maria Corominas, eds., *Construir l'espai Català de comunicació* (Barcelona: Centre d'Investigació de la Comunicació, 1991).

[26]Abram de Swaan, "Notes on the Emerging Global Language System: Regional, National and Supernational," *Media, Culture and Society* 13 (3) (1991): 321.

[27]Abram de Swaan, "The Evolving European Language System: A Theory of Communication," *International Political Science Review* 14 (1993): 245, 250.

[28]For relevant and contrasting discussions, see Josep Gifreu, "Estructura y politica de la comunicación en Cataluña," *Telos: Cuadernos de Comunicación, Cultura y Sociedad* 30 (1992): 54–61; Mike Cormack, "Problems of Minority Language Broadcasting: Gaelic in Scotland," *European Journal of Communication* 8 (1993): 101–17.

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[29]Richard Collins, *Television: Policy and Culture* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990).

[30]Giuseppe Richeri, "TV and New Technology—Satellite and Cable in Europe," in Silj, *The New Television in Europe*, 71–104. Also see "European Satellite Channels: The Full Listing," *Screen Digest*, May 1993, 105–12.

[31]Giuseppe Richeri, *La tv che conta: Televisione come impresa* (Bologna: Baskerville, 1993), 79–80; Commission of the European Communities, *Study on Pluralism and Concentration in Media*, Table 2.9.

[32]See Schlesinger, "Wishful thinking."

[33]This has been explored by Jesús Martín-Barbero, *Communication, Culture and Hegemony: From the Media to Mediations* (London: Sage, 1993).

[34]On the first point see Tamar Liebes and Elihu Katz, *The Export of Meaning: Cross-Cultural Readings of DALLAS* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), and on the second Philip Schlesinger, Rebecca E. Dobash, Russell P. Dobash, and C. Kay Weaver, *Women Viewing Violence* (London: BFI Publishing, 1992). Also see David Morley, *Television, Audiences and Cultural Studies* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992).

[35]It is an open question whether music video distributed across Europe will leave an enduring sense of "Europeanness" among those millions of young people who consume it once they leave the category of consumers of youth culture. The "top ten" still reflect taste structured according to national music markets. Recently, Viva-TV has been launched as a vehicle for German language music and pop culture to rival the Anglo-American dominated MTV. See Miranda Watson, "Rock on Germany," in "Europe Media," *The Guardian*, 13 December 1993. Moreover, the discourses of national identity (and also passionate regionalism and localism) are still actively at play in the field of European sport. See Neil Blain, Raymond Boyle, and Hugh O'Donnell, *Sport and National Identity in the European Media* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993).

[36]Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1989).

[37]See Peter Dahlgren, "Introduction" in Peter Dahlgren and Colin Sparks, eds., *Communication and Citizenship: Journalism and the Public Sphere in the New Media Age* (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), 1–24.

[38]See Commission of the European Communities, *Pluralism and Media Concentration in the Internal Market: An Assessment of the Need for Community Action, Commission Green Paper* (COM 92 480 Final) (Brussels: CEC, 23 December 1992).

[39]For a pioneering contribution see Philip Elliott, "Intellectuals, the 'Information Society' and the Disappearance of the Public Sphere," *Media, Culture and Society* 4 (3) (1982): 243–53. Further elaboration is contained in Paddy Scannell, "Public Service Broadcasting and Modern Public Life," *Media, Culture and Society* 11(2) (1989): 135–66.

[40]Colin Sparks, "The Popular Press and Political Democracy," *Media, Culture and Society* 10 (2) (1988): 209–23. Indeed, it is precisely at the popular end of the market that entertainment and information tend to become indistinguishable.

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[41]For examples of such arguments see Peter Golding and Graham Murdock, "Culture, Communications, and Political Economy," and James Curran, "Mass Media and Democracy: A Reappraisal," in James Curran and Michael Gurevitch, eds., *Mass Media and Society* (London: Edward Arnold, 1991), 15–32 and 82–117. Also see John Keane, *The Media and Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).

[42]Étienne Tassin, "Europe: A Political Community?," in Chantal Mouffe, ed., *Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community* (London and New York: Verso, 1992), 189.

[43]See Schlesinger, "Media, the Political Order and National Identity."

[44]Quoted in Mattelart et al., *International Image Markets*, 14.

[45]David Buchan, "Lights, Camera,—Reaction!," *Financial Times*, 18/19 September 1993.

[46]See *The Film and Television Handbook 1994* (London: British Film Institute, 1993), Table 16.

[47]For an official view see the European Broadcasting Union, "Statement on GATT Negotiations on Audiovisual Services," Geneva, 5 October 1993. For a more developed cultural critique see Jack Ralite, "Le GATT contre la culture: Danger pour la civilisation," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, November 1993, 32. Qualified support for the US position on censorship was offered in the leading article, "Cultural Imperalism," *Financial Times*, 6 October 1993.

[48]"Tighter Times for Film Production," *Screen Digest*, July 1993, 153–60.

[49]For relevant discussions see Mike Featherstone, ed., "Global Culture," *Theory, Culture and Society* 7 (2–3) (1990).

[50]Nicholas Garnham, "The Media and the Public Sphere," in Peter Golding, Graham Murdock, and Philip Schlesinger, eds., *Communicating Politics: Mass Communications and the Political Process* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1986), 52–53.

[51]For relevant considerations on the creation of the Spanish-American states out of administrative origins coupled with print capitalism see Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), chap. 4.

[52]On the "Eurikon" experiment and the short-lived "Europa" service see Richard Collins, "Public Service Broadcasting by Satellite in Europe: Eurikon and Europa," *Screen* 34 (2) (1993): 162–75.

[53]Stig Hjarvard, "Pan-European Television News: Towards a European Public Sphere?," in Drummond et al., eds., *National Identity and Europe*, 90.

[54]At the end of its first operating year, the channel was reaching 11 million viewers by cable and satellite and had received a top-up injection of 20 million French francs from the French government. The initial bankroll was 30 million French francs provided by public broadcasters in eleven countries plus 3 million ECU from the EC. Dominique Jackson, "Franc support," in "Europe Media," *The Guardian*, 6 December 1993, 19.

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[55]Peter Larsen, "More than Just Images: The Whole Picture. News in the Multi-Channel Universe," in Michael Skovmand and Kim Christian Schrøder, eds., *Media Cultures: Reappraising Transnational Media* (London: Routledge, 1992), 121–41. His analysis leaves open another question: what if the BBC is the competitor, where similar news values may already be present? On the impact of CNN on the competitive environment in global television news, see Marco Mele, "CNN ha fatto scuola in Europa," *MIND: Media Industry*, 26 July 1992, 8.

[56]Slavko Splichal, "Media Privatisation and Democratisation in Central-Eastern Europe," *Gazette* 49 (1992): 3–22 and "Post-Socialism and the Media: What Kind of Transition?," in Slavko Splichal and Ildiko Kovats, eds., *Media in Transition: An East-West Dialogue* (Budapest: Research Group for Communication Studies, 1993), 5–32; Karol Jakubowicz, "Equality for the Downtrodden, Freedom for the Free: Changing Perspectives on Social Communication in Central and Eastern Europe," unpublished paper presented to the Conference on the Restructuring of Television in Central and Eastern Europe, University of Westminster, London, 20–23 October 1993.

[57]In Ukraine, where the press has virtually disappeared due to the paper shortage, the centrality of audiovisual communication has become even greater. See Olga Zernetskaya, "Broadcasting Reform in Ukraine: Ukrainian Television in the Context of Political and Economic Changes," unpublished paper presented to the research seminar, Department of Film and Media Studies, University of Stirling, 18 November 1993.

[58]*Screen Digest*, July 1993, 159, reports a 37 percent decrease in film production in countries of the former Soviet bloc in 1992 compared to 1980.

[59]Jakubowicz indicates that Poland is an exception to the rule. Splichal sees parallels and differences with the "Italian model."

[60]See Elemér Hankiss, "The Media War in Hungary," unpublished paper, 1993.

[61]Richard Kilborn, "Towards Utopia—Or Another *Anschluss*? East Germany's Transition to a New Media System," *European Journal of Communication* 8 (1993): 451–70. Maybe *Gleichschaltung* better captures the process described here, although perhaps it has not been quite so complete. For evidence of continuing differences in broadcast journalistic practice see Maryellen Boyle, "Is Leninist Journalism in the Coffin with the Leninist Party? Observations on East German Broadcasting," unpublished paper presented to the Conference on the Restructuring of Television in Central and Eastern Europe, University of Westminster, London, 20–23 October 1993.

[62]See Samuel Brečka, "Transformation of the Slovak Television" and Owen W. Johnson, "Defining Interests: Slovak Broadcasting and its Czechoslovak Inheritance," unpublished papers presented to the Conference on the Restructuring of Television in Central and Eastern Europe, University of Westminster, London, 20–23 October 1993.

[63]See Slavko Splichal, "Media and State-Supported Nationalism in Eastern Europe," *Media Development* 39 (3) (1992): 9–12; Breda Luthar, "Yugoslavia—Many Media Systems in One Country," *Media Development* 38 (3) (1991): 15–16; and "Identity Management and Popular Representation Forms," in Drummond et al., eds., *National Identity and Europe*, 43–50.

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[64]See Sandra Bašić, "Media at War in Former Yugoslavia"; Slavenka Drakulič, "The Totalitarian Mind—True Enemy of Balkan Media"; and Liljana J. Baćević, "Serbia's Media Trapped In Nationalist Aggression," *Media Development* 39 (3) (1992): 12–14, 15–17, and 17–19.

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Fabio Luca Cavazza and Carlo Pelanda

Maastricht: Before, During, After

THE MAASTRICHT TREATY OPENS with the following words: "By this Treaty, the High Contracting Parties establish among themselves a European Union." Later in the text one reads that the Union has been "concluded for an unlimited period."[1] A reading of the Treaty (an exercise that is not to be recommended even to one's worst enemies) raises many questions: Was a European Union (EU) in fact born in Maastricht? If so, how can it be described? Are unions based on technical (as opposed to political) dictates viable? Do we know the final configuration of the Union? Or is Europe still engaged in a journey to an "unknown destination"?[2]

The Treaty on European Union has raised more problems than it has tried to resolve. What is more, the Treaty is at the same time the greatest victory of the so-called "functionalist approach," which for more than four decades has inspired the march toward European integration, and its first defeat on the field. There are connections between what happened before Maastricht, what happened in Maastricht, and what might happen following Maastricht. Before exploring these connections, however, one fact needs to be underlined since it is making the citizens of the Union's nations nervous and uncertain about the future. It is becoming increasingly impossible for the people of Europe to live without a commanding notion of what the Union and Europe can become in the years ahead, a notion of Europe's economic and political role in the contemporary world.

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In the European Council of Copenhagen, held on June 21, 1993, Helmut Kohl said that the European economy shows "tiredness and lack of dynamism." It is not unreasonable to note that the European malaise is a product not only of economic recession but also of the absence of a clearly discernible political design. Is Europe ready to offer itself in exchange for a political and economic design? To put it in the most simple terms, the choice is between the union of policies and the separation of political destinies; between the accommodation of diverse cultures and triumphant nationalities; between far-sighted commonsensical wisdom and self-indulgent pride. Are we to see union or division?

The authors propose to explore the conditions which would allow the first alternative to prevail over the second. Since we have based our views on certain assumptions, it is our duty to declare those assumptions. First, none of the member countries has so far dared to withdraw from the Union, and it is unlikely that such an event will take place in the future. The Union will survive because it is much too useful to all member states; none of them can afford the luxury of irreparably undermining it. Second, the EU can be achieved, provided that common institutions are created that do not entail the fusion of national states in a kind of superstate, be it federal or confederal. Already today, with the Maastricht accords for the European Monetary Union (EMU), the principle of a Europe of variable geometry has been admitted. The authors believe that the nations of Europe will collaborate to construct the Union as long as the Union is based on the principle of asymmetry, and not on the unrealistic assumption of a symmetrical equality of member nations. Third, since the Cold War is over, and no longer holds tens of millions imprisoned, the demonic forces of nationalistic pride are reappearing. This notwithstanding, the authors believe that a fertile and rich political season will soon open up in Europe, characterized by the quest for complementarities between the nation-states and the supranational regime of the principal powers. Fourth, the EU (today a name only) is the potential terrain for the construction of a novel political organism. Since it cannot be a federation or confederation, and not even a free trade zone because of the need to harmonize and direct complex unified markets, it will be a Union difficult to describe, one without clear precedents in history. Fifth, because the history of the last two centuries offers

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few trustworthy points of reference, either for describing the situation Europe and the West are living today or for avoiding the repetition of recent tragic and destructive outcomes, we concede that at the moment the final destination of the "European journey" remains unknown. Still, certain steps in the right direction are being taken; for example, it is now understood that certain destinations are impracticable or impossible. Sixth, if the EU will be "another thing," we do not presume to describe what that "thing" will be. We do not claim the imagination and insight of prophets. However, we are convinced that Europe's task is to construct compatible political architectures—if not common ones—allowing a nonprotectionist market economy (the oxygen which maintains life) to expand, not to lose ground on a global scale. We believe that no one can watch these developments with indifferent detachment, least of all those who live across the Atlantic.

FUNCTIONALISM, OR THE "SPILLOVER" EFFECT (FROM 1950 TO THE EARLY 1960s)

Thirty-five years separate Ernst B. Haas' *The Uniting of Europe* and Bino Olivi's *L'Europa difficile. Storia politica della Comunità Europea,* yet the two authors use essentially the same conceptual instruments for defining the functionalist approach to European integration:[3] Haas speaks of "sector integration" which perfectly matches the Italian expression, "*integrazione settoriale,*" used by Olivi. The functionalists hold, as Olivi says, that "the objective of the European Union (can) be reached only through successive sector integrations," which need to be accompanied by "gradual and partial concessions of sovereignty to new institutions independent of the States."[4] Haas writes that "the spillover effect in sector integration is believed to lead inevitably to full economic unity" and that "it is as inconceivable that this form of cooperation should not result in new patterns of profound interdependence as it is unlikely that the General Common Market can avoid a species of political federalism in order to function as an economic organ."[5] Olivi reinforces this concept when he says that "the sector integrations of some segments of economic and social life will impose a form of political integration, and with these fatally the weakening and even draining away national sovereignties."[6]

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Inspired by Jean Monnet and sustained politically by Robert Schuman, the functionalists won the game. The day of their victory was May 9, 1950 when Robert Schuman proposed the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the first sector and supranational integration.[7] On the foundation stone of the future building of the European Community (EC) is engraved the seal of the early functionalists: in fact, the entire history of the EC, until Maastricht, was marked by a continuity of operative concepts, methods of work, and language.[8]

For the functionalists, European integration is a process of transferring national powers to a supranational entity through measures called for, made necessary in some sense, by economic interests and by the market. Three rules have usually guided this process. First, to maintain the process of constructing the Community, the stages of economic integration must follow each other without interruption. Second, every stage must be concluded with an enrichment of the array of powers available to the Community. Third, no stage must ever be complete and perfect, in order that the next step is made inevitable. Is it possible to create a European internal market without instruments to govern it, such as a common currency and a central bank? Certainly not. Yet, the Single Act did not explicitly call for them, and no one objected.[9] The Single Act, conceived as a partial and imperfect step, was intended to render the next one, symbolized by Maastricht, inevitable.

With the passage of years, paradoxes and flaws inherent in the functionalist approach have become visible, weakening its efficacy, reducing its plausibility. The functionalist approach aimed at uniting Europe by methods entirely dependent on the political benevolence of the Community's member states. The nation-state was being quietly asked for its authority to be peeled off leaf by leaf, like an artichoke; without raising objections, it was expected to allow a gradual, but irreversible, transfer of its specific sovereign prerogatives to the Community. The failure of the European Defense Community (EDC) in 1954, by vote of the French National Assembly, revealed a paradox whose truth was to be confirmed decades later: the closer the moment came when nation-states were called on to transfer to the Community the last powers which bestow legitimacy on their sovereignty, the stronger and more pernicious were the

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pressures to limit, if not to stop outright, a European integration process set in place by a functionalist Community.

There was in the late 1940s a specific historical and political context which allowed the nation-states of the Old World no choice but to accept the perspective of unity. Destroyed by two world wars and mortally threatened by Stalin's imperialism, dominated by the beneficent policies of the United States and fascinated by the success of the American economy on a unified continent, Europe could not hope to withstand the Monnet-Schuman initiative. Though they were weak, frightened, and without any practical alternatives, these nation-states imagined that they would be able to hold on to their ultimate sovereign prerogatives, that they would be allowed to mint money, impose taxes, and organize national armies.

It is probable that the functionalists were always aware of the opposition of Community and national interests, but they had no wish to exacerbate it by outlining, even as a working hypothesis, the political and institutional destination they intended. The functionalists preferred not to alarm the member states and waited patiently, recognizing that the states were effectively imprisoned by their successive delegations of sovereignty, never indicating what new and fatal steps would soon be required.

Only at a certain moment, which was never defined, would the physiognomy of the new entity be wholly revealed. The ship of the functionalists was anchored to a whole set of formulas that seemed to say everything, that in reality said very little—and even that little was shrouded in veils of ambiguity. Implicit in Schuman's formula of a "wider and deeper community" was the operative concept of a community to be created through successive stages. This constituted the birth of the sacramental formula of an "ever closer community." The Maastricht Treaty incorporates this in Paragraph 2 of ARTICLE A: "The Treaty marks a new *stage* in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe." The same paragraph reformulates another principle of the functionalist approach: "decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen."[10] Actually, the functionalist approach never underestimated the importance of creating within the community embryonic institutions which sanctioned the classical division of powers: an executive in Brussels, a legislature in Strasbourg, a judiciary in Luxembourg. In order for this approach not to be exposed to the vagaries

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of democratic life, to electoral results which are by definition unpredictable, the functionalists knew that they had to work in a democratic environment, but that they could not use the institutions of democracy. This was the ultimate flaw in their approach.

At Maastricht, the nation-states prevailed over the Community and Germany prevailed over its partners. In the near future, European affairs will be more deeply influenced by the interests and needs of the nation-states comprising the Union than by the authorities in Brussels. This does not mean that the nineteenth-century European nation-state, like the legendary Phoenix, has risen from its ashes. Rather, it suggests that the conditions dictated by the Community, allowing for a linear, progressive, and cumulative despoiling of the nation-state's authority, have been halted. The principles put into motion by the functionalist approach half a century ago are being explicitly questioned.[11]

Maastricht brought to an end a season when, within the Community, Euro-optimism supplanted Euro-sclerosis as a protagonist. An era in the Community's life has drawn to a close. The functionalists lost more than a battle at Maastricht. Before, the Community was constantly expanding; today it is an instrument obliged to adapt itself to the needs of the nation-state. This explains why, in respect to the EMU, the proviso of opting out was included. Bino Olivi has noted that "it is the first time that such a clause is contained in a law destined to make part of the structural *corpus* of a (communitarian) Treaty."[12] As a result of this and other exceptions, the countries of the Union seem now to be authorized to move sporadically, not to act together and in tandem. An opening was created in Maastricht from which a multitiered, asymmetric Union may emerge.

THE FRANCO-GERMAN DIARCHY AND THE REFURBISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL POWERS (FROM THE EARLY 1960s TO 1989)

Today it is no longer possible to eliminate the possibility that we are indeed witnessing a reconstruction of European politics, but one that is very different from any considered in the immediate postwar years. The suspicion or conviction that in some way the Community may have been a solution for European nation-states anxious to turn it to their own advantage, to resume their own power games, knowing that it was no longer possible to do so on the basis

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of their own national resources, needs at least to be entertained. France and Germany were the first to intuit this rather banal truth. At the end of the 1950s, de Gaulle's France was weak; wishing to compensate for the loss of its colonies, it had to demonstrate that it was still a Great Power. Germany, "a political dwarf," was with each passing day becoming more of "an economic giant"; it, too, sought to acquire the status of a Great Power. The aspirations of France and Germany conveniently converged in their joint discovery that a Community directed by a Franco-German diarchy would allow them to carry much more weight both on the European and international scene. The potential of the two countries was perfectly complementary, and each had an interest to exploit it through a mutually privileged relationship. Political and strategic primacy would go to France; economic primacy would go to Germany. The French lived with the illusion that its future nuclear arsenal would offer a political counterweight to the deutsche mark; Germany, it was thought, would become the "junior partner."

Such a Franco-German diarchy did not run contrary to the interests of the other Community members, pleased to be part of a system that generated and distributed wealth to all participating states, and in which (until a few years ago) all decisions required a unanimous vote. While France and Germany were in a position to use the Community to strengthen themselves, the Community itself was free to pursue its slow and steady march toward the creation of an integrated market. Thus, other Community members were not excessively alarmed by the Franco-German initiative.

The strong and constant American commitment in Europe goes far to explain why the Franco-German diarchy did not forcefully dominate Europe. Not only did this continuing commitment balance the understanding between Paris and Bonn, but it refereed a political game from which no European country was willing or able to distance itself. Germany, which hosted American soldiers on its soil, had no wish to do so. France, more interested than ever in putting some distance between itself and the United States to underscore its political and strategic aspirations, found the arrangement eminently acceptable. The United Kingdom, after the withdrawal of Charles de Gaulle's veto, and following a season of some anxiety and uncertainty, decided to enter the Community slowly, resuming, this time from within, the ancient and honorable role of balancing

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the alliances, the axes of the countries of continental Europe. Italy, in addition to using the Community and the alliance with the United States as an insurance policy for its own domestic affairs, found it convenient when France and Germany announced initiatives to strengthen the diarchy to seek a dialogue with the United Kingdom. This was very obvious when, for example, an announcement was made that a Franco-German brigade would be created. The United States found faithful interpreters of its European commitment in the United Kingdom and Italy. France and Germany were obliged both by the United States and the Community to sing their duet sotto voce. In this manner, potentially embarrassing situations for those countries that are members both of the Community and of NATO were avoided, and the Franco-German diarchy functioned to perfection.

It is difficult to say with absolute certainty whether the Community was able to carve out for itself a free and autonomous space in relation to the Franco-German axis, or whether the axis was able progressively to impose itself to the point of dominating the Community. The circumstances surrounding the Single Act (aimed at creating by 1992 a European internal market) suggest that the second probably happened.

Launched in 1985, the initiative survived until 1988 without ever striking the popular imagination. In June 1988, Helmut Kohl, at the European Council meeting in Hannover, as if with a touch of magic, transformed an essentially bureaucratic initiative into a political action which immediately captured the public imagination. Nineteen ninety-two became the year of great expectations, the completion of the European revolution. The world asked whether the realization of the internal market—with its free circulation of people and goods, of services and capital—would result in a "Fortress Europe," whether it would create an open space in which economic initiatives could take root without restrictions. What happened in Hannover showed conclusively that the political initiative was not in the hands of the Brussels Community, but remained firmly in the control of its member nations. In 1988 Maastricht was an unforeseeable event; yet, looking at what happened before and after Maastricht, it becomes possible to see the Treaty as an attempt to formalize the Franco-German *union,* to make it the European political *union.* It was an explicit recognition of an implicit bilateral

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pact that for thirty years had served as the Community's true political backbone.

Events such as these have brought under the control of the individual nation-states, and above all the Franco-German diarchy, every major decision relative to the transfers of power to the Community. In the case of the Maastricht Treaty, with its economic and monetary union, conditions were planned and imposed principally by France and Germany, the second more than the first. Indeed, a careful reading of the Maastricht Treaty leads one to the obvious conclusion that it envisages Europe as the deutsche mark's area of influence. It is not an accident that the European Council held in October 1993 decided to establish the new European Monetary Institute in Frankfurt, an arm's length from the Bundesbank's headquarters.

Finally, the inclusion in the 1980s of new countries in the Community—Greece, Portugal, and Spain, following Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom—and the negotiations with the EFTA countries (Nordic Europe plus Austria and Switzerland) were intended to create a larger European economic space, to further European commercial interchange. One must never forget that the flow of goods that fill the rooms, refrigerators, closets, and garages of millions of European homes is more than 60 percent dependent on European interchange—EC plus EFTA. This enlargement, however profitable, has diluted the political potential of the Community. By becoming wider it has not become deeper or closer as Robert Schuman had predicted.

The nation-state is at least as much a protagonist in the process of European integration as the Community. Under certain circumstances, the process must take into account terms set by the states, particularly those known to be stronger than others. The capacities of the individual nation-states have been substantially weakened because, at least for the duration of the Cold War, but even today, the true keys to power were locked up by the Americans.

The nation-state has thus far managed its own political refurbishment by maneuvering within the boundaries of Western Europe's and the Community's domestic playing field. Every now and then, one European leader or another has tried to move beyond these boundaries, but it is doubtful that Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's words could have induced Leonid Brezhnev to change his mind when the

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two met in Warsaw in 1980 following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, or that Giulio Andreotti's errands in the Arab lands convinced Yasser Arafat to change his policies. Then the cold shower of 1989 arrived.

François Mitterrand understood immediately that for France the dismantling of the Berlin Wall could be the beginning of a political disaster. His crisscrossing of Europe was intended to win support for "go-slow" policies. On November 28, 1989, Helmut Kohl presented to the *Bundestag* a three-stage program to unify the two Germanys. Eight days later, in Kiev, François Mitterrand met Mikhail Gorbachev, imagining that the Soviet leader could reassemble the pieces of a vase he had himself broken. It was not to be. Searching always for conditions to revive an axis that Bonn had always needed far less than Paris, Mitterrand was forced to make a virtue of necessity. On December 20, 1989, on an official visit to East Germany to meet Egon Krenz, he abandoned him to his fate, saying only that he had confidence "in the maturity of East and West Germans."[13]

Germany was no less confused than France, but for more compelling reasons. Unification was within reach, and Helmut Kohl understood immediately that the Community was no longer (as it had been in the initial stages of the axis with France) the instrument to compensate for Germany's political weakness. Since Maastricht, the Community, rechristened the Union, has become the vehicle which allows the Chancellor both to consolidate Germany's leadership of Western Europe and to dilute its new power into a larger European framework. France had no choice but to accept the challenge, to follow the German cart, continuing to offer to its partners in the Union its own specific guarantees.

THE MAASTRICHT DAYS: EUROPE'S LEARNING CRISIS (1989–1993)

The power balance in Europe leans strikingly towards Germany. In the past, when challenged by similar imbalances, the nation-states reacted by creating conditions to bring about a reequilibrium. It is doubtful that this can happen again, at least in the ways it once happened. The time when European countries were in a position to carry on their deadly power games has passed forever. There is today a structural economic gap that prevents Germany from being

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reinserted in an equilibrium. It is sufficient to say that the combined French and Italian industrial labor force is not larger than that of Germany. This is one of many circumstances which compel the EU countries, and others in Europe, to congregate around Germany. Even if the dynamism of the German economy "has turned slowly into a static welfare state (which) seriously threatens Germany's capacity to compete effectively in world markets,"[14] its economy maintains a position of unchallengeable relative strength within (and also outside) the EU's compound. A confirmation of this is offered by the monetary events of 1992 and 1993. The adoption in the summer of 1993 of a thirty point range—fifteen points up and fifteen down—within which currencies in the European Monetary System (EMS) are allowed to fluctuate, makes the deutsche mark the base currency for the entire European region. Fears are diminished by the Union's role as a shield for Germany; for its part, the French franc is able to continue to navigate in relatively calm waters, thereby saving the image of France in the world.

The important point, however, is another one. Germany, from the time the axis with France was fractured, cannot but be wholeheartedly in favor of the Union, even at the cost of maintaining only nominally those organizations which belong to the Union genetically, including those foreseen by the Maastricht Treaty.

To be sure, Germany in all this is walking a narrow path. Its deutsche mark can neither be strengthened nor weakened in relation to the economies and the currencies of other Union countries. Its weakening would result in German inflation, would multiply the government's difficulties in mending the "structural weaknesses" of the country's economy, and would impede its efforts to carry through its various initiatives to reconstruct—not only physically and materially—its eastern regions. If, however, the deutsche mark were substantially strengthened, Germany would be unable to export even a pin. Neither possibility is a real option. Even if, in the case of a possible weakening of the deutsche mark, Bonn were willing to accept a modest compromise, both the Bundesbank and the German middle class would create, as they did recently, insurmountable obstacles. When all is said and done, there is no consensus in Germany for initiatives that might challenge even a small part of its national autonomy in matters of monetary politics. Germany's code

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of conduct must coincide with Europe's, and there is no room for alternatives. The Union is the heart of Europe, and Germany is the heart of both. In 1992 and 1993, Europe learned that it cannot afford the luxury of provoking a German heart attack. France learned this lesson better than any other European country; it remains keenly interested in preserving under almost any condition its privileged political relationship with Bonn.

Following 1989, the political options available to Germany grew both in number and quality. They are more numerous than those available to all its Union partners combined. Notwithstanding Germany's present troubles, its economic force is sufficient to guarantee its place at the center of any future European political configuration. Any hypothesis about the future of Europe must acknowledge that.[15] Three hypotheses need to be considered: first, as a result of internal political and social crises triggered by the need to restructure the German economy, but also to treat the complex process of reunification (which is proving to be more difficult than foreseen), Germany will turn inward; second, Germany will manage its new opportunities and political options timidly, indecisively, and will commit a number of fatal errors; third, Germany will move with caution, but with determination, along paths opened up by the new opportunities which lie before it.

Of the three hypotheses, the last appears to be the most probable. The vital interest of a country able to move with a freedom it lacked until a few years ago consists in having a say in shaping the world market, assuring itself of stable competitive advantages. To do this, Germany must acquire a negotiating force, which cannot fail to depend on the construction and availability of an *extended German national market.* This implies the definitive transformation of the Union into the "deutsche mark area," control of Central and Southeast European markets, and, if permitted by a normal evolution of present conditions, the forging of a privileged and strong relationship of economic and political cooperation with Russia. The two principal weapons available to Germany are the internationalization of the deutsche mark, which in turn requires a quick and successful restructuring of Germany's economic and industrial potential, and the consolidation of a form of political hegemony, not as a nation, nor as a people, but as the Union's only Great Power.

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The EU is even more important for Germany today than it was in the past. If, in the past, Germany favored Europe, it must now become formally, unexceptionably — one is tempted to say obsessively—pro-European. It needs the Union to create the essential tools with which to control the gradual process of internationalizing the deutsche mark, fashioning its political hegemony. For its part, the Union must get off the dead-end street on which it has lingered since Maastricht. Brussels was unable to prevent member countries, while they were engaged in ratifying the Maastricht Treaty, from transforming the EMU into a condominium with apartments, already officially reserved, to be occupied in some undetermined future, from reducing the EMU to the level of a purely nominal institution. Brussels is no longer the cat who will decide the fates of the national mice of Europe.

In this context, Germany, as the Union's strongest country, is in a position to favor various and quite different solutions. Germany can act formally as a powerful member of the EU without excessively jeopardizing its own national interests. Germany can play the precious card of a "multitiered" Europe, a card unavailable before Maastricht. One cannot eliminate the possibility that Germany will propose the creation of a Union directory for European political affairs, more or less informal, offering membership to France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Spain. Germany, strongly supported by a Union reorganized along these lines, would acquire the space and flexibility needed to establish bilateral relations with members of the Union and with others, facilitating a trajectory towards a Europe made up of concentric circles, each of which would acquire specialized and reciprocally recognized functions. In a Union of multiple orders the functionalist approach could find new applications, gradually resolving otherwise intractable problems.

Is a Union of multiple orders less acceptable than one of sixteen or eighteen national states which do not move in unison? Can a directory within a multiordered Union, or an overstretched Union lacking a hard core, be in a position to address urgent questions, such as the relationship between the Union and Turkey? What lessons ought to be drawn from the European fiasco in the Yugoslav tragedy? In order to consolidate its European trajectory, Germany would be obliged to compensate somehow for its inherent military and strategic weakness. There is no choice for Germany but to

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remain linked and subordinated to the United States' strategic decisions. In 1993, Germany reduced its military expenses, but not those related to investments for research and development for new generation weapons. In the next ten to fifteen years it will be unable to decide very much in this field, since it does not possess its own adequate military force. It is possible that Germany will not be able, given the precedence it is obliged to give to the restructuring of its economy and to the economic and social issues created by unification, to dispose of a modern and sophisticated national military potential much before the year 2010.

It follows from this that Germany (and all of Europe) will be compelled to entrust its security to the United States and NATO. Yet, it is not unreasonable to think that in what is likely to be a tight and unavoidable cooperation with the only remaining superpower, Germany (and with it, possibly, the Union's directory) may strongly advocate the development of the Western European Union (WEU), as NATO's European pole, endowing it with a minimum of political autonomy. One should not forget that such a solution is favored also by economic and industrial considerations that are difficult to ignore: NATO maintains a division, following strictly national lines, between Europe's defense industries; a strengthened WEU would not only favor, but would be inclined to accelerate transnational integration, almost certainly increasing the rate of modernization and also overall economic and industrial efficiency.

Even if official rhetoric chose not to admit it, during the Cold War Europe lived in a politically maimed condition. The direction of the absolutely indispensable Atlantic Alliance was in American hands. In addition, the Cold War, with its own very specific rules, restricted the exercise of national sovereignties, especially in Europe where the two great nuclear powers were physically contiguous. These are ancient truths, but it is useful to remember them. For all those years (almost half a century, two generations) the European governments and public became habituated to a diet which limited their exercise and understanding of political responsibilities, not to speak of their ability to reach and execute autonomous decisions. In this context, what some have called the *Pax Americana,* Europe could do only what it did—notwithstanding some feeble attempts, like in Suez in 1956, where two nations sought to behave as if they were still World Powers in the pre-1914 golden age—which was to

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integrate itself as a market, to grow economically. It is another question whether it did well or poorly. Why not acknowledge that the United States, always worried about the rise of a menacing competitor across the Atlantic, in reality played the role of prime agent and engine of West European integration? At the very least, America facilitated that integration by ensuring the safety of Europe's frontiers.

With the end of the Cold War, the role of prime agent and engine of European integration can no longer be played by the United States. Today, following Maastricht, economic, monetary, and, above all, political interests dictate a revision of the old relationship. The nature and substance of the American commitment to Europe is changing. Relations between the United States and the EU cannot continue to be managed as if the Cold War was still a reality. Since all the processes of European integration require both a prime agent and an engine, the role discharged by the United States towards Europe passes, inevitably, to Germany. The Europeans have no choice but to change their political diet, reacquiring the habit of assuming responsibility, making and executing decisions, finding their voice, and making it heard.

The European response to what has been learned in these last years cannot but come from the nation-states. They alone must decide if the lessons resulting from these years of crisis can and should be translated into political action. The European nation-states cannot any longer be what they were in the past. They cannot accept what the pessimists keep insisting on, that the end of the Cold War must, in Europe at least, lead to a "new factionalism, to sectarian strife, and violent ethnic particularisms, to skirmishes spilling over border disputes, civil wars and battles of secession"[16]; nor can they accept their own extinction, let alone passively adopt the prescriptions of Brussels. Today, and very probably for the next two or three years, the ball of the EU will be played in the nation-states' court, and not in that of Brussels.

The learning crisis of the Europeans may be synthesized in two challenges: the elaboration of a positive compromise by which the hard nucleus of the Union, possibly its directory, accepts that the internal European market coincides in fact with the extended German national market; and the recognition that Germany is already the only great European Power, and that this position of preemi-

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nence is destined to grow if the restoration of Germany's economy and the process of unification are successful. Recognition of this means laying down an appropriate foundation upon which to build political and security cooperation inside the Union, in close coordination with the American ally. The political leadership of the major European nation-states can easily imagine a Germany without Europe; would all admit that a Europe without Germany would be worth less than nothing? The problem is how to balance the needs of Germany with those of the Union's other members, how to reach an honorable compromise that is accepted by all. In negotiating these objectives, it is impossible to substitute for the nation-states, not least because when (and if) they achieve real union all the nation-states, Germany included, will no longer be what history has taught us to know. They will be quite other things. For the first time, nations, overloaded by centuries of history, have decided to unite, accepting to "dissolve" themselves, or at least to change in ways that cannot today be fully anticipated. As a consequence of a tormented and gradual process aimed at forming a European union, a multitiered, asymmetric, but effective union of countries performing specialized roles, whose final configuration awaits definition, may result. Will this be an adequate answer to the learning crisis of the Europeans? The response depends on many factors, some of which, including the most important, call for fresh analysis.

MORE THAN AN ALLIANCE, LESS THAN A UNION

The final destination of Europe's long journey is in sight. Despite the ambiguity of its text, the Maastricht Treaty, with its functionalist formula of an "ever closer community," puts into motion a political dynamic which has contributed to the clarification of which cards may be played to define, or at least circumscribe, the final destination of Europe. Today, for the first time, Europeans may discard certain destinations which are now recognized to be clearly impossible: for example, the self-annihilation of the individual European nation-states and their fusion into a new European federal superstate. If the authors have not succeeded in finding a single word to define the final destination towards which Europe is moving, a formula, while not being entirely satisfactory, may be offered: The final destination of Europe will be something more

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than an alliance but something less than a union. We are not about to see a United States of Europe.

A careful reading of European polls over the years conveys the distinct impression that Europeans are aware of the usefulness of living in a great, institutionalized European economic space, within which it is possible to work, travel, and sell products without barriers and controls at borders, protected and administered by a homogenous and reciprocally recognized system of sanctions and norms. The majority of Europe's citizens, in our view, see European integration as a unique occasion that allows their respective nations to become greater and more important in the new global arena. The union makes for force; the individual European nations are weak, if left alone, strong, if united. This means that the political design to which the citizens of the states of the Union are ready to subscribe has a particular characteristic: it is a Union based far more on banal utilitarian values than on old-fashioned national values; it is not driven by generous, utopian European impulses. If this is so, then, in time, the Europeans will certainly recognize the need to integrate their resources for a common defense.

If the United States can no longer guarantee the security of the Old World in the absolute terms characteristic of the years of the Cold War, the European states must make other provisions for their defense. This does not imply that the Union will be the decisive body, substituting its views for those of the European states on the day they must decide how to deal with their obsolete nuclear arms. This decision has a certain urgency, given the accords reached in January 1994 by the President of the United States with Ukraine, Belorussia, and Russia on the elimination and/or control of their nuclear warheads.

The more important point, however, to which the attention of readers must be turned, is that no one has ever bothered to ask the European people for their views on what the final destination of Europe should be. In particular, no one has asked them to choose with any sort of precision among the possible final configurations that the process of European integration may require. For example, is it a *strong alliance* between the European nations, with the right of vote and veto, or a real and proper *fusion* of these states, in a Union similar in many respects to the United States, that is desired?

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It is a mistake to imagine that the opinions expressed by Europeans in the referenda held in a few countries of the Union for the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty can be thought to indicate their choices concerning the final destination of Europe. In these votes, the peoples (but also the parliaments) simply voted for or against the idea of Europe, for or against the possibility of a dissolution of the Community, the Union, and foundations as laid down by the Rome Treaty in 1957. It was the life or death of the idea of Europe that was being voted on. That idea has remained alive, but not because of an uncontainable and enthusiastic vote of "yes."

For these reasons, the concerns expressed by public opinion cannot be ignored when the discourse moves to the more vital question, the future of the Union. Examples of resistances to change are numerous: the strong misgivings manifested by the Germans at the prospect of seeing the dilution of the deutsche mark in a European currency; the marked hostility of the British to automatic, uncontrollable mechanisms which would annul certain national prerogatives; the growing dissent of the French and the Italians with respect to European norms that, in liberalizing competition and the market, would limit the intervention of the state in the economy, prohibiting subsidies to public enterprises.

Other factors also feed national resistances to European union because it is a project that denationalizes nations. First, consider language. While it is true that young Europeans are much more multilingual than their parents, the primacy of the "mother tongue" will continue to exist, nourishing the national identities of the various European peoples. There is another and even more concrete factor likely to make itself felt for many years which needs to be reflected on. While the social service state of continental Europe has been shaken by a profound crisis, its funeral has not yet been celebrated. The social service state will continue to offer its own specific guarantees, and these will be offered by the nations, not by the Union. These guarantees will be qualitatively different from one nation to another. An Italian employee will continue to be less socially protected the moment he opts for work in the United Kingdom. A French farmer will enjoy in his country social (and economic) guarantees not to be found elsewhere. A citizen of one of the countries of Northern Europe will encounter enormous prob-

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lems should he or she need to use the health and hospital services of certain countries of Southern Europe. It is this lack of homogeneity that will prevent for years to come the emergence of a real, concrete sense of European citizenship widely shared at a mass level.

More than 99 percent of all Europeans will continue to live in their own national areas. Happy to live in a liberalized internal European market, satisfying their own personal and social interests through the union, their true point of reference will not be Brussels, but rather the ruling classes of their own countries. These European citizens will remain citizens of the nation-states in which they were born. The new Europeans will probably not number more than 1 percent (perhaps not even 0.5 percent) of the entire population of the Union. They will include managers of industrial enterprises or banks, highly qualified technicians, financial analysts, marketing experts, applied science researchers, public administrators, directors of pension funds, and analysts of sociopolitical affairs of one country who will agree to work for the government or enterprises of another country in the Union. In short, they will be men and women who will sell their know-how at a high price, who will be willing to live in or move to any city in the Union. In the coming decade, true European citizens will constitute a small elite who are spread out over a large area and are aware of belonging to a new and quite special social group. The others will remain rooted in their nations, "separate nations" in the foreseeable future. A part of Europe's brain will become European, but its body, including the heart, is likely to remain national for a very long time.

It is in light of these considerations that certain phenomena, visible in the Europe of the early 1990s, must be appreciated. First, the European ruling classes have absorbed the Maastricht-induced shock—the temporary tempests created by the Danish and French referenda—and are once again at work to give life to the Union. They know they are obliged to honor binding pacts, they have no wish to evade the obligations imposed by the Treaty. They know, also, that the internal European market imposes an agenda of harmonization that cannot be halted without the destruction of the market itself. The lesson learned by Europe may be summarized in the following way: European union cannot be the result only of a juridical agreement; it must also be the product of voluntary political action. The majorities in the Union that elect the ruling classes

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required to implement the Maastricht Treaty wish to keep alive certain social and political traditions of a purely national character; they have begun to evaluate the European prospective in very concrete terms, considering personal advantages or disadvantages. They have no wish to exchange the certainties of today for the uncertainties of tomorrow. As long as Europe was spoken of in very general terms, everyone agreed; the agreement grew more tenuous when Europe began to be more precisely defined. There is nothing in this that places in jeopardy the idea of *a strong alliance* among the states of the Union; it does put in crisis, however, the idea of *fusion,* which would require a quick and substantial denationalization of the social institutions of the individual European countries.

The construction of the European edifice will certainly proceed, even if the agenda foreseen by Maastricht is not respected, if parts of the Maastricht Treaty have to be renegotiated. This does not imply that Europe will move towards a union, as understood in the traditional political and historical sense of that word. The European edifice is evolving, and from this travail "something" will come out: something that will be more than a strong alliance, but less than a union. History offers no precedent for what is now happening (and is likely to happen) in Europe. Usually unions (or federations) are born where there is a subject with the political force to act as "federator," to federate others. The "federator," by virtue of its military or economic power, imposes its will. (On occasion, the existence of a common enemy may serve the same function.) Many believe that in Europe today the "federator" is Germany. While Germany has certainly played a crucial and in many respects decisive role in regard to European integration, it is a mistake to see Germany as the "federator" of Europe. The political hegemony of Germany (in part exercised together with France) has not produced in Europe a classic unionist or federalist tendency. Indeed, exactly the opposite is happening in Europe today.

Germany is negotiating the limits of its sovereignty in a condition of absolute parity with the others. While Germany has enjoyed powers of influence and of moral and material suasion greater than that available to other states in the Union, at the end of the day the decisions made by Germany, however difficult and complicated, must win the consent also of Luxembourg and Ireland. Every state in the Union must agree on which parts of their national sovereignty

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they are willing to concede to the new "something" being born in Europe. Under these conditions, it is possible to define the process as one that is both necessary and voluntary. The nation-states are the legitimate proprietors of the sovereign powers which they are asked to renounce, so that they may remain strong and make their voices heard while becoming something quite different from what they were in earlier centuries.

A NARROW AND SLIPPERY PATH

Not only Germany, as we have explained, but also Europe, in the years to come, will be obliged to walk along a narrow and slippery path. The journey towards the final destination will perforce continue, provided that certain conditions, both internal and external, are realized. First, the political systems of the states of the Union must continue to represent a large majority of politically moderate voters, be they of the center Right or the center Left. A deep fragmenting of these political systems must be avoided. The disaggregation of the electorates, towards radical movements of the Right (of a national socialist type) and of the Left (of a populist type) would destroy the Europeanist political code, which to date has witnessed decisive steps taken towards the economic and market integration of the Old World. Moreover, it would open the way to nationalist protectionism.

It will be important in the next few years that the discontinuities in the succession of political leaders and governments not be too great. The new leaders will be required to show the same talent as their predecessors in creating consensus, in holding together the moderate electorate. It can never be forgotten that the parties of the continental European countries are heavy machines, costly and obsolete. From the center to the periphery every stratum of the party has a corresponding level in the administrative organization of the state. This allows the parties to control and/or influence the behavior of offices of the state which allocate large public resources. Being what they are, the European political parties cannot be managed without recourse to public money, thereby relying on the benevolence of the taxpayer. All of the European parties (in a more or less obvious, more or less morally indecent fashion) have become crossroads, where public and private, legitimate and illegitimate

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financial resources intersect. The European political parties are today shaken by a credibility crisis; it is probable that in the coming years not a few of today's European leaders will have vanished, their places taken by others. It is important that this passage not be accompanied by fractures in the political culture.

Second, the European economic and social fabric must continue to produce (or at least maintain an inherent and substantial credibility with regard to its capacity to produce) a "great middle class" oriented towards "political optimism." This process must not be subject to abrupt breaks or tragic interruptions. The cohesion of the social majority, formed by a prosperous middle class, unfrightened by the temporary weakening of the social state constructed in recent decades, must be relied on to bring to completion Europe's integration. All of this is banal, but true. The question, then, is whether the social-economic fabric, together with the middle class that is its unique product, will be hit by a generational change soon, and whether both will be able to maintain politically moderate orientations.

Third, how and when is the profound economic crisis that presently afflicts Europe likely to be overcome? We can be reasonably certain that after the current period of recession the European economy will rebound to higher levels, exhibiting less discouraging rates of growth. Still, we cannot ignore the structural characteristics of the 1992–1993 European economic crisis, which distinguish it from all preceding crises. Will the economic recovery succeed in absorbing unemployment, particularly among the youth? Will the resources generated by economic recovery be distributed fairly within the larger countries of the Union, and, especially as regards Germany and Italy, will they reach every area of their respective national territories and be equitably distributed among different social groups?

It is crucial that the very special character of the European economic crisis of the early 1990s be understood. The major European manufacturing industries have not been able to adapt themselves to the new rules of international competition. The principal European states are today heavily indebted, and it has become impossible for them to avail themselves of political measures that can be financed through the creation of further deficits. The crisis of the German economy, aggravated by the need to direct large and unanticipated resources to the reconstruction of its new *Länder,* has

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made attempts to stabilize the economic and monetary situation in Europe more difficult. These crises have generated another: it is impossible to keep alive the welfare state machine in its old form. A diet is called for, one that reforms and augments the efficiency of the system.

There is a genuine fear in much of Europe that to make an exit from the present crisis, Europe will be obliged to reduce its labor force and cut many of the social guarantees of its welfare state.[17] This is made even more difficult by the progressive aging of so much of its population. It is probable that in these conditions of relative weakness of the European political parties and of abnormal functioning of welfare state mechanisms, an eventual economic recovery could be very selective, positively "Darwinian," and not, as in the past, diffused. In contrast to the Americans, the Europeans (like the Japanese) are not accepting of severe social and economic inequalities. The European states (rightly or wrongly) have always sought to avoid a situation that would compel millions to live in conditions of semiemployment, with incomes close to or below the so-called threshold of poverty. The possibility that conditions will develop that will amplify the fears and uncertainties of the middle class, increase their social pessimism, and fuel the mistrust now felt in respect to so many parties of the "political center" cannot be excluded.

The overload of decisions and responsibilities that today weigh on those called to positions of leadership is not likely to diminish. Nor is it likely that the member states of the Union will assign to Brussels the task of assisting them financially, directly or indirectly, to facilitate their escape from the present economic crisis. Brussels, lacking autonomous resources, has nothing to give. Each state is compelled to work out its own economic and social destiny. The major responsibility in the coming years must fall on the national systems.

Precisely because the responsibility for the evolution of the EU remains in the hands of the nation-states, it is imperative that they not become totally absorbed in their own grave domestic problems so as to ignore all their other opportunities. Indeed, the argument can be made that some of their initiatives in favor of the Union may in the end be useful towards maintaining the social cohesion in the

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European middle classes that is the absolutely necessary condition to avoid the collapse of political optimism.

The political challenge before Europe's ruling classes may be defined as follows: to transform the weakness of a purely nominally expedient, adopted *faute de mieux* into a real and substantial political opportunity. At the European Council in Copenhagen in June 1993, Chancellor Kohl, referring to the economic and social crisis of Europe, said that the best political therapy was to give citizens the bare, unvarnished truth: if they learned the truth in very precise terms, this would mobilize their energies.[18] At a time when citizens are all too aware of the internal economic, social, and political crisis that the nation-states are obliged to confront and resolve in perfect solitude, mobilizing their considerable moral and material resources, it is essential to tell them also that work continues on building the new house of the EU and that the present economic crisis has not sapped the foundations of that building. If it is to be a house in which each nation-state (including those of Central and Eastern Europe) will be able to occupy that apartment which best satisfies its own needs, Brussels must abandon the "all or nothing" approach, according to which each country which enters the Union must accept all of the so-called *acquis communautaire* and not simply parts of it. This "all or nothing" approach is mistaken. Must we have a symmetrical Europe, or can we not plan for one that is asymmetrical? Given the very substantial differences between states, their political force and power cannot be made equal by the stroke of a pen.

Juridical formalism declares all states equal and then leaves political force and power under the table to make its own rules. A duty of democracies is to regulate conflicts and state relations in public and open procedures. If this is the context in which we can (and must) enlarge the architecture of the EU, proposals such as that advanced by Douglas Hurd, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, and Nino Andreatta, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Italian Republic, deserve to be listened to. Their proposal allows the countries of Central Europe to associate themselves with the Union even if only some of the pillars of the Maastricht Treaty are accepted. The EU must be allowed to develop according to realistic principles of a political culture of asymmetry, the ad hoc rules of variable geometry. In this way, the politically weak and

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essentially nominal solutions of the EMU type could be seen by public opinion as a stage in a realistic political process. This process would be directed at accommodating within the EU nation-states which are neither ready nor prepared to submerge themselves in a European federal superstate. It is an approach which would be equally valid for present and future members of the Union.

The search for complementarities should also be translated into concrete political innovations, possibly having a high symbolic value, to be realized in as short a time as possible. One of these could involve the common defense. The European Council should elect a president for the security of Europe who would have visibility, be given full powers to act in clearly defined emergencies, including intervention in conflicts dangerous to the security of Europe, international policing, or "peacekeeping" under the aegis of the United Nations or the Atlantic Alliance. It is a way to create an exquisitely European power, a power derived not from occasional decisions, that would become visible in emergencies, that would oblige Europe's defense ministers to accelerate the preparation of integrated European military structures to be used in such cases. By the same token, the search for complementarities between sovereign states and the supranational regime should, in other fields, include relations between the EU and the United States. The Uruguay Round, for example, having resulted in a happy end, could be used to advance a Euro-American decision to institute supranational courts of justice to resolve commercial disputes between enterprises operating on both sides of the Atlantic.

Michael Mertes, writing on what would be "the glue that will keep — or could keep — the German nation together," said that "the answer depends on whether the Germans will be able to develop a calm patriotism based not only on their indivisible history (not excluding its darkest chapters), their common cultural traditions, but also, and most importantly, on shared democratic values, civic responsibility for their own *respublica,* an active sense of solidarity and togetherness." He went on to say, ". . .this is the 'true challenge of normality,' a condition neither Germany nor Europe has known for the greater part of the twentieth century."[19] If in the next few years Europeans, as well as Germans, face their problems with sentiments of "calm patriotism," one of the most difficult stages of the journey towards the final destination of Europe will be

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accomplished. The nation-states of Europe, to become European states, must understand the situations, political, social, and economic, in which they find themselves.

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ENDNOTES

[1]ARTICLE A and ARTICLE Q, respectively. Council of European Communities, *Treaty on European Union* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1992), 7, 139.

[2]Andrew Shonfield, *Europe: Journey into an Unknown Destination* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1973).

[3]Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe* (London: Stevens & Sons, 1958). Bino Olivi, *L'Europa difficile. Storia politica della Comunità Europea* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1993). Incidentally, Olivi does not mention Haas' book in his bibliography.

[4]Olivi, *L'Europa difficile*, 27.

[5]Haas, *The Uniting of Europe*, 454.

[6]Olivi, *L'Europa difficile*, 27.

[7]There are some oft-quoted key passages in Schuman's speech which describe the approach set shared by the functionalist school of thought: "Europe will not be made at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity. . . .In this way there will be realised simply and speedily that fusion of interests which is indispensable to the establishment of a common economic system; it may be the leaven from which may grow a wider and deeper community between countries long opposed to one another by sanguinary divisions. . . .By pooling basic production and by instituting a new higher authority. . .this proposal will lead to the realization of the first concrete foundation of a European federation indispensable to the preservation of peace." *Keesing's Contemporary Archives,* 10701ff.

[8]On 19 March 1951, the day in which the Treaty of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was signed in Paris, Jean Monnet, who had been named President of the ECSC, defined the objectives of the newly born Community, among them the "creation of a single market of 150 million consumers." Thirty-four years later, in 1985, the white book prepared by the Community, which identified the physical, technical, and fiscal frontiers to be removed by 1992 to create the European internal market, opens with an expression of the very same goal: to bring about the unity of a market of 320 million consumers. In the meantime, the member countries of the Community had increased from six to twelve.

[9]Livre Blanc à l'intention du Conseil Européen, *L'achèvement du marché intérieur* (Luxembourg: Commission des Communautés Européennes, 1985), 4.

[10]*Treaty on European Union,* Paragraph 2, ART. A.

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[11]Ralf Dahrendorf writes: "...one must hope that the disuniting process (of Europe) will not go too far...the best way to stop it would be to encourage initiatives which abandon the Monnet method of achieving the ultimate objective through the back door (i.e., political union by economic integration)....If we want a political Europe we have to create a political Europe rather than hope that economic convergence will force the politicians' hands. Alas! The time may not be ripe for such initiatives." Ralf Dahrendorf, *The Dahrendorf Letter* (Milan: Globalità, February 1993), 3.

[12]Olivi, *L'Europa difficile,* 377.

[13]Ibid., 331–33.

[14]Kurt J. Lauk, "Germany at the Crossroads: On the Efficiency of the German Economy," *Dædalus* 123 (1) (Winter 1994): 59.

[15]Kurt J. Lauk, after having indicated the two challenges that confront Germany, says that the first challenge "requires that comparable living conditions and equal opportunities be afforded all who today live in Germany"; the second "requires that Germany pay close attention to its economic productivity, understanding that it is the only way for the country to maintain its prosperity, to be able to compete internationally." Emphasis is placed above all on the urgent necessity that the country reformulate and renovate its own *Ordnungspolitik,* that is, "the (domestic) financial, legal, social...framework in which industrial and commercial firms operate...(and which)...company directors and workers are expected to adhere to." In fact, "the once effective values—autonomy and entrepreneurial creativity, set forth and made legal by the Federal Republic—threaten to be suffocated through excessive tutelage and overregulation." Ibid., 57, 59. In brief, Lauk seems to support the view that, while nothing is lost, Germany must urgently get rid of a Nessus' tunic that threatens to poison the once Herculean strength of its economy. In another analysis, Konrad Seitz, the German Ambassador to Italy, expresses the conviction that German industry as a whole is too absent "from the five new key industries" on which the industrial revolution, begun in the 1980s, rests: the information industry, genetic engineering, new materials, solar energy, and aerospace technology. According to Seitz, since traditional German products "face the increasingly acute competition of the newly industrialized countries of Asia, Latin America, and, soon, of Eastern Europe," Germany has "only one strategy which might lead to success...(that is, to) move simple products and activities to low-wages countries, and keep the sophisticated ones....German industry has launched the process of renewal which, under the ruthless challenge of the Japanese, American industry experienced in the '80s. And just as was the case with American industry, German industry will emerge slimmer and more efficient." Konrad Seitz, "Germania, le radici del declino," *Il Sole 24 Ore,* 25 May 1993.

[16]John J. Mearsheimer, "Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War," *The Atlantic* 266 (2) (August 1990): 35–50.

[17]In Copenhagen, at the European Council held on 21 June 1993, an authoritative source acknowledged that in Germany 10, if not 15, percent of those who receive unemployment compensation do so without having a right to it. One can only imagine what happens in other, less stringent nation-states of the Union! We wish to thank a European diplomat who made the minutes of the Copenhagen European Council, referred to as *The Copenhagen Minutes,* available to us.

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[18]*The Copenhagen Minutes.*

[19]Michael Mertes, "Germany's Social and Political Culture: Change Through Consensus?," *Dædalus* 123 (1) (Winter 1994): 23.

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Hans-Peter Schwarz

Germany's National and European Interests

A COUNTRY WITHOUT NATIONAL INTERESTS?

ARE PRESENT-DAY GERMANS WILLING to use the category of "national interest" in determining their foreign policy, or do they reject the idea entirely? Until recently the term was rarely heard when German politicians and the "chattering classes" gathered to discuss their country's foreign policy options and short and long-range goals. While the phrase has now become more common, real change will be slow in coming.

The reasons for this noticeable restraint are well-known. They have their origin in the country's recent and less recent past, going back to the founding of the German Empire in 1870–1871. If Germans made any attempt at all to define their foreign policy goals and options, the memory of the years from 1870 to the debacle of 1945 tended to make them avoid any use of the word "national." It seemed uncomfortably reminiscent of "nationalistic," "National Socialist," and the Nazi dictatorship. After the catastrophe of the Third Reich, Germans underwent a reeducation process and have spent decades trying to establish themselves as good democrats; they shun nationalism as vigorously as born-again Christians shun sinners.

More recently, Germans have had to deal with the realization that for forty years they have lived in a partitioned state. What does "national interest" consist of when a nation is divided? Of West Germany's interests alone? This would have meant abandoning the nation as a whole. Of the interests of both parts of Germany at all times? This would have given West German foreign policy a revisionist tone, implying unwillingness to accept the reality of a divided

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Europe and dissatisfaction with West Germany's status as a nation. This would have placed the strength of Germany's ties to Western democracies in doubt. The West Germans were thus tempted for a long time to define what was in the "national interest" solely in terms of the western part of their divided country, but they did so with a bad conscience. People cannot endure a psychologically ambiguous situation for decades, however, and in the late 1970s the "point of no return" appeared to have been reached. It looked as if Germans had finally accepted the partition of their country that had been forced upon them and that seemed to suit their neighbors so well: The "provisional" Federal Republic was now a permanent fixture.

Reservations, however, mainly about the validity, under international law, of the treaties signed with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) between 1970 and 1972, remained in some quarters. Such reservations—expressed at the time by political groups, chiefly the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), unwilling to abandon their memories and hopes (perhaps very distant) of common nationhood—would prove highly significant in 1990. In the intervening years, members of these political groups shied away from pursuing a foreign policy that served the "interests" of the Federal Republic alone. However, groups that attached a high priority to détente with the East (the majority of the Social Democratic Party [SPD] and the Free Democratic Party [FDP], and, of course, the Greens) feared that appearing revisionist on the "German question" could jeopardize not merely the status quo but also peace in Europe. They might conceivably have applied the concept of "national interest" to the Federal Republic alone, except that they tended to reject "national" categories altogether, preferring to express their goals in idealistic and humanitarian terms. It is hard (or impossible) to reconcile the sober calculation of self-interest required to formulate a "national" foreign policy with such lofty aims as universal human rights, racial tolerance, aid to the Third World, global ecology policies, and world peace.

The decades of partition were further complicated by the fact that, of all the major Powers in Western Europe, West Germany was the most active in the pursuit of European integration. Like so many utopias, the "United States of Europe" was distant and vaguely defined, but highly appealing. It is difficult to say whether

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Adenauer ever believed that such a federation was achievable in practical terms, but he did affirm the idea of Europe as a means of overcoming Germany's disastrous traditions of Great Power politics and atavistic nationalism. After some time he was joined by the FDP, and in the end the SPD adopted this line as well. By the early 1970s all the major German parties espoused a European policy calling for "increasing integration" as laid down in the Treaties of Rome.

Germans naturally remained vague — and certainly divided—about just what the ultimate goals of European integration were. But it was possible to avoid fighting over what the final stages would look like by concentrating on the *process* and declaring each step in it to be "irreversible." This, too, led to conspicuous avoidance of the term "national interest" when politicians in Bonn set about defining foreign policy. Not all of them professed themselves so radically pro-Europe as Oskar Lafontaine, premier of Saarland and the SPD's candidate for chancellor, who used the occasion of the first meeting of the *Bundestag* after reunification on October 4, 1990 to announce that the "new state" was merely "a transitional stage since we intend for it to be absorbed in a United States of Europe."[1] Nonetheless, during the 1970s and 1980s many Germans thought along similar lines.

Germany's past to about 1990 reflects a number of reasons why its politicians would approach the concept of "national interest" with much more caution than would its fellow members in the European Union (EU) or NATO.[2] Yet further reasons for Germany's hesitancy can be found in the still more recent past, in the events surrounding and following reunification.

In 1989, German politicians and the public alike became aware of the deep suspicion with which the governments of England and France —the other two Great Powers of Europe —regarded the emergence of a giant next door, with its population of 80 million and its powerful economy. The attitude of these governments ran directly counter to the guarantees they had provided in the "Deutschland Vertrag" of 1954, and it was not representative of public opinion in their countries, where many people had supported the East German protest movement and believed Germans had a legitimate right to self-determination. But the attempts of the French and British leaders to slow or halt the rush toward unification did

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not go unnoticed. In her memoirs, former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has documented her efforts to forge a Franco-British axis in the winter and spring of 1989–1990 "to curb German power."[3] President Mitterrand decided to pursue the same goal with a different strategy, namely by placing the deutsche mark under European controls. From the German point of view this was an imposition and hardly the way to treat friends. But Mitterrand's tactics succeeded, at least until the European Monetary System (EMS) was shaken by the crises of 1992 and 1993.

To all appearances the German government accepted the Maastricht Treaty as a quid pro quo arrangement by which it could attain the assent of the two most powerful nations in Western Europe to German reunification. Anxious politicians in Bonn debated whether it would actually be in Germany's own interests to acquire a semi-dominant position of economic superiority. Was not the combination of demographic strength and economic clout likely to trigger reflex responses of extremely dangerous anti-German sentiment? This could not be avoided, unless at the moment of reunification Germany also voluntarily surrendered its most powerful economic tool, namely control over its own currency. The statistics speak for themselves: Compared to Germany's 80.3 million inhabitants, Italy, the next largest country in the EU, has only 57.6 million. Great Britain follows with 57.5 million, and France comes next with 56.6 million. The figures, however, that concern Germany's neighbors are economic: In 1992, when the country had entered a sharp recession, Germany's exported goods valued more than 429 billion dollars. For Italy the corresponding figure was 180 billion dollars; for Great Britain 190 billion dollars; and for France 235 billion dollars.[4]

At the very moment that Germany was regaining the status of a united nation and major European Power, it decided to limit its own autonomy and to function as a unit of the EU. It goes without saying that the political parties which approved of such a plan were not thinking in terms of a foreign policy dictated by narrow calculations of "national interest." As one of Helmut Kohl's advisers stated, "The *Staatsräson* of a united Germany is its integration in Europe." Germany performed "a symbolic act of profound significance" when it amended ARTICLE 23 of its Basic Law to include commitments to development of the EU and "the realisation of a

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united Europe."[5] By this step the virtual equation of German and European interests (whereby for the time being "Europe" is limited to the member countries of the EU) was anchored in the constitution.

For all the reasons cited, recent German history and experience have made it impossible for Germans to use the concept of "national interest" as unself-consciously as their French and British neighbors. In general, German politicians are very fond of viewing and defining their country's interests in the context of a larger group of friendly nations. For example, NATO was never understood by Germans as an exclusively military alliance, but rather as a community based on the shared values of the "free world." Now that the Cold War has ended and the United Nations has become more capable of action, many Germans (including some government officials) are inclined to let the UN Security Council define "German interests" with regard to trouble spots around the globe. Rather than clarifying "national interests" first and then working to have them adopted by international organizations, the German government has done the reverse. The "oversell" of the Maastricht Treaty at home is yet another example.

GERMANY MUST ARTICULATE ITS INTERESTS IN AN ALTERED POLITICAL CLIMATE

The basic tenor of German foreign policy has been determined in part by a need for harmony, in part by idealism. This policy has begun to encounter objective difficulties. They have arisen primarily as a result of the revolutionary changes that occurred in many European countries between 1989 and 1993. In one particular respect these objective difficulties also have their source within the Federal Republic itself, namely the immense financial burden of reunification.

Since the establishment of reform democracies in the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, it has become objectively impossible to limit Europe to the existing group of EU members. The negotiations with Austria, Sweden, Finland, and Norway prove that the EU will not be able to isolate itself from its neighbors. Such expansion, however, is incompatible with the idea of a homogeneous economic and currency bloc striving

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to achieve a common foreign and defense policy, an idea that was still embodied in the Maastricht Treaty. Most governments of EU countries still insist that the EU can be both broadened and deepened at the same time. But it is impossible to ignore the fact that these are, at least in part, conflicting goals.

Germany is most acutely aware of this as the easternmost country of the EU and a country which exerts a major economic, political, and cultural influence on Eastern and Southeastern Europe; the nations of these regions have particularly high expectations vis-à-vis Germany's role. The German government emphatically denies the existence of an intractable conflict between the stated intention to establish the Union as provided for in the Maastricht Treaty and simultaneously to expand its total population from 340 to approximately 500 million. Nonetheless, informed public opinion in Germany has grown increasingly skeptical and convinced that fundamental choices about the Union's future will have to be made, probably sooner rather than later. There can be no possibility of homogeneity in a greatly expanded Union; Europe will continue to consist of a variety of nations. And, in such a case, Germany will have to stop imagining that its interests can be "European"; it will have no choice but to recognize that it has national interests and to define them as such.

We can recognize today that the European Economic Community (now known as the EU) has reached the limits of a system that while linking countries in an unprecedented manner has retained the principle of national sovereignty. This has been demonstrated by the discussions surrounding the Maastricht referenda in Denmark and France, the ratification process in Great Britain, and also by the palpable resistance expressed in the media and opinion polls in Germany. For the first time the suspicion was openly voiced that governments had created a supranational system behind their citizens' backs, so to speak, and without regard for popular sovereignty. Is it possible to establish a quasi-national state without a corresponding "European citizenship"? Can one delegate quasi-governmental powers to decision-making bodies in Brussels without subjecting them to parliamentary controls?

In fact, because the countries of the EU are democracies, in the long run it will not be possible for governments to continue cooperating without more genuine parliamentary legitimation than is

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provided by the relatively weak European Parliament. But the smaller member states, for understandable reasons, are unwilling to accept true parliamentary representation in the Union, and France and Great Britain are just as reluctant. At the same time, the EU is more than just a community of democratic nations. Its member states are societies with very heterogeneous economic structures. And while it may well be possible to homogenize to some extent their various systems for regulating social welfare, taxes, production of goods, and labor unions (to name only a few), this process will take decades, and will certainly not be achieved within the framework of Maastricht.

One could argue that the predictable failure of the Maastricht approach—ratification notwithstanding—hardly represents a tragedy. European integration suffered no permanent setback from the failure of the European Defense Community in 1954 (an attempt at integration that was both premature and ill-conceived), or from similar reversals. The actual problem should rather be seen in the fact that, even before Maastricht, the limits of political integration had already been reached in many areas. Business groups and ordinary citizens are unwilling to follow the governments and parliamentary majorities of their countries any further; few are keen on establishing a federation. Citizens are growing increasingly hesitant to pursue a policy of gradualism that transfers key government responsibilities to the European level without giving voters the power to hold the decisionmakers accountable. This low level of democratic accountability is built into the structure of the EU, just like the disparate economies, social systems, and cultures of its member states. Their peoples, now thoroughly roused, are determined to keep a more watchful eye on their sovereign rights than before. What choice do Germans have but to accept the fact that their country will not be "absorbed" into Europe after all, as Chancellor Kohl and Lafontaine would have had it!

It has become apparent since the end of the Cold War that the United States is increasingly inclined to turn inward and reduce its military presence in Europe to a minimum. It does not matter whether or not this is labeled "neo-isolationism." What matters is that the United States will no longer be the strongest nuclear power and the second strongest conventional military power in Central Europe, as it was until the Gulf War in 1991.

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The US decision will have repercussions on the relationships between the major Powers in Western Europe. The framework of the Western European Union (WEU)— comprised of Germany, Great Britain, France, the Benelux countries, and Italy— calls for an integrated defense system capable of both deterrence and intervention. It is hard to imagine how this can be achieved effectively, either in the short or long term. It is to be feared that a NATO in which the United States has only a symbolic conventional force left or the replacement of NATO by a European defense community will suffer from the easily foreseeable rivalries among the European Powers, producing among the members more dissension than credible deterrence. A strong American presence would also be indispensable to keep Russia in check (in either a cautiously friendly or more confrontational manner) should it again be tempted to adopt a policy of expansion. Neo-imperialists have nearly succeeded twice in taking over power in Moscow, and the future does not look rosy after the elections in December 1993. If it began to look likely, rather than merely possible, that the Empire was about to stage a comeback, with all the unpredictabilities of an authoritarian regime, then the brief interlude of East-West harmony would be over. But in that case, the EU would be far too weak for the necessary policy of containment, and would remain so for a long time.

The growing instability in the security area is critical for Germany, which—although not a nuclear power—would be urgently needed to defend the new reform democracies in Eastern Europe should they face a military threat. Germany's geographical location gives it a key strategic role, and while France and Great Britain would like to have a voice in security policy on the region east of the Oder, as befits their prestige as major Powers, they would prefer not to take on any major risks. Such a point of view is understandable, and a number of Germans feel the same way. Yet, even if it wants to, Germany will hardly be able to ignore future crises on its own eastern border.

The disintegration of both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia has created zones of varying size where war has either already broken out or could do so at any moment. A number of destabilized nations, both old and new, are looking to the EU for support, including support for their military conflicts. The crises in Croatia

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and Bosnia have given ample proof, however, that no agreement on an EU foreign policy can be reached by the member states. They have even had difficulties in coordinating their individual policies, and the unity that has been achieved often exists solely on paper.

Certainly efforts to increase cooperation are continuing within the frameworks of the EU, NATO, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and the UN, and if a common European foreign policy did not already exist, it would have to be invented immediately. But the conflicts are in many instances so serious and the interests of the various EU member states so contrary that despite all efforts to act in concert, the governments of the major powers will continue to act independently on occasion, either openly or in secret. And, as demonstrated by Greece, this can also hold true for the smaller countries.

It is thus inevitable that, in addition to the official shared foreign policy, countries will define their own "national interest" to reflect public opinion within their borders. The time is past when a German government could present the results of policy negotiations within NATO or the European Community (EC) as identical with German interests, and this now applies to security questions as well.

As the conflicts grow more intense and the cries for help louder, as the streams of refugees and public outrage swell, the German government will be less able to remain impartial. Occasional solo forays will become inevitable, if only because the German public will realize that other governments are also acting unilaterally. No doubt future German governments will continue to seek multilateral agreements before involving themselves in dangerous conflicts, and they would be well advised to do so. But whether they will always succeed, or whether it is always wisest to travel in a large convoy, remains open to doubt.

Similarly, Germany will be compelled to consider its foreign trade interests from the point of view of a rather narrowly defined "national interest." Of course, this has always been done to some extent within the EC, at GATT negotiations, and elsewhere. For a long time, however, approaches based on "hard numbers" encountered political opposition. But now that the country has been hard hit by recession, the predominant view is that structural problems have contributed to it, threatening the ability of German products to remain competitive on world markets.

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This very problem has been debated in England since the 1960s, and if the English case proves anything, it is this: When production costs make their exports too expensive to compete, highly developed countries experiment with various strategies, all of which lead to one form or another of domestic or international controversy. On the domestic front, attempts to curb the power of trade unions and reduce costs in the public sector are accompanied by efforts to increase industrial productivity. Internationally, experience shows that a country will take a tougher negotiating stance on payments to the EC and a variety of other issues within the community, including development policy, multinational technology projects, military expenditures, and arms exports.

None of this means that Germany will follow England's lead immediately, but we can expect that future governments will react to harsher economic conditions by protecting Germany's own interests in the same hard-hearted, penny-pinching spirit as England did under Margaret Thatcher and as France has done for a long time. Germany can no longer indulge in a kind of generous checkbook diplomacy within the EC for the sake of advancing political integration.

Sooner or later the need to keep export levels high may limit Germany's foreign aid and often generous cooperation with international relief organizations. The same need may also lead to a rise in Germany's exports of high-quality defense materials, which have been quite modest compared to France, England, and even the United States. Needless to say, the debate in Germany about the wisdom of linking the deutsche mark to Europe will not be long in coming. Even though implementation of the Maastricht Treaty looks exceedingly unlikely for the near future, it will certainly be argued that to protect German industry implementation ought to be postponed indefinitely. In the same connection, it is possible that Germany's relationship with the new reform democracies in Eastern Europe could enter a phase of discord, if the policy now based largely on political cooperation is replaced by the same economic protectionism as practiced by other EU countries. Is it conceivable, for example, that German trade unions would accept without protest the admission of Poland to the EU, when that would mean opening the German labor market to millions of skilled Polish workers?

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A set of domestic issues that will almost certainly lead to a shift in Germany's priorities in dealing with its partner nations deserves mention. These issues are the severe economic and social disruptions arising from reunification. Although many foreign observers feared that a reunified Germany might emerge as a brash and swaggering economic giant, exactly the opposite has occurred. Reunification has noticeably reduced the country's financial and foreign trade options, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

The federal government is transferring approximately DM 150 billion per year to the new German states[6] (out of a total proposed budget of DM 478.4 billion for 1994). The size of these sums already makes it appear doubtful that Germany would be able to make the sizable payments called for in the Maastricht Treaty to help poorer EU countries that wish to join the currency union. German voters will certainly reject any sizable increase in German contributions to the EU, since the funds going to Europe would obviously have to be taken from other sources, such as the budgets for improving the infrastructure and stimulating the economy in the new states and domestic social welfare programs. The proposed budget for social programs in 1994 was DM 122 billion, one-quarter of the total budget. The same difficulties apply to the payments now being made to Russia and other Eastern European republics. Although their necessity has often been stressed, it is unclear how such payments can be continued in light of the existing federal debt. It looks as if the demands of domestic politics will definitely bring "the era of good feelings" (as a period of US-Latin American relations was once called) to a close.

Germany drew on international capital markets to finance its transfer payments to the new states; as critics have frequently noted, this contributed to climbing interest rates in Europe, and thus also to the collapse of the EMS in 1992 and 1993. This demonstrated the extent to which some of Bonn's most cherished EU projects have suffered as a result of the burdens imposed by reunification. We will inevitably see this repeated in the future.

The observations sketched above point to one quite simple conclusion. In the future, Germany will find itself compelled, on objective grounds, to make its foreign policy, and also its European policy, more self-centered, more tightly budgeted, and less flexible

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than it has been, all in the service of a rather narrowly defined national interest. I wish to stress, however, that this will not occur because Germans have lapsed into old nationalistic habits, much less the kind of tribal nationalism now raging in the Balkans, Russia, and many of the republics of the former Soviet Union. Certainly Germany, too, has its hard-line right-wing nationalists, whose antiforeign sentiment was fueled in some measure by the irresponsibly lenient policy on asylum seekers maintained for years by the German government. But such nationalist extremists can be found today in every West European country. They are annoying and often outrageous, but they remain a small minority.

The more serious problems will continue to be the objective constraints that I have described here arising from changes in the international system and the cost of German reunification. A political establishment that prided itself on its international outlook and "postnational and European" ideology is now coming to the painful realization that both at home and abroad such attitudes will no longer work.

Germany's foreign policy orientation will have to be clarified and coolly defined, primarily in terms of the country's security and economic interests. Whatever the decisions that are reached, all the options pose their own difficulties and risks. A clearer and more precise definition of German interests does not mean giving up established confederations or paralyzing them with intransigent demands. But it will call for a different language, and less fuzzy thinking in formulating programs, in addition to a tougher and more alert stance on negotiations. First and foremost, however, Germany must clarify what kind of Europe is in its own best interest, how its future security should be organized, and what policy to adopt toward Eastern Europe.

WHOSE EUROPE: DELORS' OR THATCHER'S?

What kind of Europe should Germany strive to attain? All aspects of international relations are extremely complex, but if there were another word to describe even greater complexity, it would have to be reserved for the creation and continuation of the EU. Nevertheless, rivaling concepts of the evolution of the EU are under discussion, and Margaret Thatcher's memoirs, published last year, offered

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a highly compact sketch of the two basic options for German policy toward Europe.

Mrs. Thatcher describes "two competing visions of Europe," and these may justifiably be characterized as "Delors' Europe" and "Thatcher's Europe." Delors' vision of Europe, to which the German government has been fully committed until now, developed increasing tendencies "towards statism and centralism" in the late 1980s. In retrospect, Thatcher believes that "a coalition of Socialist and Christian Democratic governments in France, Spain, Italy, and Germany forced the pace of integration,"[7] whereby the EC Commission forced the pace of integration on the governments. In 1988, when Jacques Delors was serving as the Commission's president, he proclaimed that within ten years "80 percent of economic legislation, perhaps even of tax and social legislation" would come from Brussels.[8]

Thatcher's picture of Delors' Europe is intentionally painted in dark colors, but is nonetheless accurate; in her view the Commission under Delors was "ambitious for power" and showed "an inclination towards bureaucratic rather than market solutions to economic problems." The leadership in the governments supporting Delors displayed "an un-British combination of high-flown rhetoric and pork-barrel politics." The charm of Delors' Europe for the poorer countries in the South lay in the payoff they could expect for supporting the currency union. In Northern Europe, businesses "hoped to foist their own high costs onto their competitors" in the South, who until then had been able to produce goods more cheaply. The Socialists hoped to see greater scope for state intervention; the Christian Democrats supported Delors because their political traditions were "firmly corporatist." It transpired that the supposed federalists were actually the isolationists, "clinging grimly to a half-Europe when Europe as a whole was being liberated."[9]

Thatcher's own "vision" of Europe (if the term "visionary" applies at all to her narrow English perspective) was a "*Europe des patries,*" a community of "open trade, light regulation, and freely cooperating sovereign nation-states." Currency policy was to be independent, and the EC would be decidedly open in its dealings with outsiders. She deplored the fact that it was England alone, supported by the Dutch, who endeavored "to raise the flag of national sovereignty, free trade, and free enterprise," while France,

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with Germany in its wake, had already adopted a statist, technocratic, Social Democratic policy, all protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.[10]

The statement that Germany is faced with two different options regarding Europe needs some qualification: Bonn's parties (both in the government and in the opposition) have in fact opted more or less unconditionally for the French version. To some extent this seemed to be dictated by the quasi-mystical reconciliation that has taken place between the French and German peoples since the war. But the French vision of Europe would not have been accepted with such alacrity in Germany if Britain had not first abstained from participating in the process of European integration, then tried to hinder it, and finally irritated its partners after joining through its hesitancy and Margaret Thatcher's petty, penny-pinching tactics. A member of an international federation that acts in a demonstratively self-centered manner will not find many takers for its proposals, even if they happen to be objectively more reasonable.

Now that the governments of most EU countries have realized there is no particular advantage to be gained for their own economy from further centralization, the British view will probably win adherents in more places, including Germany. The new developments mentioned above made it evident that a model in which democracies surrender some of their autonomy but remain sovereign states is more realistic than a union striving for more centralization, unwilling to make the leap to a single federal state. In this more realistic model, a chief task of each government will be to calculate which functions it should delegate to Brussels and which it should retain for itself. Without retaining key powers it runs the risks of undermining its national sovereignty and sustaining unacceptable damage to its own economy.

Nonetheless, it would be incorrect to call the British model (or whatever modified version of it emerges) "renationalization." Both the Delors and Thatcher models differ significantly from the political system of Europe before World War I and II. One can no longer speak of national autonomy or Great Power saber rattling in Western Europe today. Warnings of the sort uttered now and again by President Mitterrand, that a departure from the Delors model might endanger peace in Europe, can be dismissed as fearmongering. What would the consequences be if France were to lose Germany's

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support for its statist model of integration? While France would not be relegated to the sidelines of the EU, it would certainly lose its current place at the very center. But such is the course of world events; sometimes nations must accept unfavorable developments.

It is conceivable that conditions within the EU will lead in greater measure than before to the forming of "coalitions" determined by national interests. On careful examination, of course, the elaborate system that reached decisions through the European Council and councils of ministers has always resembled a subtle system of checks and balances, in which coalitions formed in certain issue areas and then dissolved again. Only the French-German axis, often joined by Spain and Italy, has proven to be something of a permanent "alliance," but it, too, is nothing more than a coalition within the EU. It thus seems possible that new realities will demand more variable coalitions, in which England and Germany will have to demonstrate greater flexibility than they did at the height of the Delors era.

NATO OR THE WEU?

According to official announcements, the coexistence of the WEU and NATO has been achieved for the time being: at the NATO summits of 1991 and 1994 in Rome and Brussels, and in the Petersberg Declaration of the WEU. NATO will continue to represent the vital core of the integrated military organization, while the NATO Council will handle the political coordination of military measures. Yet optimists who believe that this resolution of the problem will be permanent are probably mistaken. In the final analysis, Germany will have to decide whether it is better served by a broadly based North Atlantic system of defense such as has existed up to now, or by a West European system in which the United States no longer plays a central role.

France has been pushing for the latter for years, arguing that the EU must develop its own foreign and defense policies and that sooner or later isolationist tendencies in the United States are bound to prevail in any case. It is essential that a West European defense organization be ready to step in and fill the gap. In this view, NATO would serve primarily as a fall-back organization for acute crises, and otherwise as an institutional link between West European and US defense policies. Such a concept is gaining in popularity in

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the United States; it matches the Americans' desire to reduce their engagement in Europe.[11]

The problems, however, posed by an EU defense community are considerable. To begin with, it can only be a long-range goal. If the Europeans were to try to push ahead with it too quickly, the Americans, who will still be needed for a long time to come, would become outsiders, thereby speeding up the pace of their withdrawal. From the point of view of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, NATO loses its attractiveness without the full participation of the United States. Finland and Sweden, on the other hand, which desire to join the EU, will not benefit much from the WEU, while the Americans fear that the links between the WEU and NATO might indirectly impose additional obligations to guarantee the security of those two countries. Furthermore, neither France nor Great Britain favors a common defense policy in the WEU, since both would prefer to keep open their options for independent action. England in particular hopes that in a crisis it would be able to reactivate its "special partnership" with the United States. Still other problems remain unsolved concerning those countries that belong, or wish to belong, to only one of the two organizations.

Apart from these knotty issues, there are, from the German point of view, two more major arguments against making the WEU the long-term defense organization of the EU: *1)* The security situation in Europe has broken down twice in this century because the United States did not want to involve itself until the last possible moment. US military presence in Europe, on the other hand, has led to the maintaining of democratic governments and peace, and in the end to the collapse of the Soviet empire. *2)* Without the United States as a strong "balancer," a West European defense community—were it ever to be granted real powers—would be divided and paralyzed by petty jealousies and maneuverings for position.

Thus far, the German government has struggled, successfully, to steer a middle course between the United States and France, between NATO and the WEU. But how long can it continue? Germany's "national interests" in the narrower sense suggest that it would be best to continue on its present course. But if it should become necessary to choose, a reformed NATO looks like the preferable option for Germany, with a multilateral defense and forces for

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collective intervention. Such a reformed NATO would be mainly responsible for long-term planning and political coordination of ad hoc troop deployments; it would also continue to develop integrated staffs and military infrastructures. In this case, the WEU would be structured as a fall-back organization in the event that the United States reduced its commitments to NATO or refused to meet legitimate West European expectations.

Of course, the NATO option is based on the assumption that the United States would be willing to maintain a strong military presence in Europe. Since the end of the Bush administration, however, German political groups with an Atlantic orientation have been finding it difficult to get a hearing from high-level American officials. If the WEU concept were to win out—and the possibility exists that it might—then the danger of German "renationalization" is greater than in the present system. It is difficult to imagine that Germany, a key European, but nonnuclear, power, would allow its security policy to be dictated for an indefinite period by France and England, countries with weaker economies and weaker positions vis-à-vis Russia. In such a case, developments could take an unpredictable turn, one of which might be German self-isolation based on legalistic and cryptopacifist attitudes. In the middle term, the threat of self-isolation comes not from neo-Wilhelminian arrogance but from pacifist weakness.

A major psychological problem in current German security policy is represented by the political left wing, usually only sluggishly active on defense policy matters but otherwise influential in the party system and the media. These leftists, affiliated mainly with the SPD and the Greens but also clearly recognizable within the governing coalition, would only be prepared to accept collective defense planning within the framework of NATO. But they no longer accept the Atlantic Alliance as an instrument for developing political consensus, and they are thoroughly opposed to deployment of NATO forces outside NATO countries. They prefer to treat peacekeeping in other areas as a political and diplomatic problem best left to international organizations such as the EU, the UN, or the CSCE, which should limit themselves to diplomatic activities. With its political parties at an impasse, Germany is thus moving toward greater isolation in Europe, while at the same time complicating or even hindering a genuine reform of Western secu-

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rity systems. We are likely to see an increase of these tendencies in Bonn next fall, no matter who wins the 1994 elections, be it a "grand coalition" of the CDU and SPD, an SPD-Greens coalition (with or without the FDP), or a weakened continuation of the present CDU/CSU-FDP government.

As long as this domestic political impasse prevents a reorganization of alliances, all plans to reform NATO or to integrate it with the WEU will have to be put on hold. The strongest member of the European alliance has only a limited ability to act. A foreign policy based on Germany's "national interests" would thus have to see a continuation of the present multilateral security policy as one of its main goals, even under altered conditions. Cryptopacifism and neo-isolationism are counterproductive for Germany, and only strengthen the existing tendencies toward "renationalization." For the present, however, they are facts of life.

Ironically, it is the German Left, which sincerely opposes "renationalization" of the Atlantic Alliance, that is currently fueling the growth of such tendencies. The moderates are groping for a path through the fog that for the moment envelops both the WEU and NATO. There is no sign yet of a right wing committed to a pro-Atlantic policy. German rightists, full of illusions, have once again discovered the East. But there, too, the view seems to offer nothing but insoluble problems.

THE CHAOTIC REGIONS OF THE EAST

It will take at least one or two generations to rebuild the regions that the Communists left in ruins, in both material and human terms. Stable structures will not be available immediately, and in the meantime internal politics and international relations there are based on what Jacob Burckhardt, the great skeptic of the late nineteenth century, has called "the internal fermentation of the nations putting an end to all security."[12]

Long-range foreign policy strategies are impossible in dealing with regions as unstable as Russia, Ukraine, the smaller countries in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), or the Balkans. The driver can go only as fast as the curves in the road allow. Since 1990 the Western Powers, including Germany, have pursued a policy of trying to build up good relations with all the new nations

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between the Oder and Vladivostok, Riga and Skopje, Kiev and Eriwan, supporting reform groups at least symbolically. Through the CSCE, the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NAAC), and numerous bilateral efforts, they strove to promote peace, tolerance, and humanitarian goals. The Federal Republic has proceeded on the principle that, to the extent that positive influence can be exerted, efforts must be multilateral and coordinated by the Western democracies. From time to time both the Chancellor and the German Foreign Minister have appealed to other members of the EC, the United States, and Japan, and some positive results have been achieved. Experience has shown, however, that some independent actions on the part of single nations were and are inevitable, as a result of widely diverging interests. One need only consider the economic picture.

Germany is currently responsible for 55 percent of all payments by the G-24 nations to the CIS; the total amount of loans, humanitarian aid, and direct investment by the private sector is estimated at approximately DM 80 billion.[13] The proportionally large German contribution can be explained as the result of a policy determined in many respects by national interest. The withdrawal of Russian troops from the former East Germany by mid-1994 has been a high priority; to this end, payments, as provided for by the treaties of 1991, of approximately DM 12 billion have been made. The considerable costs incurred as a result of restructuring the debt were an inevitable consequence of previous commitments made by both the public and private sectors. Occasionally there has been keen interest in boosting exports to Eastern Europe as a way to help struggling enterprises in the new German states. Many investments in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary have been based on calculations of profit for German industries, and the same applies to new private investment in the Russian market. It need not be stressed that Germany, with its geographical location and traditional trading activity in Eastern Europe, takes a greater economic interest in this part of the world than does France, England, Italy, or the United States. If anything, this tendency is likely to increase. From the point of view of the reform democracies, Germany is the logical trading partner. In 1991, for example, approximately one-third of all their foreign trade with the industrialized nations of the West was with Germany.

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On the other hand, it should be noted that Germany's foreign trade relations with Eastern Europe have altered fundamentally since the period between the wars. Today, German exporters regard Western Europe as their most important market: In 1992, 54.4 percent of German exports went to EU countries, 17.1 percent to other countries in Western Europe (particularly those in the European Free Trade Association [EFTA]), and about 6.4 percent to the United States. This amounts to approximately 78 percent of all exports, in a country where the export of goods and services makes up approximately one-third of the GNP. By contrast, exports to all the new Eastern "reform democracies," including Russia, made up approximately 5.6 percent of total German exports. The most important trading partners with more or less balanced export/import percentages are France (13 percent, 12 percent), Italy (9.3 percent, 9.6 percent), the Netherlands (8.3 percent, 9.2 percent), Great Britain (7.7 percent, 6.8 percent), Belgium and Luxembourg (7.4 percent, 7 percent), Austria (6 percent, 4.4 percent), and Switzerland (5.3 percent, 4 percent). These rank far ahead of Russia (1.7 percent, 1.7 percent), Poland (1.2 percent, 1.3 percent), and the Czech Republic (1.2 percent, 1.1 percent).[14]

A look at direct investments reveals the same picture. Approximately one-half of the total German investment abroad in 1991 was in EC member states: DM 19.1 billion in Belgium, DM 22.8 billion in France, DM 19.2 billion in Great Britain, DM 12.9 billion in Ireland, DM 13.9 billion in Italy, DM 8.6 billion in Luxembourg, DM 16.2 billion in the Netherlands, and DM 14.7 billion in Spain. Direct investments in Austria in 1991 amounted to DM 9.4 billion and in Switzerland to DM 12.3 billion. Approximately one-quarter of the total investment by German corporations (DM 59 billion) was in the United States.[15]

Compared with this, the level of investment in the East was ridiculously low. According to figures published by the Bundesbank, DM 1.2 billion was invested in Eastern Europe in 1991. In 1990 and 1991, Germany made DM 27.5 billion available. This situation improved for the neighboring countries of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary between 1992 and 1993, mainly because of the relatively low wages there. Since the end of the communist regime in the Czech Republic, for example, approximately DM 800 million has been invested.[16]

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These figures indicate that the economic importance of the Eastern reform democracies for Germany will increase significantly in the middle and long term, but the primacy of Western markets will remain. Predications are frequently heard that changing economic interests will shift German orientation toward Central or even Eastern Europe, but in my view the figures cited above show this to be an illusion. If reorientation toward any part of the world economy is called for, then it will be toward the growing markets of the Far East.

Germany's primary interest in its neighbors to the East is not so much economic as it is political: Its aim is to support developments toward stability. Some idealistic considerations certainly come into play here. Democracy and a free-market economy are seen as fundamental positive values, and demands for self-determination are viewed sympathetically. (This explains the German pressure for prompt recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.) Genocide against ethic groups is sharply condemned. (This explains German aid to Bosnia and the strongly anti-Serb attitude prevailing in the German media and public.) At the official level, however, stability remains Bonn's chief goal.

Should destabilization in Russia lead to a renewal of expansionist policies or revanchist foreign policy, we would be in for a second round of the Cold War in altered circumstances. We would be faced once again with a threat to peace and climbing defense budgets. There would be fears for the fate of the reform democracies in the Baltic states, in Poland, and in the Balkans, and fears of further streams of refugees like those already created by the war in Bosnia.

Germany views the possibility of political or economic destabilization in other members of the CIS and its neighboring reform democracies with similar concern. As a result of Germany's geographical position, upheaval in Eastern and Southeastern Europe affects it sooner and more severely than other countries. (It is correspondingly more inclined to help; since the wars in the former Yugoslavia began, Germany has taken in approximately 400,000 refugees from that region.) Concerns about political stability also constituted the prime motive behind German Defense Minister Rühe's proposals at the end of 1993 to allow Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia to join NATO without delay.

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Clearly, Germany has a strong, specifically national interest in the stabilization of the East. Nonetheless it is determined to coordinate its East European policy with its partners in the West. In the long run, the security of the reform democracies as a "stability zone" can be guaranteed only by an agreement of the present NATO countries or by expanding NATO to include them. Similarly, a progressive linking of the reform democracies with the EU can be achieved only through multilateral efforts. Therefore, although Germany has a far greater interest in these regions than do its partners in the EU or the United States, it will take no unilateral initiatives. On the other hand, the last few years have demonstrated clearly that in many instances the simultaneous coexistence of multilateral and unilateral Eastern policies cannot be avoided. Sometimes unilateral steps can benefit the Western communities, as when Germany negotiated asylum treaties with its neighbor states to the east and southeast; sometimes they can be harmful, as the disintegration of Western policy toward Yugoslavia has shown.

An increase in solo forays by single nations cannot be excluded, given the rapidity with which situations can change. Time-consuming consultations are often not possible. "National interests" as defined by government and broad currents of public opinion will no doubt continue to make themselves felt when, as in the case of Yugoslavia, the nature of the crisis demands intervention in the form of an embargo, air strikes, or UN peacekeeping missions. The volatility of the situation in Russia and its neighboring countries suggests that the flounderings of the EU and NATO to develop a policy on Bosnia might be only a hint of things to come.

In a certain respect one could compare the position of reunified Germany to that of the United States after World War II. Although not directly threatened at that time, the United States regarded the creation of stability on its facing coast in Western Europe as one of its most urgent tasks. In Germany today powerful isolationist forces exist who argue against involvement and intervention on historical, moral, constitutional, and budgetary grounds. But Germany's true "national interests" lie in stabilizing its surroundings. In the case of the Visegrád Group nations, moral arguments also exist for involvement, as well as a shared Middle European culture and history. The German situation bears a further resemblance to that of the United States after World War II: while stabilizing efforts must take place

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in close cooperation with other Western democracies, they must be designed to deter Russian retaliation rather than to provoke it.

GERMAN NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS

The previous observations have all been based on the premise that reunified Germany is a "postmodern" nation. "Postmodern" in this case means that it has been purged of the most virulent characteristics of nineteenth and early twentieth-century nationalism: cultivation of historical myths and old hatreds, folk ideology, a tribal mentality, and religious intolerance. We are currently witnessing an outbreak of such fanatic nationalism in the Balkans and the territories of the former Soviet Union. In contrast to this, reunified Germany bases its idea of nationhood primarily on popular sovereignty and a sense of shared history, language, and culture. Germans also see themselves as citizens of an industrial democracy cooperating and competing with other industrial democracies, with all the ideological shadings and antitheses characteristic of a pluralistic society. A national consciousness of this sort no longer understands the nation in terms of an absolute value, recognizing that postmodern nation-states can thrive and prosper only when they surrender parts of their autonomy to regional bodies. If the emerging nation-state of the modern period was characterized by a striving for autonomy, the postmodern nation-state is focused on establishing cooperative international communities. These are essential for successful functioning, but within them the nation retains its sovereignty.

In this respect, Germany has become a normal Western democracy. German national consciousness is comparatively matter-of-fact and postmodern to that of the French, British, Dutch, or Italians. Admittedly it is somewhat more complicated, as there is the history of imposed partition and preceding nationalist catastrophes to be dealt with. But on closer inspection every country in Europe represents a special case with its own complicated and sometimes burdensome history. What is crucial, however, is that in none of these countries is national identity elevated to mythological status. The last West European leader to attempt this was General de Gaulle. But even that phase of French history has now been over for twenty-five years, and France, too, has long since become an ordinary postmodern

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state. In this respect, Western Europe could not differ more strikingly from Eastern and Southeastern Europe.

Observers recognize, however, that Germans find it harder to come to terms with their nationality than do citizens of other West European countries. The reasons lie in the historical events discussed at the beginning of this essay. This also makes the rational definition of "national interests" more problematic than in the case of Germany's large and small neighboring states. "National interest," which always implies the existence of other nations, starts out as a thoroughly rational concept: the analysis of one's own interests and the probable reactions of one's partners demands dispassionate and level-headed thinking. Interests are a utilitarian category, and the more utilitarian the approach governments take toward achieving them the better.

Yet, it is also true that emotional components, such as pride, group identity, feelings of safety and security, and memories of national triumphs and defeats, enter into citizens' perceptions of themselves as a nation. Sometimes antipathies and hatred of other nations, and occasionally self-hatred, play a role. Wherever disturbances in the emotional dimension exist, rational analyses of self-interest will be more difficult.

So soon after reunification, Germans naturally still have difficulty reaching a rational and confident definition of their own "national interests." Yet this should be regarded as a transitional stage. The more normally this reunited country is treated by its partners in the EU, the better able its citizens and political leaders will be to reconcile Germany's interests with those of its partners, in a normal and intelligent fashion.[17]

Translated by
Deborah Lucas Schneider

ENDNOTES

[1]Oskar Lafontaine, *Texte zur Deutschlandpolitik* III (86) (1990): 774.

[2]The British, for example, even today proclaim "national interest" to be the guiding principle of their foreign policy without the slightest trace of embarrassment.

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[3]Margaret Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years* (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), 760.

[4]Figures taken from the *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1993* (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 1993).

[5]As quoted by Timothy Garton Ash, *In Europe's Name: Germany and the Divided Continent* (New York: Random House, 1993), 385.

[6]Presse-und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung, *Aktuelle Beiträge für Wirtschafts-und Finanzpolitik*, 13 July 1993, 18.

[7]Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, 536.

[8]Cited according to "The European Community: Back to the Drawing Board," in the supplement "A Survey of the European Community," *The Economist*, 3 July 1993, 5.

[9]Thatcher, *The Downing Street Years*, 727–28.

[10]Ibid., 536.

[11]Uwe Nerlich, "Sicherheitsfunktionen der NATO," *Europa Archiv* 48 (23) (1993): 664 – 65.

[12]Jacob Burckhardt to Friedrich von Preen in a letter of 21 February 1878 in *Briefe* 6 (Basel and Stuttgart: Schwabe & Co. Verlag, 1966), 230.

[13]These statistics are taken from an address given by Helmut Werner, Chairman of Mercedes-Benz AG, to the US study group of the "Atlantic Bridge" on 14 October 1993, Bonn.

[14]These statistics are taken from the *Fischer Weltalmanach 1994* (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1994), 1038 –39. No major shifts took place in 1993. According to a report by the German Bundesbank of October 1993, the export volume for the month of February 1992 (after seasonal adjustment) was 26.4 billion dollars to EC countries, 3.6 billion dollars to the United States, and 3.5 billion dollars to Central and East European reform countries. This represents a certain rise against the 1991 figures, which is hardly surprising: The period of upheaval is over in Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and the economic picture is beginning to recover.

[15]These statistics are taken from the monthly report of the German Bundesbank of July 1992.

[16]*Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 20 November 1993, 12.

[17]A more elaborate study of the theme of German national interest will be published in a forthcoming monograph, Hans-Peter Schwarz, *Der traumatisierte Riese. Vom geteilten Land zur Zentralmacht Europas* (Berlin: Siedler Verlag, 1994).

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The prestige of the members of parliament has fallen precipitously since they no longer have to resist an autocratic principality and are enjoying a career that is almost without risks. To the public they seem to be dispensable: a constitutional state and a functioning government are already insured by good organization and efficient development of the political apparatus.

The organization of parliamentarianism, originally created for political problems, is not suited to deal with the penetration of economic and social problems into the concerns of government. Lawmaking has extended its boundaries considerably. It embraces almost all areas of social existence and it makes too great demands on the abilities of the members of parliament, both technically and temporally. The results are extended periods of session and necessary specialization. The participating citizen is replaced by the professional politician, who himself becomes a bureaucrat, a functionary, without having the experience and the specialized training of the state official.

Karl Dietrich Bracher

From "Problems of Parliamentary Democracy in Europe"
Dædalus 93 (1) (Winter 1964)

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Luigi Campiglio

Europe on the Mark: Ready to Go?

INTRODUCTION

LIKE AN ATHLETE WHO AFTER MANY YEARS of hard training is now set for the race and waits only for the starting signal, so the European economy, while achieving great success, has yet to deliver the full force of its promise. Europe, like the athlete, remains on the mark; everything is in place, but he cannot move off. The reasons are numerous and complex; they need to be disentangled. The process of full integration of the European market is blocked, in great part because it is so difficult to reach an agreement on how to share its costs.

The only way out of the impasse is through an upsurge of economic efficiency, opening Europe fully to the rest of the world. The schedule planned in the Maastricht Treaty is blocked because European markets are today diverging rather than converging. High and persistent unemployment is disrupting the economic and social network. Suffering the consequences of a generational imbalance, coupled with a demographic decline, the net result for Europe is a huge waste of human resources; it is in no condition to compete effectively with the United States and Japan.

Indeed, Europe is the real loser in the economic battle between Japan and the United States. The United States will, in the end, maintain its world leadership principally because it allows a greater inflow of men and resources from the rest of the world. By comparison, Europe's stubborn policy of keeping the real interest rate higher than the real growth rate is causing devastating damage, and Europe is increasingly playing the role of an old aristocrat wishing to consume much more than he produces. The fall of the Berlin

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Wall has caused a dramatic shift in the economic and social landscape: to cope with these changes, it is necessary for Europe to undertake sweeping reforms, rethinking the role of its welfare state, reforming its political processes, and allowing for a generalized flexibility of which labor flexibility is only one part.

THE EUROPEAN UNION: PAVING THE WAY FOR A PUBLIC GOOD

Building and completing a common market for the European Union (EU) means paving the way for a public good, partly material but principally nonmaterial. A market is a social and technical network with a critical mass, from which everyone is in a position to benefit. The number and strength of the connections between any two economic agents represent the opportunities for exchange; they define the extent of the market. In practice, the technical network is related mainly to the distribution of information and is made up of communication infrastructures, from roads to E-mail. Broadly speaking, the social network is related to cultural connection, and is composed of two main elements: language and trust. These infrastructures typically have a high level of fixed costs; only under very special circumstances will private agents incur the expense of providing them. Given pervasive externalities and the high transaction cost of making private agreements, the state is usually called on to create a new market and to maintain it.

Not by accident, then, does the recent white paper of the European Union Commission address the problem of unemployment in this framework: it calls for investments in European infrastructures, strengthened mutual cooperation, and greater competition. Indeed, such a policy is mandatory for completing the European market. What a market boils down to is the opportunity to make comparisons, to choose the best alternative from a rich choice set. In this sense, Western Europe is still far away from what is taken for granted daily in the American or Japanese economy. Choice—arbitrage—works well in financial markets; this is why stock markets are emerging so rapidly in countries as different as Turkey and Poland. The crucial problem, however, is that markets for services and commodities remain plagued with too many informational and technical barriers.

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Trying to make others pay for one's own costs is the free rider problem intrinsically associated with the provision of public goods. It is today the major obstacle confronting the EU, plagued with undersized and inefficient markets. The political problem for the EU is the trade-off between those who would be free riders and the others; the greater the number of its members, the greater the risk of free riding. The nation-state is able to overcome the free riding problem with its powers of compulsory taxation. This solution is not available to the EU, which has to cope explicitly with the problem of assessing the willingness of states to pay for the Union; it relies on coordination rather than coercion.

The recurring conflicts between national and European interests are mostly the consequence of a generalized attempt to free ride, such as we witnessed in the case of German unification. A related but more subtle point is typified by the 1992–1993 crisis of the European Monetary System (EMS), with the wild devaluation of the Italian lira being an example of free riding. It has brought about an impressive improvement in the balance of payments with a volume of resource reallocation which would have been difficult, if not impossible, to conceive within the framework of a single currency. The recent currency crisis recalls the importance of achieving strong economic convergence as a prerequisite to European monetary union.

The poor development of markets in Western Europe produces weak competition inside the European Community (EC); this, in turn, paves the way for a weakened standing in international competition, especially with the United States and Japan. Improving competitiveness requires a well-functioning market, in which the state has the leading role. A European market requires cooperation among nation-states; this has proved exceedingly difficult to secure. Multinational companies or agreements between companies of different countries can help trigger the market process, counterbalancing the inefficiency of states, but there is a limit to what they can do.

Cooperation is the core principle of an economy founded on increasing specialization; since Adam Smith the market has represented the invisible hand for creating decentralized and efficient cooperation. In modern societies, however, the efficiency of the invisible hand of the market is related also to the visible hand of state command or of company management. The common charac-

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teristic of all European countries is the major role played by the state in the economy: total government outlays for the four major European countries represented 48 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 1990; it was 36 percent in the United States and 32 percent in Japan. For the EU countries the balance between the invisible and visible hand, or indirect and direct cooperation, leans towards the latter, a mechanism still not well understood. A government seeking direct cooperation may confuse economic behavior by attempting to achieve too many objectives at the same time: the result may be a failure in the coordination of public policy. This is Europe's present situation. In contrast, the invisible hand, working through private interests, has the advantage of pushing the single and well-defined objective of maximizing profits.

In this perspective, the profit motive has a social legitimacy only if it is able to generate a common predictable behavior, on which an economic policy enhancing social welfare can be built. The persistence of economic fluctuations mirrors the unsolved unpredictability of economic behavior. The problem today is that the visible hand of the state is also becoming unpredictable: a case in point is the European welfare system, created to level off the individual uncertainties of life, which is now becoming a social lottery. In trying to combine the best of both worlds— direct and indirect cooperation within each state, together with planned cooperation between states—Europe does not seem to have achieved either. It is time to strike a new balance.

IN SEARCH OF DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY

The main contribution of European integration has been to reduce exchange uncertainty through the establishment of a better property rights regime. As a result, international exchange uncertainty has been removed, allowing European companies to move more freely and export or invest in other European countries with a low risk of international default. It is obvious, though still much debated among economists, that in general a firm will prefer to invest and sell in its own country rather than abroad; the reason, already evident to Adam Smith, is simply that for a given return doing business inside national boundaries is safer. On the other hand, international mobility for labor and capital is the key for increasing efficiency, for

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creating an international market as a public good: this is where well-defined property rights become important. The scope for profitable exchanges widens when a firm is able to conduct its economic activity abroad with the same ease as in its own country; in other words, if the law of a foreign country protects the economic interests of foreign firms as it would its own. Well-defined property rights can, by themselves, represent a major advantage in international trade.[1] Indeed, protectionism, which remains the main obstacle to world trade development, tends to make internal resources unavailable to foreign investors.

The EC, thriving on the benefits of property rights, has had the unintended consequence of nurturing a kind of protected competition, demonstrated by the close relationship between EC integration and the growth of international trade in the form of intra-EC trade. The share of EU exports going to other EU countries went up from about 40 percent in 1960 to around 50 percent in 1972, and remained at this level for more than ten years, regaining its earlier momentum in the second half of the 1980s, reaching 60 percent in 1990.

The increase in intra-EC trade is probably the most compelling rationale behind the effort to achieve monetary union: the problem is that intra-EC trade still shows great disparities between the several EC members. Intra-EC trade, as a share of exports, is the lowest for Denmark and the United Kingdom (50 percent) (they are the countries most reluctant to take further steps toward monetary and political union); it is highest for Belgium, Luxembourg, Ireland, and the Netherlands (all with 74 percent). Intra-EC trade, again as a share of exports, was 62 percent for France, 57 percent for Italy, and 54 percent for Germany in 1988. These large differences may explain why the national interests in pushing for further economic union vary so greatly among the several countries, and why their governments' behaviors are so divergent.

Defining property rights is a key strategy for those Eastern countries seeking to establish a market economy. The problem in Europe, both West and East, is that well-defined property rights are a necessary but not wholly sufficient condition for competitiveness and steady growth. While promoting internal trade, property rights are less effective in international trade, except where they are defined at the world level. In addition, well-defined property rights

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carry substantial enforcement costs and negative externalities in the form of greater litigation. Property rights do not provide built-in incentives to strive for dynamic efficiency; they must be coupled with the competitive pressure of international markets. This is the principal lesson of the privatization experience in Eastern Europe where well-defined property rights seem more relevant in the realm of social justice than in creating economic efficiency.

The search for further economic integration cannot be justified without obvious and tangible economic benefits. For example, the well-known Cecchini Report estimated that the completion of the internal market, starting in 1993, would produce a one-shot benefit of 4.5 to 7 percent of additional growth in GDP and 1.7 to 5 million new jobs.[2] Unfortunately, it did not work out that way; in 1993, Europe was experiencing a severe economic slowdown with a sharp increase in unemployment.

It is not clear what kinds of comparative advantage have driven the increase of intra-EC trade in the past thirty years, with the strong patterns of intraindustry development rather than interindustry trade. In any case, there are good reasons to believe that the benefits of intra-EC trade are almost exhausted; it is time to consider the problem of how to expand the EU to include new countries. Indeed, a clear trade-off is arising between the extent of the EU market and the cost of decision-making between its members.[3] The benefits that followed the entry of Spain into the EC, like the dramatic increase in foreign investments, provide a model of behavior that is thought to be relevant for the future. Applicants for EU membership include Turkey and Morocco (since 1987), Austria (in 1989), and Cyprus and Malta (in 1990). Interest in securing membership has also been formally expressed by Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. However, the process of expanding the EU will become increasingly difficult if it is insisted that no country ought to lose out by the admission of a new member. European countries have not yet succeeded in devising a decision process capable of addressing and resolving internal conflicts; in these circumstances, there is a clear preference for the status quo and a hostility to change and innovation.

The experience of the EC decision-making process has pointed to the power of small interest groups in vetoing decisions for the entire community when their voice is loud enough to be heard at the

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national level: this type of deadlock is perhaps most serious in blocking policies that could interest the great majority. Thus far, the EU has been more a legal than an economic construct; it lacks the economic incentives to compete successfully at the international level while undertaking its ambitious goals of complete unification.

ARE EUROPEAN MARKETS DIVERGING?

In 1991, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries represented 14.6 percent of the world population but accounted for an overwhelming 77 percent of the world GDP. By comparison, the EU represented 6.4 percent of the world population and accounted for 28 percent of the world GDP: inequalities of this magnitude cannot be resolved only on the basis of inherited property rights. It may be argued that Europe deserves more, but the problem remains whether deserts alone, however defined, justify inequality to this extent. Moreover, the European population, declining in relative terms, will in a few years also decline in absolute terms; by the year 2000, the EU population will have shrunk to 5.6 percent of the world population; it will be even more difficult then to claim an unchanged share of the world GDP. While the same may be said for the United States, there is a crucial difference: the United States has always been open to immigrants in a way that Europe never was. While certain scholars are concerned by the increased fragmentation of American society and the new patterns of behavior characteristic of recent immigrants,[4] the more compelling reasons for concern have to do with the changes in American attitudes to new immigrants. These could, in time, lead to a tightening of immigration policy, but an official policy excluding all new immigrants is almost inconceivable. Europe, by contrast, is moving in that direction; without an explicit exclusion policy, it is curtailing the number of immigrants allowed to stay, even temporarily. While some economists are urging Europe to absorb the migration pressure from the East European countries, the real problem is how to implement that policy in the face of increased racism and xenophobia.[5] The proposition that a thriving economy depends on there being an open and multicultural society is not universally accepted. Indeed, few are willing to recognize that Japan will never seriously challenge the United States so long as its borders

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remain closed to foreigners. Similarly, few Europeans accept that the present immigration policies are fraught with danger.

The problem of Europe's declining population, for which immigration could offer a welcome relief, may be fully grasped when one compares birth rates: 1.6 in the EU countries, 1.7 in Japan, and 2.0 in the United States. Only the United States comes close to the rate consistent with a constant population. While all European countries show birth rates well below the constancy level, Italy, Spain, and Germany show the lowest. The principal, but frequently ignored economic advantage of German unification has been to bring together an aging West with a younger East. Unfortunately, the immediate consequence of unification has been an abrupt decline in births in the former German Democratic Republic.

The most compelling force for making a single European market has always been population size; the EU, with its twelve member states, boasts a population of about 345 million, which outpaces the US population, 253 million in 1991, and is almost three times larger than Japan's population, 124 million. However, NAFTA, with its combined population of 363 million, is challenging the EU's population supremacy, forming the largest economic free trade area in the world. According to UN projections, European population, including Eastern Europe, is expected to peak at 519 million in 2005, up from 509 million in 1990, and then will start to decline.[6] In short, the EU market is large but eroding, losing ground in comparison to a steadily growing United States.

Unemployment and the Generational Shock

Unemployment is the biggest and oldest European problem: the cumulative waste of human resources in the last twenty years compares only with the disaster of the Great Depression. European economists and policymakers, challenged by the magnitude of the problem, must recognize that the declining birth rate is a key to understanding the unemployment issue. During the 1970s, all of the industrialized countries experienced a labor force imbalance caused by the pressure of the young entering the labor market in numbers far exceeding those who were retiring. This imbalance was exacerbated by the fact that the young were the "baby boomers"; the old were from a generation that was decimated by World War II. Europe, Japan, and the United States have responded in quite

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different ways to this same imbalance. Europe, characterized by persistently high unemployment since the early 1980s, kept the nominal wage level rigid, thereby protecting the employed at the expense of the unemployed. The United States allowed much more wage flexibility, providing more employment, though the working poor were stretched to the limit. Wage flexibility seemed an acceptable solution if one attached a positive value to having a "regular" job. Japan, with its massive investments, allowed a simultaneous increase both in wages and employment. Europe has clearly chosen the worst alternative in terms of employment. While it is true that the imbalance of the labor market will gradually disappear in the next ten years, so far the waste in human resources has been enormous.

Europe must take steps to reverse this waste, and this is best achieved by investing in education, an area in which the European countries lag far behind both the United States and Japan. The average amount of schooling is 9.8 years in the EU, 12.3 years in the United States, 10.7 years in Japan, and 3.7 years in developing countries. The number graduating from secondary schools is equally disproportionate: 42 percent in the EU, 74 percent in the United States, and 90 percent in Japan.[7] The income gap between the EU and the less developed countries, measured in GNP per capita or as income share, is even wider than that of education. If we take education as a reward principle, the share of world income accruing to Europe is greater than the one deserved.

The lags and shortcomings in Europe with respect to human resources become even more evident in tertiary education at universities, teachers' colleges, and higher professional schools. The tertiary education enrollment ratio is 25 in the EU, 39 in Japan, and 70 in the United States. If we consider an international comparison over the period from 1950 to 1985, the United States has always been the leader in the average number of years of education. The only country approaching the United States is Japan, and the differences between the United States and the United Kingdom, for example, are striking.[8]

The United States' leading role in higher education and in culture more generally is reflected in a surplus of the trade balance with the rest of the world: Hollywood and the most prestigious American universities make a silent but substantial contribution to maintain-

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ing the United States' position as a world leader. But higher education in the United States is becoming too expensive, and, with the high value of the dollar, almost prohibitive for foreigners from certain countries. In addition, the United States is slowly discovering that its private universities are a myth, that they depend heavily on public funding. As the formal divide between public and private universities in the United States becomes increasingly blurred, European universities can seize the initiative and make up for lost time. The competitive edge in the educational and economic marketplace will depend increasingly on the ability to deliver knowledge efficiently. The United States and Japan are still on the whole better equipped to face this challenge.

THE EUROPEAN CASUALTIES OF COMPETITION

Economic convergence is a central focus of both positive and normative economic theory. Convergence among nations is a predicted result of free trade, and is considered highly desirable because it brings about greater international equality, which in turn can be conducive to economic and social order. This was the economic rationale for the Maastricht Treaty, which called for a precise timetable to achieve convergence in the next years. The problem, however, is that new diverging forces have taken over, and the planned schedule of convergence is no longer believed in.

Between 1950 and 1985 it was possible to see a distinct pattern of convergence within the four major European countries (Italy, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom).[9] In Italy, however, a study of the period from 1980 to 1990 shows that convergence seemed to be occurring only until 1985. The inequality between the North and South of Italy, both in GNP and in consumption per capita, has increased steadily.[10] There is good reason to believe that this partly explains the sweeping political changes now occurring in Italy.

In Germany, unification has added a built-in inequality between the regions. And in the United Kingdom, evidence of regional and social inequality became increasingly conspicuous during the 1980s. The upsurge of European unemployment has done much to increase inequality between and within European countries. Unless this pattern is reversed, any effort towards further European integration, as

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required by the Maastricht Treaty, is certain to be jeopardized. When inequality increases in a sluggish economy, losses need to be distributed; this fact is profoundly disruptive in an organization like the EU which has no institutions capable of coping with the internal conflicts of its members.

A pattern of divergence would run counter to the historical evidence of the post-World War II years. While some scholars have pointed out a convergence of per capita income and productivity among the most advanced countries, including those of Europe, there is a distinct possibility that in a world of uncertainty and imperfect information this pattern could be reversed.[11] Also, GNP per capita, by which convergence is measured, does not describe all facets of human life. It is possible to achieve convergence of GNP and divergence of the quality of life. This argument, forcefully advanced by Amartya Sen and empirically confirmed by the Human Development Index, suggests that GNP per capita can be a flawed measure.

The root of the European malaise can be traced back to the abnormal level of real interest rates during the 1980s and 1990s. An estimate of the average long-term interest rate for the most industrialized countries was 2.5 percent in the 1960s, a little less than 1 percent during the last half of the 1970s, over 5 percent in the 1980s, and only slightly below 5 percent in 1991–1992.[12] Because wealth distribution is always much more concentrated than income distribution, a sharp increase in the return on capital assets can, by itself, increase income inequality. As a result, rent income and "rentiers" are more conspicuous in all the major industrialized countries. During the 1980s, capital income, including interest and dividends, increased sharply both in Europe and in the United States. In 1991, for example, it accounted for 17.3 percent of total personal income in the United States, 18.9 percent in Italy. The crucial difference between Europe and the United States is that when, in the first years of the 1990s, interest rates in the United States eased, deflating the financial bubble, real interest rates in Europe remained higher than the rate of growth of the economy. In the world economic landscape of the 1990s, Europe is playing the role of the old aristocrat enjoying opulence amid the destitution of millions of unemployed. The perverse combination of slow or diminished GNP and high real interest rates in Europe is hardly

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compatible with the strong competition required to halt, if not reverse, a pattern of deindustrialization which, especially during the 1980s, has disrupted the manufacturing sectors. In the four major European countries employment in manufacturing fell from about thirty million in the early 1970s to about twenty-three million in the early 1990s. In the United States, employment in manufacturing has hovered around nineteen million for the last twenty years.

While manufacturing employment has been declining steadily in Europe and has remained stable in the United States, it has been steadily increasing in Japan from twelve million in the mid-1960s to fifteen million today. In many ways, especially in respect to durable consumer goods, Japan is now the "factory" for the whole world. Europe seems to be losing what Japan and other Asian countries like Korea and Taiwan are gaining: manufacturing employment in Europe has been decreasing uniformly over this period in all the major European countries. Ultimately, the real economic battle will be between Japan and Europe rather than between the United States and Japan; or, to put it differently, Europe is today the victim of the competition between the United States and Japan. Implementing NAFTA will only further reinforce this tendency.

Similar conditions obtain in respect to output and international trade for high-technology products. Labor productivity convergence in Europe has slowed markedly since 1973.[13] A recent McKinsey study suggests, for example, that Germany's productivity in automobile parts is 24 percent lower than that of the United States, 39 percent lower than that of Japan.[14] Europe is falling behind in its capacity to promote an economic environment conducive to increased efficiency and its ability to select leading competitive industries. Europe needs to regain a sustained pace of growth to encourage the savings and investments needed for a balanced development of the larger Europe.

THE WELFARE STATE PARADOX

The original aim of the welfare state was to bring equality and justice to the market, to provide special protection to the unemployed. The idea was that removing certain of the pains of life's uncertainty would help people cope with the terrors of unemployment. It is no secret that the welfare state has not achieved its

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original goals. Indeed, as the welfare state has developed, the original aims have been lost, some would say that it has in fact contributed to new inequality, unfairness, and most seriously to greater uncertainty. If uncertainty and unpredictability in providing efficient goods and services are increasingly complained of, this is not to say that there are not many good hospitals and doctors providing excellent health care, or teachers providing superior instruction, but one has to be lucky enough to happen across them. To encounter the efficient rather than the inefficient is increasingly a matter of chance.

While there are no systematic studies of the inequality created by the welfare state in Europe, there are abundant signs, however partial, that tend to confirm the paradox of a welfare state that has become, unintentionally, an "illfare" state. The conjectured link between inequality and the welfare state, if confirmed, is crucial for economic growth. Indeed, some recent papers argue that in modern democracies a greater inequality of income and wealth tends to be associated with lower, not higher, rates of economic growth.[15] The explanation is simply that in a democracy the median voter will tend to "correct" excessive inequality, demanding higher tax rates which in turn serve to lower investment and growth. The problem with this explanation is that not all of the potential voters do in fact vote, resulting in what may be called the median-voter paradox: for some unspecified reason, people who would benefit from an income transfer do not vote in its favor. If we wish to disentangle the complex relationship between inequality and growth, the role of public expenditures must be taken into account. A high level of public spending is not always essential for achieving greater economic equality; this is demonstrated in Japan where inequality is substantially less even though the level of government spending (as a share of the GDP) is much lower than in the EU. The inflated welfare state of Europe may produce greater inequality precisely because it only disguises the group conflicts so characteristic of these societies. We often forget that the roots of the modern welfare state need to be traced back to the class conflict of the 1930s; at that time the welfare system was the characteristic response to the social disruption created by mass unemployment. Indeed, the three pillars of the Beveridge Plan in 1944 were protection against unemployment, the provision of universal public health care, and supplemen-

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tary benefits for children. In the 1990s, class conflict has been replaced by group conflict. The Beveridge Plan, like all the others that imitated it, proved successful in diminishing clearly-defined class conflict; it is powerless today in reducing group conflict. The range of group conflict is both disparate and wide: generational conflicts; regional conflicts; conflicts between workers in industries with different rates of productivity, with different exposures to international competition; gender conflicts; racial conflicts. The failure to resolve these new group conflicts shows up frequently as deficits in the public budget: the tax revenues for resolving such conflicts, and thereby achieving a balanced budget, are simply not available. Through evasion or open revolt, as in the Italian case, the powerful political interests resist reform of the welfare system, and only add new charges.

The problem with modern welfare is that it was conceived as an answer to individuals with a shared set of needs, as in the case of the mass unemployment of the 1930s. During the last forty years we have witnessed a growing heterogeneity of needs. Welfare benefits are no longer tailored on individual needs, but on the average of group needs. The heterogeneity of social needs and social groups has transformed the welfare state into a system which benefits interest groups rather than individuals, with a correspondingly increased chance of abuse and corruption.

Three examples may suggest the nature of the problem. Old-age pensions do not reduce overall inequality since they are normally tied to the salary earned before retirement. Moreover, the supplementary pensions provided to certain small social groups, especially by large companies, tend to increase inequality. Inequality is further increased by the wide range of individuals who benefit from more than one pension or a combination of pensions and income. Public expenditures for education are structurally biased against the poor, especially with respect to higher education, where students coming from lower income levels are generally underrepresented. If tuition fees are substantially less than real costs, the well-off are indirectly funded by the poor, even in private universities which benefit significantly from public funding. Finally, public expenditures for health care may give rise to a regressive externality even where a system of universal coverage exists. This may happen if doctors take their

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apprenticeship in the public sector and later practice in the private sector.

The best solution for the distortions produced by a system which emphasizes groups rather than individuals would be a completely decentralized welfare system tailored to individual needs. Unfortunately, this solution is not feasible; it is impossible to collect all the personal information needed to implement it. This means that European governments are obliged to find other solutions, playing down the claims of specific interest groups, focusing on the fundamental and heterogeneous needs of individuals.

VOTING AND THE MANAGEMENT OF DEMOCRACIES

If the European democracies are compared with the United States and Japan, the most striking political difference has to do with the turnout at elections: it is particularly low in the United States (54 percent); low in Japan (68 percent); and medium or high in most of the major European countries—France (70 percent), the United Kingdom (74 percent), Italy (84 percent), West Germany (87 percent), and Belgium (94 percent).[16] This pattern of voting behavior between Europe, Japan, and the United States may also explain the differences in welfare spending and may shed some light on the complex relationship between democracy and public spending.

Analysis of US data shows that nonvoters are concentrated in the lower income brackets. It is arguable whether the votes of nonvoters would make a real political difference, but it is difficult to argue that nonvoters are not represented.[17] Representatives scarcely consider nonvoters among their constituents and make little effort to bring them into the political arena. If ignoring the needs of nonvoters represents a shortcoming of modern democracies, it is because it grants too many privileges to the interests groups who do vote and apply pressure. On the other hand, when nonvoters become active the impact on public finances can be significant, sometimes the source of even larger budget deficits. In fact, there is clear evidence that transfer payments, such as old-age pensions, are directly related to the percentage of voters in those groups. Similarly, other benefits are directly related to the size of the voting population aged sixty-five and older.[18] Representatives, confronting rather well-defined constituencies, understand that a tighter control over public expen-

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diture would require a change in the European political process. This is not easily achieved; the postwar European democracies, once believing in the possibility of accommodating the claims of all social groups, are reluctant to acknowledge that this is in fact impossible. The crisis of the European welfare state boils down to the demands of organized interest groups who use the political parties to take advantage of resources. A feasible solution to the paradox of inequality, exacerbated by the welfare state, would be a marked increase in efficiency together with a more precise targeting of the underprivileged. To tackle the crucial problems of productivity, as Myrdal understood decades ago,[19] the institutions of the welfare state must be revitalized through popular participation and management. In the private sector the customer is generally treated well by the salesperson; a system of labor payment needs to be designed which would give incentives for comparable behavior in the public sector.

COPING EFFICIENTLY WITH SHOCKS

Flexibility is crucial for economic efficiency, particularly where economic systems are required to adapt to a constantly changing environment. What is necessary in normal circumstances becomes essential when shocks clearly require changes in economic policies. An efficient welfare state could smooth out certain inequalities and redistribute sacrifices, thereby allowing for efficiency gains. Because the causes of inequality change with time, the welfare state is required to change accordingly: flexibility ought to be its main attribute. Instead, one of the unintended consequences of the European welfare state has been to transform welfare benefits into vested rights. As a result, the principal problem of the European welfare state is more its rigidity than its size, which is easily translated into rigidity in the marketplace. Damage caused by widespread economic rigidity is not normally felt but shows up when external shocks occur, when the damage caused by the failure to undertake structural transformations becomes apparent.

In the postwar period two major shocks have strained the EC: the first, the oil shock of 1973; the second, German unification in 1990. The contemporary competitive problems plaguing Europe can be traced back to the inefficient responses to each of these

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shocks. Japan responded to the oil shock with an impressive increase in high-technology exports; its share in the world market jumped from 11.6 percent in 1975 to 19.4 percent in 1985. Corresponding figures are 8.4 percent and 7.9 percent for France, 16.8 percent and 16.0 percent for Germany, and 24.5 percent and 24.2 percent for the United States.[20] This pattern confirms the claim that the consequences of America's competition with Japan are felt primarily in Europe. Almost all of the increase in the West European share of total world export since the first oil shock has been due to the increase in intra-European trade. In contrast, Japan has gained market shares worldwide.

The economic disruption caused by German unification paved the way for further imbalances with both the United States and Japan. Its main negative consequence thus far has been the high level of real interest rates, which the Bundesbank transmits to the rest of Europe as a heavy monetary externality: the damage could be irreversible in terms of lost investments, lower growth, and higher unemployment.

Work sharing is presently discussed as an answer to unemployment in Europe but it would, in fact, offer only temporary relief. The key relationship is between employment and productivity: fewer hours of work are socially desirable but only if they imply higher productivity. This goal is not achieved if the reduction in hours produces organizational disruption, greater economic rigidity, or social unrest. Indeed, the case for the reduction of hours again reveals strong divergences between the states of the EU, the United States, and Japan. Japan has the longest work week and the shortest vacations; Europe has the shortest work week and the longest vacations; the United States is closer to Japan than to Europe. Given that Germany is perhaps the country where people work the fewest hours, it is no wonder that German unification is proving so painful. East German workers catching up with Western standards will place a huge financial burden on the whole of Europe, and this is probably an instance where to have more employment, people must be prepared to work more rather than less.

Increasing productivity presupposes greater worker efficiency together with a steadily expanding capital stock. Entrepreneurs and managers carry the social responsibility for keeping productive capital growing, searching always for the best ways to organize

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labor and capital. Stressing the rigidity and privileges of European workers is certainly unfair if one does not consider the equally serious rigidity of European entrepreneurs and managers, their lack of "vision" for new products, processes, and markets. In fact, they have permitted a massive deindustrialization of the Old World, which lies at the root of the principal European problems, compounding the difficulties of confronting and resolving them. Rising public and private debts, combined with high real interest rates, have diverted valued management energies into financial gambling, thereby hindering new innovative investments.

In Europe, the notion of the domestic market has been distorted to mean "captive" market, and the existing rigidity is a consequence of this economic timidity. One tends to forget that in any competitive process the winner is generally the one who makes the fewest mistakes; making the right managerial decision is a form of competitive advantage. In a modern democracy, new institutions need to be devised to cope with the consequences of "rational errors," particularly when the survival of the firm is at stake. Another way of looking at European management rigidity is to consider what is now called the "reengineering of the corporation."[21] What "reengineering" asks is how the current business would be run if it were possible to start again from the beginning, without existing constraints. Reengineering European corporations and public administration would mean that European managers would acknowledge their social responsibilities and be willing to accept a very flexible salary scheme, with significant salary reductions and mobility during periods of recession. Some sort of management flexibility is certainly the key to winning acceptance for greater flexibility among the workers.

CONCLUSION

Europe is today off the track and needs seriously to amend its practices if it is to resume its path to greater unity. *1)* Europe needs a more closely connected market. Large joint projects for new infrastructures, public and private, seem a feasible way to reach a critical mass for the whole community. Such projects would, of course, benefit from lower interest rates. *2)* In order to compete better in international markets, the EU ought to promote a wider

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and more multitiered membership; it has virtually exhausted the potential benefits of intra-European trade. *3)* Europe has so far been the real loser in the competition between the United States and Japan, with high unemployment and increasing divergences being among the more conspicuous results. It would be much better to lower tariff barriers, to face competition directly in order to foster dynamic efficiency. *4)* To compete effectively Europe must save and invest more in machinery and equipment but also in human resources. Europe is lagging behind in all these things, and must agree to work more and give up free riding the rest of the world. *5)* Greater investment would ease many of the European problems that now seem intractable. To further increase investment, Europe has to resume its growth, lowering real interest rates. The problem of "rentiers" must be confronted; lower interest rates and a more effective fiscal policy would do much to change the situation. *6)* With 6.4 percent of the world's population, Europe absorbs 28 percent of the world's GNP, and pressure from the Eastern and developing countries is mounting. Common principles of immigration policy have to be worked out while there is still time. Concurrently, action must be taken to reverse the population decline. *7)* The European welfare state has become a source of social rigidity and, paradoxically, of economic inequality. It is a crucial economic problem, contributing to large public budget deficits, which are disguised evidences of unresolved conflicts between social groups. A new European welfare state must be constructed: flexible and reduced in size, it must serve individuals who become actively involved, and its principal purpose must be to promote the well-being of the underprivileged. *8)* European political decisions tend to be based on unanimity; indeed, complete unanimity is required for the admission of new members to the EU. It is essential that new rules be devised for coping with internal European conflicts, the alternative being to maintain the status quo, to hinder innovation. *9)* European monetary policy should follow rather than precede convergence, the growth of intra-European trade, and the development of common social institutions. A tighter coordination of monetary policies should be pursued to minimize the risk of conflicts. *10)* It is necessary to devise new social institutions to cope with the consequences of external shocks, but also the "rational errors"

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made by managers. Making the right decision is a new form of competitive advantage that Europe has yet to exploit.

ENDNOTES

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One of the striking political and social developments of the postwar period has been the increasing reality of Europe as a unit, as against the assembly of often hostile nations that filled the same place on our maps in the past. Despite occasional stoppages of this trend, such as the rejection of the European Defense Community in 1954, or that of Britain's application to join the Common Market in 1963, western Europe, including Britain, is today more than a geographical concept. But this political fact must not deceive us about the variations within the continent. Even within a single country there are some social differences as large as those between, say, Sweden and Ghana. This is all the more true as we move across the boundaries of nations and languages. It is one of the melancholy shortcomings of any generalizing sociological analysis that it tries to make us believe that living in Palermo is really much the same as living in Bordeaux, in Graz, in Amersfoort, Preston, Göteborg or Darmstadt.

Ralf Dahrendorf

From "Recent Changes in the Class Structure
of European Societies"
Dædalus 93 (1) (Winter 1964)

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Mark Lilla

The Other Velvet Revolution: Continental Liberalism and its Discontents

SEVENTY YEARS HAVE NOW PASSED SINCE the publication of Guido De Ruggiero's *Storia del liberalismo europeo,* the last great history of the European liberal tradition and its national variants. At the time he wrote, De Ruggiero was a disciple of the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce, whose humanistic idealism he admired. Like Croce, De Ruggiero believed that the free human spirit was the inspiration behind political liberalism, which was charged with protecting and cultivating that freedom. He was no doctrinaire. He was willing to admit a great variety of aspirations and institutions within the liberal tent, aware that liberalism's adaptability made it far more harmonious with the dynamism of the modern age than communist or conservative dogma. For De Ruggiero, as for Croce, liberalism was the quintessential form of modern political life because *la storia* had become *la storia della libertà.*

This was in 1924, just as the lights of liberty were flickering out across Europe. De Ruggiero's Italy had recently stumbled through the Libyan farce, World War I, and, only two years earlier, the march of Mussolini's brown-shirted mob on Rome. The French Third Republic was tensely polarized between Left and Right, and Spain's First Republic had just been overthrown by the military. In Germany the situation was utterly desperate. When De Ruggiero's book appeared, hyperinflation was at its peak and Walther Rathenau had recently been murdered; socialist uprisings had already been put down in a number of cities after the war; and the Munich "beer hall putsch" had just taken place. Only in Britain had the postwar pessimism about liberal government failed to affect political institutions.

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De Ruggiero certainly knew that the idea of *la libertà* was out of phase with the movement of *la storia* in the mid-1920s. In fact, his book was less a history of European liberalism than a spirited brief in its defense during those dangerous times. He no doubt found it hard to imagine the whole of Western Europe living under stable liberal governments anytime soon; nevertheless, he wrote as if that were the only goal towards which enlightened Europeans could sensibly work. But as the dark 1930s progressed, this must have seemed an utterly vain hope. The Great Depression, the Spanish Civil War, the German military build up — everything pointed towards a future under radical right-wing or left-wing regimes, not towards a reconstruction of liberal constitutionalism. As World War II broke out, intellectuals of both extremes could agree on at least one thing: liberalism in Europe was finished.

One needs a long memory or an active historical imagination to conjure up this spirit of interwar pessimism today. The remarkable fact is that the whole of Western Europe was slowly but surely liberalized in the decades following the war. The right-wing antiliberalism of the 1930s never survived the defeat of fascism (except in Spain, which showed no interest in exporting it). And while on the surface it appeared that left-wing antiliberalism remained an active threat in the early postwar decades, in retrospect one can now see that the peace guaranteed by American oversight, the affluence brought by the three decades of unprecedented economic growth, and the expansion of the welfare state worked together to erode the traditional working-class base of left-wing parties through progressive *embourgeoisement*. Today, every single Western European nation has a limited constitutional government, an independent judiciary, multiparty elections, universal suffrage, civilian control of the military and police, rights to free assembly and worship, a large middle class, and a developed consumer economy. Moreover, as is reflected in the universal appeal to "human rights," "democracy," "the market," and "Europe" in contemporary political discourse, for the first time in two centuries no other model of society or government commands a significant following as an alternative to liberalism. François Furet's oft-repeated pronouncement that "the French revolution is over" would seem to hold true for Western Europe as a whole. Despite the disturbing presence of new nationalist and regionalist parties, despite outbursts of ethnic violence and conten-

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tious debates over immigration, no government in Western Europe faces the kind of challenge to its legitimacy that all liberal governments faced when De Ruggiero wrote.

Today, it is clear that Western Europe underwent its own "velvet revolution" in the half-century following World War II, and that its less dramatic entry into the liberal age was the historical precondition of the more spectacular revolutions we recently witnessed in Eastern Europe. But while there is currently much debate over the collapse of state socialism, and much finger-pointing over our inability to "predict" it, the liberalization of Western Europe in the postwar epoch has been met with an almost embarrassed silence by intellectuals and politicians alike. Not only was this a velvet revolution; it is, even today, an unclaimed revolution—and we need to understand why.

One reason may simply be a healthy aversion to any reconstruction of the postwar era that smacks of historical inevitability. The more intelligent reactions to Francis Fukuyama's shilling-shocker on the end of history took this line, and they had a point. It is certainly true that the ultimate liberalization of Western Europe was in no sense guaranteed. As little as fifteen years ago the Cold War was still at the center of international attention, and it remained unclear how attached the continent was to its liberal constitutions. It was not forgotten that those institutions had been imposed on the vanquished nations after the war—firmly imposed in the case of West Germany, more subtly and indirectly in Italy. And for the generation of Western leaders who had lived through the 1930s it was an open question whether those nations would ever be "culturally suited" to liberalism. The birth of the French Fifth Republic had been turbulent, the rhetoric of labor unions remained radical, there was talk of "Eurocommunism," and anxiety about terrorism was pervasive.

Still, one need not be a strict Hegelian to see, retrospectively, that a slow transformation of European society had been underway ever since the war, and that below the clash of quotidian politics this revolution was steadily following its course. Its existence was not entirely apparent to those engaged in the battles of the day, especially those whose frame of reference was the 1930s. But now that we know how the story ends (if we accept 1989 as the end of something), we necessarily have a different perspective on what the

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real "story" of this short history was. While those active at the time may remember it as a series of discrete and contingent events, we now recognize that the collapse of the old socialist and fascist alternatives, the failure of a new, "postliberal" political system to emerge, and the slow institutionalization of a stable liberal order were all of a piece. It is, of course, undeniable that the nervous standoff we call the Cold War made it possible for this liberalization to reach its term, and that the outbreak of a real war might have ended it. But that does not mean that there was no "sense" to what happened during the peace, or that, considered *à la longue,* it does not constitute a single revolutionary event.

A second reason why this velvet revolution has been unclaimed may be confusion over what to call the postwar regimes and an aversion, especially among continental Europeans, to the term "liberal." This aversion has both historical and partisan roots. For an intellectual historian like De Ruggiero, what distinguished the classical liberal idea from other modern doctrines was its focus on the *ensemble of political and economic institutions* necessary to secure liberty, rather than its pursuit of one principle to the exclusion of others. He admitted, however, that this liberal approach to politics disappeared on the continent in the course of the nineteenth century under the pressure of the social question, and that "liberal" came to refer almost exclusively to the economic policies of the propertied classes and their parties. Yet he also insisted that the classical liberal idea was not primarily an economic one, as radical libertarians or socialist critics would have us believe (for different ideological reasons). For De Ruggiero, as for Benjamin Constant, liberalism was a modern political *genus,* within which many different *species* can evolve and have evolved under changing social and economic circumstances.[1] In this sense, all Western European states are liberal today, even if many of their features could not have been foreseen by nineteenth-century liberals. For example, the welfare services provided on the continent have roots outside liberalism in nineteenth-century socialist programs and the Wilhelmine bureaucracy, but since World War II they have grown *through* the basic institutions of liberalism, not *against* them. The same is true of European trade unions, the state-run banks, and the nationalized industries. Western Europe today is not made up of "social democratic," "social welfare," "corporatist," "late capitalist," "postindustrial,"

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or even "postmodern" states, although each of these terms describes certain of their aspects. It is made up of liberal states whose basic constitutional and economic structures are very much those imagined by classical liberals, and attacked by antiliberals down through the years.

A third reason the liberal revolution has been met with silence, and perhaps the most important, is that it was a revolution without ideas. This fact certainly would have puzzled an old-fashioned liberal like De Ruggiero, who shared the Enlightenment belief that if a liberalism of the spirit was protected it would eventually trickle down into the institutions and mores of European society. But in the postwar era just the opposite occurred. Throughout the decades-long process of political and economic liberalization, liberal thought was almost wholly absent from continental Europe. Citizens in every country seemed to make their peace with the new political institutions rather quickly, and economic growth combined with welfare-state policies eventually sapped whatever class-based hostility remained to capitalism. But for continental intellectuals things were not so simple. Up until the mid-1970s the intellectual dominance of Marxism and its variants was unquestioned; and even as Marxism's attraction faded, as it already had begun to before the dramatic events of 1989, liberalism's star did not correspondingly rise. The liberal institutions of continental Europe today are the products of history, of chance, of shrewd political judgment, of American protection—but they are not the homegrown products of the postwar European mind. Confounding the Enlightenment expectations of De Ruggiero, Western Europe today finds itself in the odd position of having built liberalism without liberals.

Does this matter? Perhaps not. The lesson of the postwar years may be that intellectual and political ideas are a good deal less important than economic growth and peace for establishing a liberal order. But there are equally good reasons for thinking that the economic and international conditions of that era were unique, and that in the long run the role of ideas will become more, not less, important. The current confusion over the relation between the ideas of "Europe" and "the nation" is just a small sign that Western Europe finds itself in a situation it did not will, and which it is intellectually unprepared to understand. For much of the past five

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decades, European intellectuals have been in a state of "cognitive dissonance," living in the bosom of liberal society by day while writing learned tomes about its impending demise by night. (Remember "late" capitalism?) The issue is not that these intellectuals refused to become liberals; it is that their partisan rejection of liberalism a priori prevented them from understanding what it was. Marx himself taught that the criticism and change of present social conditions are only possible on the basis of a nonpartisan (for him, "scientific") analysis of those conditions. During their voluntary servitude to Marxist dogma, European intellectuals forgot this simple and true lesson.

Today, of course, Marxism as a political and intellectual doctrine seems spent, brought down by the combined forces of "democracy," "human rights," and "Europe." Yet a closer look at recent continental political thought shows that beneath this superficial rhetoric there is very little rigorous thinking about the nature of the regimes in which Western Europeans find themselves living today. The sole exception is France, where there was a serious revival of liberal thought in the 1980s. In Italy and Germany, by contrast, the disappearance of Marxism has revealed persistent hostility to the liberal idea, having roots in particular historical experiences. Remarkably, those experiences are the very ones which De Ruggiero saw as barriers to liberalization in the 1920s: corruption of the state in Italy, the national question in Germany. Although the experiences proved not to be barriers to liberalizing the political and economic systems after the war, they continue to color the way in which intellectuals think about their liberal polities.

The following reflections on the liberal idea in postwar Europe are offered as a modest supplement to De Ruggiero's *Storia*. De Ruggiero had concluded that, while Great Britain's attachment to liberalism was nearly unshakable, each of the continental nations he studied—Italy, Germany, and France—faced a different barrier to making its peace with liberal theory and practice. If we return to those nations today, after the war and after the Western European velvet revolution, we find that De Ruggiero's analysis of the Italian and German barriers has lost none of its topicality. But if we look to France, we learn that at least one modern European nation has managed to escape the weight of its illiberal intellectual history. Whether the French experience offers a model for other countries is

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an open question, but it does at least vindicate De Ruggiero's conviction that one day the liberal spirit would find a home on the continent.[2]

THE ITALIAN EXPERIENCE

The history of postwar intellectual life in De Ruggiero's own Italy throws light on the difficulties which the liberal idea continues to face there. The single most influential intellectual in twentieth-century Italy, Benedetto Croce, was also its greatest liberal; even his formidable critics on the Right (such as Giovanni Gentile) and the Left (such as Antonio Gramsci) were shaped by Croce's liberal ideas about the relations between culture and politics. But as De Ruggiero himself wrote, intellectual liberalism of the Crocean variety had almost no political influence in modern Italy. He traced its impotence to the development during the late-nineteenth century of the immobile, clientelistic party system which Gramsci had dubbed *transformismo*. From its very beginnings the modern Italian state managed to transform liberal reformers into clients/directors of the government apparatus without permitting them to liberalize it fully. Liberal intellectuals unwilling to engage in this influence trading faced a choice: either to join the antistate party of radical opposition, or to withdraw into an apolitical secular liberalism. Croce chose the latter course.

The enormous prestige which the Italian Communist Party (PCI) enjoyed without interruption among intellectuals after the war, and their relative indifference to the liberal tradition during the same period, can only be explained with reference to the continuing effects of *transformismo* on Italian intellectual life. As we can see today, many of the economic and cultural forces that helped to liberalize Western Europe as a whole were also at work in Italy. Before the war much of the country lived in near Third World conditions of poverty and ignorance; these conditions, memorably recorded in Italian cinema and literature, persisted into the 1950s. Over the next several decades Italy began to change: incomes rose, as did literacy, and the basic structures of a welfare state were set into place. In the political sphere, however, very little changed. The sad truth is that, in practice, Italy has been and remains the least liberal among the formally liberal European states. The

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"Tangentopoli" ("Bribe City") scandals that, at this writing, are bringing down the parties that have colluded since the war, confirm almost everything that the Italian Left has always maintained about the Italian political system: that it was arranged to maintain the power and fill the pockets of party leaders; that criminal investigations of politicians had been smothered; and that informal cabals of military, religious, and financial leaders held secret strings to power.

Throughout the postwar period many intellectuals who admitted the virtues of liberalism in principle and admired it elsewhere nonetheless concluded that it bore little relation to Italy's political situation, which they likened to that of Latin America or Eastern Europe. Others were driven further to embrace the Marxist line that Italian liberalism was a cover for bourgeois domination, that the United States and NATO were instruments of that domination, and that the communism represented by the Soviet Union offered the promise of a better life. The vast majority no doubt simply hoped that their support for the PCI would finally bring the political *alternanza* which liberalism had promised but had never delivered. But even if intellectuals harbored these liberal hopes, virtually no one would have described himself as a liberal. To be a "liberal" in postwar Italy either meant that one belonged to the tiny Liberal Party that had been "transformed" into a member of the governing coalition (and, we now know, participated in its plunders), or that one had studied at the University of Chicago.

There were, of course, important exceptions, but the fact of the matter is that every attempt by genuinely liberal intellectuals to gain a larger following among their peers or in politics was stillborn. The best-known example is that of the *Giustizia e Libertà* movement, which was originally founded by the liberal socialist Carlo Rosselli during his exile from fascist Italy in the 1920s. After his assassination in 1937, this group became the *Partito d'Azione,* which was disbanded in 1947 after a brief moment in the sun just after the war. Another example is the fate of *Tempo Presente,* the extraordinary liberal magazine edited by Nicola Chiaromonte and Ignazio Silone from 1956 until 1969. Like other magazines sponsored by the anticommunist Congress for Cultural Freedom during the Cold War, *Tempo Presente* provided one of the few reliable sources of information on life in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as well as analyses of political developments throughout the

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Western world. But on Italian politics it was virtually silent, choosing to remain above partisan squabbles rather than be tied to any single party in the noncommunist majority. Like the followers of Croce before the war, Italian writers associated with *Tempo Presente* found themselves and the liberalism they represented outside the mainstream due to the realities of intellectual *transformismo*. Other examples might be added to these, all reflecting essentially the same experience.[3]

In such an atmosphere it was little wonder that the PCI managed to recruit into its ranks such a large number of Italian intellectuals, who remained fiercely loyal to the Party through thick and increasingly thin times—indeed, right down to the Party's dissolution in March 1990. In their reaction to the power of political *transformismo*, they themselves were transformed into intellectual spokesmen for the antisystem PCI. They convinced themselves that it was not a communist party at all (not true), that it was the only clean party in a dirty system (half true), and that it was the only hope for breaking the power of the *partitocrazia* and achieving a real democratic *alternanza* (hypothesis never tested). They also convinced themselves, as a corollary, that anyone who wanted clean government and democratic alternatives could therefore find his intellectual roots in the infinitely revisable Marxism of the Party, and not in the liberal tradition. In fact, though, their adherence to the Party was almost completely motivated by short-term political calculation rather than theoretical zeal. Unlike France, which was dominated by Sartre's meanderings through Marx in the immediate postwar years, Italy never produced a major intellectual figure capable of turning the dissatisfactions with liberalism into a coherent left-wing doctrine. Gramsci's posthumously published prison notebooks were consulted carefully, and in the 1960s and 1970s there was a vogue for French Marxists such as Louis Althusser. But surprisingly, the postwar Italian Left never produced a major political thinker of its own. Political theory, such as it was, mainly consisted in commentary on Gramsci, Party pronouncements, polemical journalism, and anguished reflections on the future of *la sinistra*.[4]

But by the early 1980s, faith in the Party's prospects had become difficult to maintain. The great expectations that attended Enrico Berlinguer's decision in the 1970s to effect a *compromesso storico* with the governing parties, in the hope of opening the political

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system, were quickly dashed. The Party was outmaneuvered ideologically on the Left by groups coming out of the movements of 1968, and politically on the Right by the governing parties who managed to implicate the PCI in its failures without sharing power. The great progressive achievements of these years—the liberalizations of the divorce law (1974) and the abortion law (1978)—had come about under the pressure of grass-roots referendum initiatives, not through an *alternanza* led by the PCI. Moreover, the economic and cultural changes which had given Italian society unprecedented affluence and mobility made nonsense of the Party's Marxist economic doctrine, however carefully revised. By 1982 envious Italian intellectuals watched on as the French and Spanish socialist parties came to power by making their peace with liberalism; meanwhile Italy was saddled with "socialist" Bettino Craxi as prime minister, a politician who only further entrenched the power of the *partitocrazia,* enriching himself in the bargain.

As the 1980s progressed, so did the sense among left intellectuals associated with the Party that "*la cosa non va.*" And it was with a palpable sense of relief that they welcomed the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev, the rapid collapse of the Soviet Union and its empire, and, finally, the PCI's decision to sever its ties with communist ideology and to reestablish itself as the Democratic Party of the Left (PDS) in 1990. But relief soon gave way to confusion as Party adherents and sympathizers considered their predicament without the Marxist spectacles to which they had, willy-nilly, grown accustomed. Italian intellectuals today consider themselves democrats of a sort, but most continue to believe that democratic principles are the exclusive preserve of *la sinistra* and maintain an instinctive suspicion of the liberal intellectual tradition. However, they are finding that the idea of *la sinistra* offers little guidance for thinking about the challenges facing their country, from the construction of the European Community to the reconstruction of the Italian political system in the wake of Tangentopoli. These are problems that can grow up within any liberal polity today, and the tradition of liberal thought provides a vocabulary for debating them. Unfortunately, this vocabulary has not been translated into postwar Italian. For the past fifty years the Italian Left has told itself that liberalism was a nineteenth-century doctrine bearing little relation to the political and economic realities of "late" capitalism, which could

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only be understood through some variant of Marxism. The contrary turned out to be true. Today it is the search for the elusive *sinistra* that has an anachronistic, nineteenth-century air about it.

Given the political history of postwar Italian intellectual life, any imaginable rapprochement with the liberal tradition is most likely to come from the Left. But two different models of how that transition might be made are currently on display. One can be seen in the writings of Paolo Flores d'Arcais, editor of *MicroMega,* the leading left-wing journal published in Italy today.[5] Flores was a young communist who was eventually purged from the PCI in 1967 for "factionism" and "Trotskyism," and the following year helped to lead the Italian student revolts. During the 1970s he began to write widely-debated articles expressing his disenchantment with Marxism, documenting the realities of East European life under communism, and expressing appreciation for antitotalitarian humanist thinkers like Hannah Arendt, Leszek Kolakowski, and Albert Camus. In the mid-1980s he launched *MicroMega,* which promised to offer "*le ragioni della sinistra.*" Like *Tempo Presente,* this new journal has maintained that an embrace of Western democratic values by the Italian Left must go hand in hand with a serious reconsideration of the relation between Marxism and totalitarianism in the postwar era. Yet, although Flores and his magazine are liberal by almost any definition, it is revealing that they still refuse this label. Flores insists on calling himself a man of the Left working to revive it, even though he frequently invokes Rosselli and the *Partito d'Azione* as his models.[6] His position is similar to that of the various reformist groups within the new PDS, which call themselves *azionisti, miglioristi,* even *clintoniani*—but never *liberali.*

A different model of how to liberalize the Italian Left is offered by Norberto Bobbio, the grand old defender of liberal socialism.[7] Bobbio was born in 1909 and, like many in his generation, came under the influence of Croce's liberalism and was later associated with *Giustizia e Libertà.* But after the war Bobbio began to turn towards the study of liberal political institutions and publicly defended the necessity of a liberal path to any socialist ends. Bobbio's position has been unique in postwar Italian thought. Though committed to a dialogue with intellectuals in the PCI, he stubbornly lectured them on the primacy of individual rights, the rule of law, the need for representative institutions, and the importance of studying

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liberal thinkers like John Locke and Benjamin Constant. Indeed, over the past decade Bobbio has written almost exclusively about problems of liberalism, while his invocations of economic socialism have virtually disappeared. It is generally recognized that Bobbio is the most important political thinker Italy has produced since the war, and he is often compared to Raymond Aron. But although he enjoys almost universal respect today, unlike Aron in France he has not convinced a young generation of intellectuals to think about their liberal polity in the categories of classical liberalism. Thinkers like Flores owe a great deal to Bobbio, but they have not yet followed him in placing the fate of liberalism before that of *la sinistra.*

Once again, this choice may owe more to the realities of contemporary Italian politics than to a theoretical rejection of liberal ideas. Although most Italian intellectuals have abandoned Marxism and become de facto liberals over the past decade, they find it hard to embrace the liberal intellectual tradition so long as the Italian political system fails to deliver what that tradition promises. The strict divide between a reformist *sinistra* of intellectuals and the immobile state remains, even after 1989. With the breakdown of the parties and networks of influence that paralyzed the state for decades, Italy is more in need of liberal thought than at any time in the postwar period. But the important lessons of Norberto Bobbio — that the pursuit of worthwhile political ends must pass through liberal institutions, and therefore that liberal reflection about institutions must precede reflection about ends—seems to have fallen on deaf ears. Until the Italian state delivers something that looks more like liberalism, Italian intellectuals remain reluctant to think like liberals. The failures of the First Republic still discredit the liberal idea, and only the creation of a more liberal Second Republic seems capable of legitimizing it.

THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE

The dysfunction of liberal institutions cannot be blamed for the discredit of liberal political thought in Germany today. Those institutions—the parties, parliament, courts, and civil service—have held up better than anyone dared hope in the aftermath of World War II. Despite the Cold War, despite the continued presence of

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NATO forces and weapons, despite the recurrent threat of terrorism, the survival of constitutional government has never been seriously in question. After significant changes in party government were effected calmly in 1969 and 1983, West Germans could congratulate themselves on finally living in *ein ganz normaler Staat.*

Nonetheless, they remained conscious that they did not live in *eine ganz normale Nation,* and perhaps never would. World War II was a historical and cultural caesura more profound than any experienced by a major nation in modern times. And one sensed this ever more sharply as memories of the war experience faded; as the physical signs of destruction disappeared, the cultural traces became only more apparent. Many West Germans of an otherwise liberal bent accepted the deep sense of shame and self-doubt that overwhelmed the postwar generations as necessary for mastering the "unmastered past" and for uprooting the traditional antimodern tendencies in German culture. In the end, it was thought, the presence of the past would help to bolster the foundations of a modern liberal state. And in most respects it probably has.

But today, after the Cold War and the unification of Germany, one can begin to assess the illiberal purposes which the "present past" also served. For although, on balance, public memory of German guilt rallied general public opinion to the institutions of the Bundesrepublik, among a great number of West German intellectuals it had quite the opposite effect. For them, the rejection of the German past also meant the rejection of the German present, including the new liberal state meant to "master" the past. The most extreme view was that the Bundesrepublik deserved to be treated as a pariah, that it had reincarnated rather than overcome the German problem. But even among less radical thinkers, arguments about the present liberal state in which they found themselves dissolved almost inevitably into debates over the past and future of the German nation—hardly the atmosphere in which liberal thought and debate can flourish. If anything, it was argued, "Germany tried liberalism" during the Weimar Republic and it had failed, forever casting doubt on the Germans' ability to resist their nationalistic and militaristic impulses. Unable to withstand the onslaught of these forces in the 1930s, liberalism was subtly implicated in their crimes. If Germany was to start anew, if it was to break with all that was dangerous in its past, it would have to move beyond the old liberalism.

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This attitude, which still reflected the political pessimism of the 1930s, was not widely expressed immediately after the war but became dominant with the rise of the New Left during the mid-1960s. It was during these years that the "mandarins" lost their traditional hold on the German universities, leading (as some would have it) to a healthy new engagement with social questions, or (as others maintained) to a dangerous politicization of scholarship and stifling of debate.[8] This period also marked the birth of the *Alternativkultur* among young people, which even today maintains a far more significant social presence in Germany than in any other major Western nation. It is impossible to separate the continuing suspicion of German thinkers towards the liberal tradition from this cultural-political milieu in which political thought in the university grew up after the war.

On the surface, the revival of the German Left made it appear that German intellectuals were catching up with their French and Italian counterparts, who had been steeped in Marxism since the war. In fact, they were headed in an entirely different direction. For although in theory all European Marxists rejected the institutions of "bourgeois liberalism," in practice the French and Italian Communist Parties had made significant concessions to the formalities of liberal life in order to survive. Those concessions were made possible by combining Party dogma with appeals to national feeling. The French communists capitalized on their role in the resistance and maintained *une façade republicaine*; Italian communists did the same, and were thus drawn into direct participation (mainly in local government) by the centripetal force of *transformismo* and their Gramsci-inspired doctrine of cultural politics. The German Marxist Left faced very different circumstances. It had no party to call its own since the banning of the Communist Party in 1956 and the liberalization of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) at Bad Godesberg in 1959. More important, it was understandably unwilling to appeal to national feeling. French or Italian communists could justify a tactical compromise with the liberal state in the name of the nation, which it had "rescued" from fascism and which it would eventually rescue from liberalism. The German Left had also resisted fascism and was prepared to resist liberalism—but not in the name of the nation, which it also resisted. For all their internationalism, the French and Italian communists remained teth-

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ered to their nations; the German Left was without a party, without a government, and also without a nation.

This is a distressingly familiar phenomenon in German political history, and in the postwar context it led to the revival of a very German idea: the *Sonderweg*, the special path which Germans have from time to time believed to be their destiny in Europe. After the war, the notion found a most unlikely home among the antinational Left, which sought a "third way" between Western liberalism and Soviet communism. Through an odd inversion of reasoning, the pariah nation now became the Paraclete of a new dispensation in world politics. Odder still, the existence of a communist state on German soil only helped to nourish this illusion. An astonishing proportion of West German intellectuals found it difficult to criticize the East German regime, or at least found it no less legitimate than the liberal Bundesrepublik. The last East German workers' revolt had been in 1953, and no organization like Polish Solidarity arose to disturb the fiction of social harmony in the workers' state. Nor were there prominent East German dissident intellectuals, no Solzhenitsyns, Michniks, Havels, or Konrads, to set an example or nag at one's conscience; even poet-singer Wolf Biermann was more ironical than outraged by his expulsion from his homeland. While left intellectuals in France and Italy began discovering Eastern Europe in the late-1970s and celebrated its spirit of resistance, the German Left kept an embarrassed silence and remained firmly on its antinational *Sonderweg*.

This faith in the "third way" became increasingly difficult to maintain in the 1980s. Although socialist governments had been elected in Spain and France, their leaders had embraced liberalism, defending its political institutions and showing little inclination to transform capitalism. Meanwhile, German public opinion had become more conservative, and in 1983 the Christian Democrats returned to power after nearly fifteen years of Social Democratic government. This election dealt a severe blow to those on the intellectual Left. They had, of course, always rejected much of the Social Democrats' program, protesting its pro-NATO stance and criticizing its social-welfare policies for undergirding capitalism. It also disoriented those intellectuals closer to the SPD, such as the writers for *Die Zeit,* who represented a vague liberalism that dared not speak its name. For both these groups the return of the

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conservatives to power was unexpected and produced a strong, at times hysterical, reaction. A dangerous "neoconservative" intellectual *Tendenzwende* to match the electoral one was sighted and then suspiciously monitored as if it marked the return of the German nightmare, further deepening the intellectual polarization.[9]

Throughout the 1980s, while the conservatives remained in power, the West German Left maintained its principled resistance to liberalism in the name of antinationalism. Even the Green Party's entrance in parliament had a dreamy, "apolitical" feel to it, as did the Euromissiles debate. While the German population was growing ever more attached to the institutions of liberal government, and therefore ever more comfortable expressing national feeling, left intellectuals drew further away. However understandable this reaction was, it had the unfortunate consequence (as Ernst Nolte, alas, rightly put it) of opening a chasm between the *pays légal* of German intellectuals and the *pays réel* of the German population. Hence the profound sense of shock in the aftermath of the events of 1989. The moment West and East Germans descended into the streets to march under common banners proclaiming "*Wir sind ein Volk,*" the illusion that East Germans had been happily pursuing a "third way" was shattered. Many Europeans expressed misgivings about such scenes and had reasonable reservations, mainly geopolitical, about unification. But a number of prominent West German intellectuals campaigned against unification on openly antinationalist grounds, Günter Grass first among them. And when Christa Wolf and Stefan Heym published their petition ("*Für unser Land*"), calling for the preservation of East Germany as a workshop for building the "third way," it evoked surprising sympathy among prominent West German intellectuals.

The difficulties facing the German state since unification are real enough, but left intellectuals continue to see in them nothing but the German past, not the new challenge of incorporating a formerly communist population into a legitimate liberal state. At some level they still consider that state to be illegitimate. A good example of this ambivalent attitude towards the Bundesrepublik, and now towards unification, is the work of Jürgen Habermas. Habermas remains the single most influential political thinker in Germany. The work of other philosophers (such as K. O. Apel) may have eclipsed his own, the political journalism of other writers (Ralf

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Dahrendorf) may be more highly esteemed, but Habermas' moral stature is unique. This is because, as with Sartre in the 1950s, Habermas' theoretical works and partisan engagements are meant to be read together and to be mutually reinforcing.[10] Consequently, his philosophical rejection of liberalism and liberal thought have only made his journalistic criticisms of existing liberal regimes, especially the Bundesrepublik, more potent.

What has always made Habermas' theoretical antiliberalism different from that of orthodox Marxists or the founders of the Frankfurt School is that it explicitly grows out of reflection on the German national question. In Habermas' view, Germany has been the home of political reaction since the early nineteenth century because it never made its peace with the principles of modernity that were first expressed in the Enlightenment. A major theme of his writings is the need to bring Germany into the modern age, to make it an enlightened republic. Yet, from the very first, Habermas has also maintained that the "Enlightenment project" can itself only be fulfilled if Western liberalism is surpassed and a more radical form of democracy is instituted. Only the construction of a postliberal order guaranteeing rational "communicative action" promises full emancipation for modern man. What "communicative action" means, and how new institutions might ensure it, has been the subject of Habermas' increasingly technical and self-referential theoretical writings over the past two decades.[11] Despite their obscurity, they show him to have remained remarkably consistent in his defense of a nonliberal variant of Enlightenment political philosophy.

With an engaged thinker like Habermas, these theoretical reflections on Enlightenment and modernity must also be read against developments in postwar German politics. It does not take much to see in his philosophical work a more parochial concern with the *Wirtschaftswunder* of the 1950s, the Cold War, the rise and fall of the New Left in the 1970s, and, lately, renewed German nationalism and patriotism. With remarkable consistency he has criticized virtually every political development in the liberal Bundesrepublik for not meeting his radical Enlightenment standards. Political experience elsewhere, notably in the less than enlightened Soviet empire, interested him little. He was never an apologist for the East German regime, but preferred to speak of the Bundesrepublik's "legit-

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imation crisis" instead. On the one hand, Habermas was a relentless critic of the *Sonderweg* idea in German culture, arguing for full German participation in the Enlightenment culture of the West. On the other hand, since no existing Western state was radically democratic enough, he remained opposed to the liberalism that Germany now shared with the West. Habermas, it seemed, refused to let Germany join any club that would have it as a member. He thus unwittingly became a philosopher of the "third way," a proponent of a new *Sonderweg* based on the rejection of liberalism and the embrace of an imagined, utopian Enlightenment.

In the 1980s, as the prospects for radical democracy in Germany dimmed, as the predicted crises of the welfare state failed to materialize, as French and Spanish socialists embraced liberalism, Habermas stood his ground against the liberal tradition and a liberal Germany. His political journalism became gloomier as he described a "new obscurity" in German political life and warned ominously of the threat posed by neoconservatives. It is revealing that his most important public intervention of the period, in the so-called *Historikerstreit* of 1986, was not over contemporary politics but over judgments of the German past. As a look at the collected documents makes clear today, Ernst Nolte's restatement in 1986 of his unsavory theses about the war also provided Habermas with a convenient occasion to settle scores over the new conservatism by raising the specter of renewed German nationalism.[12]

The collapse of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War have done little to work a rapprochement between Habermas and the liberal tradition. Even today he maintains that the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was based on "progressive ideas" that had simply been "misused," and that socialism and radical democracy must go hand in hand.[13] Immediately after the events of 1989 he announced his skepticism about any national unification that did not bring "real democracy" to both the East and the West. Once unification was complete he wrote that the East Germans had only experienced a "catch-up" (*nachholende*) revolution, saddling them with the problems of Western liberal societies: unemployment, social domination, individualism, and the rest.[14] He frankly admits his disappointment with socialism's unpopularity today, writing that "the devaluation of our best and most delicate intellectual traditions is for me one of the most terrible aspects of this inheri-

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tance that the GDR brings into the enlarged Bundesrepublik."[15] The disturbing increase in racial violence and right-wing nationalism since unification have only confirmed Habermas' view that liberalism can never tame the Germans' demons. To fulfill the aims of the Enlightenment, Germany must accept a "post-traditional" identity in a multicultural world and replace all exclusive national sentiments with an inclusive "constitutional patriotism" (*Verfassungspatriotismus*) open to all who accept the principles of radical democracy. He holds up Switzerland as a model of this type of social relation.[16]

There are, of course, more liberal and less utopian voices, whether they be those of Ralf Dahrendorf, Wolf Lepenies, Peter Schneider, or (at times) Hans Magnus Enzensberger. Habermas' views may be less representative than they were a decade ago, but they remain emblematic of German intellectuals' difficulty in thinking about their own liberal polity. For Habermas, as for many intellectuals still today, the question of liberalism remains linked to that of the legitimacy of the German nation as such and its "unmastered past." By insisting on the absolute priority of this national question, by ignoring what Fritz Stern once called the "failures of illiberalism," and by transforming the moderate liberal aims of the Enlightenment into a utopian dream, thinkers like Habermas may have helped to postpone the German rendezvous with modernity which they undoubtedly desire.

THE FRENCH EXCEPTION

Surprisingly, the one Western European country where liberal political thought was revived recently and is vital today is France.[17] This fact hardly squares with the caricature of postwar French intellectuals, which may be why foreigners, and Americans in particular, have been so slow to absorb the recent atmospheric changes in Paris. The standard history of twentieth-century French thought begins with Hegelianism in the 1930s, moves to existentialism, Stalinism, and Marxist humanism in the decade after the war, passes through the structuralism of Claude Lévi-Strauss and Roland Barthes, and culminates in the poststructuralist dispensation of Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. This is a thoroughly left-wing account of the period, one in which anticommunist intellectu-

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als play a very small role. It is also generally accurate, for the period was indeed dominated by a culturally profound, though often philosophically superficial, illiberalism. But roughly fifteen years ago this illiberal tradition fell out of favor and a perceptible turn in intellectual orientation began. If one were to ask a typical young French intellectual today whom among the postwar political thinkers he most admires, the answer would most likely not be Sartre, Althusser, or Foucault, but either Raymond Aron, Cornelius Castoriadis, or Claude Lefort.[18] And if one were to ask him what the central questions are for political philosophy today, they would without a doubt be the liberal ideas of "humanism," "rights," and "individualism."

How this intellectual sea change came about is a story worth studying, and its background can be found in the series of social and political transformations that took place after the war. Before the war there had been a general sense on the Right and the Left that liberalism was "obsolete." But over the next thirty years, which have come to be called "*les trente glorieuses*," France built two republics that were fundamentally liberal and a booming economy that utterly remade the social landscape.[19] This liberalization of postwar French society did not happen automatically. There remained the permanent challenge of the French Communist Party (PCF) and its unions; there was the untidy process of decolonization whose bloody dénouement was the Algerian War; there were threatened military coups associated with the latter; and, above it all, there was the unpredictable presence of Charles de Gaulle. But certainly by the mid-1960s it was clear that however "exceptional" France remained, it was not about to turn either to fascism or communism, if only because the base of such movements had disappeared in the flowering of the affluent society.

This slow process of liberalization, which took place across Western Europe, is easier to see with hindsight today than it was during the 1950s or 1960s. But what made it even harder to see at the time was that French intellectuals were almost unanimous in their rejection of liberal society and their adherence to some form of Marxism (and to the one party, the PCF, that claimed to offer the authoritative interpretation of Marxism). Yet the endless theorizing about Marxism and the intellectual putsches that arose from it bore almost no relation to the real social dynamics of the time. This

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finally became apparent in the events of May 1968, which not only failed to bring down the Fifth Republic, but finally demonstrated that the Party and its intellectuals had no idea how profoundly France had changed in the decades after the war. As Cornelius Castoriadis once wistfully remarked, the last chance for revolution evaporated later in the summer of 1968 when the gas stations reopened, permitting the masses to reach their private vacation homes in their private cars. The affluence, mobility, and individualism brought by economic growth had already taken their toll on the old idea of a unified Left made up of workers, their unions, the PCF, and the intellectuals. If anything, the events of May 1968 reflected dissatisfactions with a consumer society that were expressed in the highly individualistic terms of that very society.[20]

The election of François Mitterrand as President of the Republic in 1981, and the simultaneous arrival of the first socialist plurality in parliament since the war, was actually the final act in this drama of liberalization. On one level, Mitterrand's election brought about a liberal normalization of the Fifth Republic, removing it from the long shadow of de Gaulle and the conservative parties who had ruled France in his name since 1958. Since 1981 the French have learned that their institutions were not only open to communist participation (1981–1984) but even to a socialist president "cohabiting" with a conservative prime minister (1986–1988 and 1993–present). On a deeper level, the Mitterrand era has also represented the final rapprochement of the French revolutionary tradition with the liberal institutions of the Fifth Republic. Rather than heralding *la gauche au pouvoir,* it has marked the end of a long tradition of political illiberalism and the birth of what François Furet has called a "centrist" republic.[21]

It was in this context of progressive economic and political liberalization that the revival of liberal political thought eventually took place in the 1980s. It actually began in the mid-1970s, long before the events of 1989 and the belated rethinking they provoked on the rest of the European Left. For some reason, world events that elicited little immediate response elsewhere in Western Europe—the translation of Alexander Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag Archipelago,* the butcheries in Cambodia, the flight of the boat people, the rise of Solidarity in Poland—suddenly set off a profound *crise de conscience* among the French. Why these particular events had such an

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effect when innumerable others (for example, Budapest 1956 and Prague 1968) did not is a question that future historians will have to answer. Whatever the cause, the effect was real. In the space of a few years intellectuals who once subscribed to Sartre's view that Marxism was the "unsurpassable horizon" of our time began to concede that communist totalitarianism might fall within that horizon and not be a historical accident. And those who had followed Foucault in seeing classrooms, hospital wards, and offices as thinly disguised concentration camps now confronted the real thing. By the end of the 1970s the public record of postwar communism was finally a matter of frank public discussion and a cooler look at Western liberal societies became possible.

The changes in the French intellectual climate that followed were profound. There was, for example, an almost universal abandonment of the Hegelian, Marxist, and structuralist dogmas that nourished intellectual contempt for liberalism after the war. One also saw the demise of a certain conception of the intellectual as a "master thinker" whose philosophy of history or theory of power licensed him to deliver ex cathedra judgments on the political events of the day. As a result, space opened up for more serious and reasoned reflection on politics and on the liberal age which France has now entered. During the 1980s, discussions of political philosophy centered on books that would have been unwritten, unpublished, or unread ten years earlier: studies of important political thinkers of the past, theoretical treatises on human rights, essays on liberal government and society, even translations of Anglo-American political and moral philosophy of the "analytic" variety. A number of important new reviews were also founded—the most significant being *Le Débat, Commentaire,* and the "new" *Esprit*—all concerned with contemporary liberal society and its problems.

Nonetheless, it would be a mistake to speak of anything like a consensus in French political thought today. Few French thinkers consider themselves to be liberals in an unqualified sense, and fewer still in an American or British sense. While it is not uncommon for an American or British political theorist to take up a "defense" of one version of liberalism or another, recent French political philosophy has been by and large diagnostic (and somewhat pessimistic) rather than promotional. Moreover, under the influence of François Furet and his analysis of recent French history as a struggle over the

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revolutionary heritage, much of it is also far more historical than programmatic, asking what place liberalism has in the unfolding of the modern age. Although respectful of liberalism and disabused of traditional illiberal alternatives, recent works of political philosophy share no common approach or party doctrine. But they do share a common *problem*: how to think about politics now that liberalism, and not Marxism, appears to be the "unsurpassable horizon" of our time. Otherwise, among the new French "liberals" there number followers of Tocqueville, Constant, Kant, Weber, Strauss, Habermas, Rawls, and even a closet Thomist or two.[22]

How is this turn to be understood? Some have expressed skepticism, wondering whether the new orientation is anything more than a passing Parisian fashion. But if we compare the political and intellectual situation in France today to that of Italy and Germany, there are good reasons for thinking that the revival of liberal thought is linked to more profound changes in the world of intellectuals, and will therefore prove more enduring. Although Italian intellectuals have also by and large abandoned Marxism, and in any case were always more moderate about it than the French, they still remain unwilling to embrace the tradition of liberal thought so long as the Italian state makes a mockery of many liberal ideals. In Germany, on the other hand, the healthy functioning of liberal institutions has had little effect on those intellectuals who equate the Bundesrepublik with the pariah nation. In France, both these institutional and national issues have already been settled.

Most obviously, the institutional structure of the Fifth Republic has given the French a well-run liberal state and kept them from entering the destructive logic of political *transformismo*. But the conditions of intellectual *transformismo,* which in Italy turned thinkers and writers into caretakers of the PCI, and then into pioneers of a new *sinistra,* used to exist in France. From 1945 until 1956 the PCF held a near monopoly on intellectual opinion, and up until 1968 it was still a major force. But either because of the Party's retrograde nature, or the distinctive character of May 1968 in Paris, or the rise of structuralism, or what Raymond Aron called the innate irresponsibility of French intellectuals—whatever the reason—the fate of the PCF or any other political party soon ceased to be the focus of intellectual attention. After 1968, French intellectuals were no longer engaged with political institutions such as parties

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or even labor unions; as one saw in the popular works of Michel Foucault at the time, to the extent that there was *engagement* it had become quasi-aesthetic and mainly self-referential. But it now appears, paradoxically, that the intellectuals' very "irresponsibility" may have been what eventually permitted them to take a dispassionate look at liberalism in the years that followed. The experiences of the 1960s and 1970s had already freed them of their responsibility for the PCF, and the Mitterrand election then freed them of any vague responsibility for *la gauche*. Once liberated from the old model of the French intellectual as a left-wing engagé, they could then begin to think more responsibly about the liberal polity in which they had been living all along.

The French resolution of the national question, which so torments the German mind, has a longer history, stretching back to the "republican" synthesis that was effected in late nineteenth-century French political thought. *Républicain* is the least precise and most widely invoked concept in the French political lexicon; even today, after the waning of Marxism, there is hardly a politician or intellectual who does not claim it as his own. The term harks back to the rhetoric of the Revolution, which was deeply imbued with references to classical (especially Roman) republicanism. In the historical writings of Michelet or in the events of 1848, republicanism continued to mean recapturing and consummating the spirit of 1789. But over time it also took on a more nationalist cast, presenting itself as a distinctly French alternative to both radical socialism and democracy, on the one hand, and clericalism and reactionism on the other. The central tenets of republican doctrine were worked out progressively during the nineteenth century: an austere secular morality to replace that of the church; an active citizenry educated in public schools; a highly centralized, majoritarian government; a homogenous culture, achieved through national education, but also through a slow war of attrition against signs of diversity (for example, the campaigns against regional French dialects). In short, republicanism was a syncretic mix of political principles, some universal and some chauvinistic. To be *républicain* came to mean that one defended the timeless principles expressed in the French Revolution, which were valid for all nations, but that one prized France above others as the supreme embodiment of those principles.

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Republicanism's relation to liberalism is a matter of much dispute today. Some have pointed out the difficulty of reconciling certain of its features—notably the hostility to individualism, its cultural uniformity, and political centralization—with classic theories of liberalism. And, indeed, much of the Third Republic's early history was marked by conflict over those very features, whether in debates over the secularization of the schools or, most memorably, in the Dreyfus Affair. Others, however, have suggested that republicanism has assisted France's liberalization by giving the French a modern sense of national identity that is deeper than their partisan differences.[23] French republican instincts were even on display in the early postwar decades: although the intellectuals were extremely hostile to the liberal institutions of the Fifth Republic, they never doubted the legitimacy of the French nation. They opposed Vichy, they opposed the Algerian War, they opposed de Gaulle — but they did not oppose France. Instead, they opposed the United States, which served as a convenient scapegoat for the failings of liberal societies and the sins of Western imperialism. France was *intouchable.* The appeal of that republican tradition is still strong today, even among younger liberal thinkers, who generally prefer the French model to the American one.

Clearly, some sort of "French exception" remains among the liberal nations of Western Europe, especially in intellectual matters. But this time the exception is a potentially fruitful one, from which the Italians and Germans might be able to learn. In contrast to the Italian experience, it shows that continental intellectuals can support traditional progressive aims—the rule of law, the independence of public offices, an *alternanza* in government—within the scope of liberal institutions, without having to become spokesmen for a particular party or partisan program. In contrast to the German experience, it proves that intellectuals can also reconcile national pride and a sense of cultural identity with the Enlightenment values of modern liberal politics. These are not philosophical contradictions or sociological impossibilities.

Now that Western Europe has experienced the velvet revolution for which Guido De Ruggiero once hoped, the question is whether its intellectuals will experience their own "catch-up" revolution. The French already have, providing one model of how liberal thought might develop on the continent in the future. Whether

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Italian and German intellectuals will find a way to follow this French example, or perhaps make a separate peace with their own liberal societies, is the question of the day. If they do not, if the gap between the *pays réel* of liberal Western Europe and the *pays légal* of its thinkers and writers persists, liberalism could find itself facing new, unforeseen challenges. A liberal Europe without intellectual defenders of *la libertà* is something never pondered in De Ruggiero's *Storia*.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Anson Rabinbach and Michaela Richter for suggestions on Germany, and Daniel Bell for a provocative correspondence that forced me to clarify my argument at several junctures.

ENDNOTES

[1]A similar argument has been made in Stephen Holmes, "The Liberal Idea," *The American Prospect* (Fall 1991). See also Stephen Holmes, *The Anatomy of Anti-liberalism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).

[2]I have excluded Great Britain and Spain from this article for reasons of space, but also because the former's attachment to liberalism was unbroken after the war, while the latter's experience with it is too recent to judge.

[3]One exception is the circle around the journal *Il Mulino,* which is sympathetic to the Einaudi tradition of economic liberalism but remains independent of the Liberal Party. But although it has influence in established institutions (some universities, banks, businesses), it has no large following among other intellectuals, who remain further to the Left.

[4]The work of the two most prominent Marxist theorists of the period, Galvano della Volpe and Lucio Colletti, only confirms this judgment.

[5]Collections of Flores' political journalism include *Il dubbio e la certezza* (Milan: Sugareo, 1982), *Oltre il PCI* (Genoa: Marietti, 1990), and *La rimozione permanente* (Genoa: Marietti, 1991). Among his works of political philosophy is the recent *Etica senza fede* (Turin: Einaudi, 1992).

[6]On *azionismo* as a model for the Left see Paolo Flores d'Arcais, "L'alternativa azionista," *MicroMega* (3) (1991) and "La sinistra da inventare," *MicroMega* (2) (1993). For a sharp criticism of this model see Ernesto Galli della Loggia, "La democrazia immaginaria. L'azionismo e 'l'ideologia italiana'," *Il Mulino* (March-April 1993).

[7]In English, see Norberto Bobbio, *Which Socialism?* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); Norberto Bobbio, *The Future of Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press,

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1987); and Norberto Bobbio, *Liberalism and Democracy* (London: Verso, 1990). Among his other important works in Italian are Norberto Bobbio, *Politica e cultura* (Turin: G. Einaudi, 1955); *Da Hobbes a Marx* (Naples: Guida, 1965); *Stato, Governo, Società* (Turin: Einaudi, 1985); and *L'èta dei diritti* (Turin: Einaudi, 1990).

[8]The passing of the "mandarins" after 1968 has been hailed in Hauke Brunkhorst, *Der Intellektuelle im Land der Mandarine* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1987). A less sanguine picture of the post-1968 university scene is offered in Hermann Lübbe, *Hochschulreform und Gegenaufklärung* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Rombach, 1972); in Helmut Schelsky, *Die Arbeit tun die Anderen* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975); and in Thomas Nipperdey, ed., *Hochschulen zwischen Politik und Wahrheit* (Zürich: Interfrom, 1981).

[9]Typical of the attacks on the "neoconservatives" are Jürgen Habermas, *The New Conservatism* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989); Helmut Dubiel, *Was ist Neokonservatismus?* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1985); and Hauke Brunkhorst, *Der Intellektuelle im Land der Mandarine* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1987). The resulting intellectual polarization is described in the English preface to Karl Dietrich Bracher, *The Age of Ideologies* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984).

[10]This is consistent with the defense of "committed" social theory that Jürgen Habermas developed in his early works. See Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and the Human Interests* (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1971) and Jürgen Habermas, *Theory and Practice* (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1973).

[11]The definitive statement of the theory is to be found in Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action,* 2 vols. (Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1984–1987). For a recent application of the theory to constitutional issues, see Jürgen Habermas, *Faktizität und Geltung* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992).

[12]The documents have been translated and published in James Knowlton and Truett Gates, trans., *Forever in the Shadow of Hitler?* (Atlantic Heights, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1993). A sense of the polemical debate behind the historical debate can be had by consulting Hans-Ulrich Wehler, *Entsorgung der deutschen Vergangenheit?* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1988); Imanuel Geiss, *Die Habermas-Kontroverse* (Berlin: Siedler, 1988); and Imanuel Geiss, *Der Hysterikerstreit* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1992).

[13]Jürgen Habermas, "Die DDR hat. . .forschrittliche Ideen zu ihrer Legitimation mißbraucht." "Die andere Zerstörung der Vernunft," *Die Zeit,* 10 May 1991, 63. See also Habermas, *Faktizität und Geltung,* 12–13. Habermas' unwillingness to confront the experience of state socialism is severely criticized by Adam Michnik. See their debate.

[14]Jürgen Habermas, *Die nachholende Revolution* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1990).

[15]Habermas, "Die andere Zerstörung der Vernunft."

[16]The idea of a *Verfassungspatriotismus* was developed by the social scientist Dolf Sternberger in his research on postwar German political attitudes. Habermas has since appropriated the term for his own theoretical purposes. See Habermas, *The New Conservatism* (Chapter 10), "Staatsbürgerschaft und nationale Identität" in Habermas, *Faktizität und Geltung*, and "Die Festung Europa und das Neue Deutschland," *Die Zeit,* 4 June 1993, 3.

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[17]The following remarks are developed at greater length in Mark Lilla, "The Legitimacy of the Liberal Age," in Mark Lilla, ed., *New French Thought: Political Philosophy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994).

[18]Of the three, Raymond Aron is the best known abroad. He was, of course, a major public figure in postwar French life, writing dozens of books, serving as a regular journalist (*Le Figaro*), and launching several reviews (*Preuves, Contrepoint, Commentaire*). Although Cornelius Castoriadis and Claude Lefort shared Aron's anticommunism, they were not liberals. In 1949 they founded the *Socialisme ou barbarie* group that subsequently published a series of remarkable books and magazines criticizing communism from an anarcho-syndicalist viewpoint. The two soon went their separate ways, though Castoriadis ran the group until it disbanded in the early 1970s. Among his works in English are Cornelius Castoriadis, *Political and Social Writings*, 2 vols. (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1988); *Crossroads in the Labyrinth* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984); *The Imaginary Institution of Society* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987); and *Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). Claude Lefort began in the 1940s as a Trotskyist, later became a student of Merleau-Ponty's and a collaborator at *Les Temps modernes*, but recently has moved closer to the liberal tradition. Among his important works are *Democracy and Political Theory* (Cambridge: Polity Press/Basil Blackwell, 1988); *Éléments d'une critique de la bureaucratie* (Paris: Gallimard, 1979); and *The Political Forms of Modern Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1986).

[19]Two classic works giving slightly different accounts of these changes are Jean Fourastié, *Les Trente Glorieuses* (Paris: Fayard, 1979) and Henri Mendras, *La Seconde Révolution française* (Paris: Gallimard, 1988).

[20]It is Gilles Lipovetsky's provocative and much discussed thesis that May 1968 can only be explained as an expression of a new social individualism produced by postwar liberal life. See Gilles Lipovetsky, "May 68, or the Rise of Transpolitical Individualism" in Lilla, ed., *New French Thought: Political Philosophy*, as well as his essays in *L'Ere du vide* (Paris: Gallimard, 1983). A contrary view is expressed by Castoriadis himself in Edgar Morin, Claude Lefort, and Cornelius Castoriadis, eds., *Mai 1968*, 2nd ed. (Brussels: Complexe, 1988). See also the special issue of *Pouvoirs* (39) (1986) devoted to this question.

[21]See François Furet, Jacques Julliard, and Pierre Rosanvallon, *La République du centre* (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1988).

[22]Examples of many of these tendencies are to be found in Lilla, ed., *New French Thought: Political Philosophy*. Few of the important new French works on liberal society have been translated into English. The major exceptions are the writings of Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, who defend a modern "humanism" drawn from Kant and Fichte. Among their joint works in English are *French Philosophy of the Sixties* (Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press, 1990); *Heidegger and Modernity* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1990); and *From the Rights of Man to the Republican Idea* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1992). Separately, Luc Ferry has written *Rights* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1990); *The System of Philosophies of History* (Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press, 1992); and *Homo aestheticus* (Paris: B. Grasset, 1990). Alain Renaut's *The Age of the Individual* is scheduled to appear in the "New French Thought" series at Princeton University Press in 1995. Among the other impor-

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tant political thinkers in this generation is Marcel Gauchet, editor of *Le Débat*. His major works, which take an anthropological approach to modern history, are *Le Désenchantement du monde* (Paris: Gallimard, 1985); *La Révolution des droits de l'homme* (Paris: Gallimard, 1989); and, with Gladys Swain, *The Asylum and the Democratic Revolution* (forthcoming). Another is Pierre Manent, whose work is inspired by both Raymond Aron and Leo Strauss. His books are *An Intellectual History of Liberalism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); *Les Libéraux* (Paris: Hachette, 1986); *Naissances de la politique moderne* (Paris: Payot, 1977); and *Tocqueville et la nature de la démocratie*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Fayard, 1993).

[23]See, for example, the recent collection edited by François Furet and Mona Ozouf, *Le Siècle de l'avènement Républicain* (Paris: Gallimard, 1993). The classic study of republicanism as an idea is Claude Nicolet, *L'Idée républicaine en France* (Paris: Gallimard, 1982).

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So it is conceivable that the problems of history, sociology, politics, psychology need not only correction, but radical reformulation. In other words, it looks as if Europe has come to a point where everything in the treasure-house of a very old culture has to be looked at anew, has to be weighed again and assayed. All questions would have to be asked again, but from the viewpoint of their consistency, of their basic unity, of their relevancy. The task would be not so much to solve the problems one by one—that would be the hopeless attempt to rely once more on unquestioned questions and "self-evident" practical axioms, an attempt which would lead back to nihilism. The relevance of the problems would have to be established, their importance, place, and function for a way of thinking leading toward a nonarbitrary unity of thought and life, a unity not given, but to be discovered—discovered in a very cool and very passionate quest.

Only a prophet could tell if that tremendously hard task will be undertaken and, if so, if it will be accomplished. The need, it seems, is acutely felt by thinking people all over the Old Continent; perhaps more felt than clearly understood. It might be that even intellectually courageous people will turn away from it. There is so much to be done; there are on the other hand such big potential audiences waiting for any new "final solution"; there are so many possibilities for comforts of every kind that, if you add to enough bread enough *circenses*, the sense for problems, as opposed to difficulties, may wither away. A pessimist would say that the resulting boredom, sometimes already visible as a social phenomenon, would lead to a new barbarism, the reign of violence, and the destruction of the perfect ant-heap, to borrow Nietzsche's expression. But that would be a pessimist's outlook. It is quite as possible that ants are content—or that human beings accept to think.

Eric Weil

From "Philosophical and Political Thought
in Europe Today"
Dædalus 93 (1) (Winter 1964)

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Nancy Bermeo

Democracy in Europe

THIS ESSAY PUTS OUR CURRENT social science thinking about Eastern Europe's new democracies into historical perspective and presents a case for cautious optimism. There is no "scientific" prediction here—if our work on regime change bears any resemblance to a science at all, it is to medicine and not to physics. Like physicians, we compare the case before us to other cases and we make an educated guess.

The agenda requires a comparative perspective but choosing a set of comparable cases is not easy. The dizzying pace of change in post-Cold War Europe has forced us to grab on to all sorts of historical parallels to get our bearings. These range from Europe in 1066, to Muscovy in the 1600s, to the end of colonialism in Latin America. The choices are further complicated by the argument that these new European democracies are essentially incomparable. Martin Malia maintains that postcommunism (like communism itself) is "unique in human history."[1] There is much truth to this but it is still too early to know the extent to which these regimes will be defined by their communist antecedents.

I make the assumption that the East Central European regimes will be defined not solely by their communist past but by their European location. These regimes have already adopted the institutions of European parliamentary democracies and the majority of their citizens aspire to be accepted as modern Europeans.[2] Though much of the recent history of this region *is* unprecedented, the aspiration to forge and maintain a "new" democracy on European soil is not. This is, after all, the *fourth* wave of new European

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democracies since World War I and there is much to be gained from viewing these new regimes in the context of their predecessors. The sets of democracies formed in the interwar years, in the years following World War II, and in the mid-1970s differ from the postcommunist regimes in important ways, but all of these new democracies faced problems of stability and consolidation. Their successes and their failures are relevant today not simply because they provide lessons from a common European home but because they have profoundly affected our thinking about democracies in general. Many of the remedies being prescribed for the troubles of Eastern Europe in the 1990s are forged through the analysis of these historical cases and many of our predictions about the future of new democracies today are based on what we believe about their earlier counterparts.

The argument for West European comparisons is strongest in the Central European states of Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, and these are the contemporary focal points of this analysis. The Russian Federation is discussed as well but it remains in a separate analytic category because its status as a formal democracy is so recent.

THE MALADIES OF THE NEW DEMOCRACIES

The tone of the literature on Europe's new democracies runs from triumphant to despairing. Jeanne Kirkpatrick opened a 1991 speech on postcommunism with the words "We won!"[3] but there is no shortage of pessimism in the social science community as a whole. On the contrary, the list of maladies allegedly affecting the new democracies in the East is long and troubling. The legacy of political history in these nations is said to be especially "unfriendly" to democracy and their current pools of leaders are said to lack the qualities required for the tasks of consolidation.[4] Communism is believed to have left behind a "distrustful," nondemocratic civil society[5] and a strong likelihood of serious performance failures.[6] Writers on both sides of the Atlantic warn of the drift toward populism and the ugliest forms of nationalism:[7] Leszek Kolakowski reminds the triumphant that the "victory of democracy" is far from assured and that there are "noncommunist forms of tyranny";[8] Adam Michnik writes that democracy's defense against "xenopho-

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

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

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bic authoritarianism" is weakening;[9] and Václav Havel writes that "demagogy is everywhere" and that citizens are becoming "more and more clearly disgusted" with their elected governments.[10]

The pessimistic forecasts for East Central Europe are easily matched by those for the former Soviet Union, where problems of leadership, political culture, and policy-making seem even worse. There, 126 different peoples live within the current federation and even the fundamental problem of national boundaries is unresolved.[11] The recent parliamentary elections, in which 23 percent of the vote went to Vladimir Zhirinovsky and his ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party, simply confirmed the pessimism of many. The depth and breadth of the problems in the Russian Federation may mean that democracy is not a possibility and that the state is simply "too big to salvage."[12]

PREVIOUS DIAGNOSES

We cannot know what these many maladies will lead to but we can learn something from putting our pessimism in historical perspective. Looking backward, we see the same degree of despair about Europe's new democracies in the years following World War II. As a 1955 article in the *American Political Science Review* observed: "the political communities" of the major continental countries "are fragmented into exclusive ideological movements. . .alienated from the West, politically apathetic or actively recruited to communism. . . .The survival of parliamentary and democratic institutions" in Western Europe "is by no means to be taken for granted."[13]

Postwar analyses of German and Italian democracy were filled with foreboding. Studies of Germany's first several elections bemoaned the continued popularity of antidemocratic forces and concluded that the trend was "clearly against the center."[14] Analysts feared the weakness of the nation's political parties,[15] "the unparalleled apathy" of the population,[16] and even the political sympathies of the middle class.[17] Studies of Germany in the late 1950s revealed that only one-quarter of the adult population were "consistent supporters of democracy."[18]

The forecast for the new democratic regime in Italy was not much better. Studies of public opinion concluded that the "chances of democracy" there were "not good" and that parliamentary govern-

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ment was a "hypocritical fiction."[19] At least two serious analysts projected that Italy's future political system would be like Salazar's dictatorship in Portugal[20] and some even wrote of a threatening civil war.[21]

The pessimistic forecasts were not confined to the former Axis Powers. The French Fourth Republic was—justifiably—a source of great concern. As Gordon Craig reminds us, the "gloomier newspaper pundits" predicted a communist takeover in France by the end of 1947.[22] A 1949 article in *Foreign Affairs* described the public's "disgust" with parliament in a tone which presages the words of Václav Havel,[23] and a poll conducted in 1958 found that only 4 percent of the French public would actively oppose a military coup (four months later a military coup took place).[24] The Republic which had produced no fewer than twenty-five governments in twelve years was replaced by a new democratic system designed by Charles de Gaulle. Concern about the viability of French democracy continued, however, and Stanley Hoffmann has argued that it was not until the 1980s that the new democratic system was truly consolidated.

When another set of new democracies emerged in Southern Europe in the mid-1970s, scholars were again reluctant to be optimistic. An article by Juan Linz, which appeared in *Dædalus* in 1979, exemplified both the uncertainty and the pessimism of the period. The list of factors identified by Linz as "handicaps" to the Southern European regimes in the 1970s is remarkably similar to the list of maladies associated with the Central European states today. He cautioned that the new regimes in Greece, Spain, and Portugal were emerging at a time of simultaneous economic and ideological "crisis" which left "no clear models to follow or reject." Economic constraints meant that none of the states could "carry out the progressive policies" that would win them popular support. The uncertainty of national leaders, the "limited legitimacy of some of the participants," "the dangers of polarization, fragmentation or immobilism" inherent in their extreme multiparty systems, and "the serious threat of peripheral nationalisms" in Spain meant that each of the three new democracies was beset by "a crisis of legitimation."[25]

Objectively, concern for the crisis of Southern European democracy as a whole was neither intense nor long-lasting within the American scholarly community in general. The community paid

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little attention to Greece[26] and reservations about Spanish democracy soon gave way to laudatory discussions of Spain's peaceful and pacted transition.

Portuguese democracy *was* a source of special, if not enduring, concern due to its revolutionary beginnings and to the presence of a relatively popular pro-Soviet Communist Party. The image of Weimar Russia, used so frequently today, had an ironic parallel in the image of Bolshevik Portugal in the mid-1970s.[27] Henry Kissinger likened Mario Soares to the ill-fated Kerensky,[28] and even social scientists who were further removed from the front lines of the Cold War shared a profound pessimism regarding Portugal's future. A 1976 article in *Foreign Affairs* was representative of the contemporary mood:[29] it was profoundly pessimistic despite being written after democratic forces had already gained the ascendancy in the freely elected Constitutional Assembly, the provisional government, and the military. It argued that Portugal's democratic revolution was "doomed to face the worst of all possible worlds at the worst of all possible times," that "no group has the capability of easily or quickly destroying the other, but each has an incentive to seek to do so. . .," and that only "some miracle" would prevent a Spanish style "civil war."[30]

Thankfully, this bleak scenario was never played out. Conflicts were always resolved peacefully and within the realm of law. The parliamentary and presidential elections of 1976 proceeded without incident and gave overwhelming support to prodemocratic, mainstream parties—just as the elections to the Constitutional Assembly had done in the previous year.

There were many reasons to believe that the new democracies of Southern Europe would not prove viable. During the two centuries before these transitions, Southern Europe was a region of "unparalleled instability."[31] Scholars emphasized the "weak institutionalization" of interest groups,[32] the "fragile political attachments"[33] of the Southern European people, and their general lack of "civicness."[34] Yet, each of these regimes has held together for nearly twenty years and each is considered a fully consolidated democracy today.

This points toward two conclusions. The first concerns the actors who are most likely to challenge democratic rules and institutions. Despite grave problems, and unlike their predecessors in the interwar years, none of the postwar democratic regimes was successfully

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challenged through parliament, through the executive, or through popular mobilization in the streets. The *only* regimes which *did* break down were targets of military revolts: The French crisis of 1958 led to a reconstructed democracy; the Greek military coup of 1967, which led to a vile dictatorship, was the *only* case of democratic breakdown in the entire postwar history of over twenty-one West European parliamentary regimes. These are very good odds.

The second conclusion is that we have despaired about new European democracies before and that things worked out better than expected. The social science community had sound reasons to doubt the viability of each of these new systems—in some ways they showed even less promise than those of East Central Europe today—but democracy in its many forms muddled through in all these states—and in the potentially difficult cases of Belgium, Finland, and Austria as well.

Why is it that the most despairing scenarios never came to pass in the West European cases? What can be learned from the erroneous predictions? The primary reason the likelihood of democratic breakdown was overstated was that no one considered the other half of the regime-change dilemma. New democracies are indeed very difficult to create and maintain but successfully *assaulting* a democracy is very difficult as well.[35]

THE PATHS BETWEEN CRISIS AND BREAKDOWN

Democracies can be in crisis for a whole variety of reasons: they may have grave economic problems, unwieldy party systems, serious social cleavages, or all of these problems and more—but crisis and breakdown are two distinct phenomena. The paths between crisis and breakdown are not traveled as frequently as some of us imagine because these paths are treacherous in themselves. Antidemocratic groups who travel this terrain often fail and most do not attempt the journey at all.

The image of democratic "collapse" is misleading. Democratic political systems do not simply break down from exhaustion or from some set of structural maladies. They must be deliberately assaulted and disassembled. Some of the agents who contribute to this process may do so unwittingly, but ultimately democracies are

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disassembled by actors with power who think they have a better idea and organize to implement it.

Philippe Schmitter argues perceptively that democracy "has to be chosen" by "real live political actors" who "have plenty of room for making right or wrong" decisions.[36] The same can be said of those who seek to assault a democracy in crisis. If we are going to make any sense of the new democracies in Europe, we must think more systematically about who chooses dictatorship and about the paths they choose in the terrain between crisis and breakdown.

There are only a limited number of paths through which a democracy can be assaulted and destroyed. Military coups and foreign invasions constitute one set, but democracy can also be attacked through its own legitimate governmental structures.[37] These latter assault routes loom especially large in pessimistic forecasts for democracy in the East. This is a legacy of the failure of the new democracies of the interwar years, when antidemocratic forces triumphed over democratic groups through victories in national elections and nomination to executive office. Fascists played the democratic game and won — even though they played in gross violation of its basic rules. Whether this route will be traveled by antidemocratic forces in East Central Europe is a question for area specialists, but those who would hope to block these paths have much to learn from studying the historical cases in which they were traveled with success.

The cases of Italy and Germany are the most important because they have had such a profound effect on our thinking about democratic consolidation. The connections between political extremism and economic dislocation, between parliamentary immobilism and proportional representation, between authoritarianism and presidentialism, and between dictatorship and certain political cultures have all been graphically illustrated by these two tragic cases. Much of the pessimism about what may transpire in Europe's new democracies is based on observations that the frailties of these earlier democracies are being duplicated in another setting.

There are several similarities between today's new democracies and the democracies which gave way to fascism. Proportional representation has again proven to be a barrier to absolute majorities, and critics again accuse their newly democratic governments of immobilism.[38] Economic crises have contributed to the growth of

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nationalist-extremist parties and minorities are once again blamed for a whole range of economic and social ills.[39] In Poland and in the Russian Federation it is feared that presidential government may eventually deteriorate into some form of partially legitimated authoritarianism.

These sorts of parallels lead some analysts to conclude that antidemocratic forces in Central Europe will triumph just as their counterparts did in the interwar years. Both Mussolini and Hitler established political parties, competed in elections, won seats in the national legislature, and were then chosen to head governments by legitimate actors at the summit of their respective constitutional systems. Both these dictators took the governmental path to power and were assisted on the last leg of their journey by nominations to executive office from the King in Mussolini's case and the President in Hitler's case. But these facts should not be considered out of context.

Political scientists have given a great deal of attention to parliamentary institutions and elites in their analyses of the interwar breakdowns but what went on outside parliament and outside the rule of law was equally if not more important to the success of antidemocratic forces. Happily, these extraparliamentary factors have few parallels in the Central European cases, and the governmental path to power will not be so easy to negotiate.

Three critical qualities distinguish interwar Italy and Germany from the new democracies of Central Europe: armed extremism, bipolar extremism, and judicial dysfunctionality. The Italian and German democracies were greatly affected by the fact that World War I had left thousands of men on both ends of the political spectrum with arms, military experience, and little material security. For the communist Left, the success of the Bolshevik Revolution provided a positive model for an armed assault on the state and on property in general. For the extreme Right, the violence perpetrated by the Left provided an excuse for counterviolence and a multitude of "preemptive" assaults. These assaults were the work of highly organized (if often decentralized) paramilitary organizations involving thousands of men. In both Italy and Germany, they targeted not only individual political actors but buildings, enterprises, and even the freely elected governments of large municipalities.[40]

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In Italy, this meant that fascist squads dominated many rural areas and presented themselves as bastions against communist attack. They terrorized the populations of such cities as Ferrara, Ravena, Cremona, Bologna, Parma, and Florence. From Naples they openly threatened the central government, deposed the freely elected socialist government of Milan, and brought thousands of armed men to riot in the capital *before* the infamous march on Rome.[41] Similarly, Hitler's S.A. (Storm Troopers) and S.S. marched throughout Germany by the thousands with weapons and uniforms long before Hitler formally came to power.[42] They regularly disrupted election campaigns, terrorized all who would "distract the minds" of the German people,[43] and even erected a cordon around Berlin during the presidential elections of 1932.

Amazingly, these and other flagrant violations of legality went unpunished. In Italy, fascist deputies brandished weapons in parliament, seized a communist deputy, and literally threw him out of the assembly yet they were never punished — despite the fact that their party commanded only 7 percent of the assembly seats. In both states, the judicial system usually failed to prosecute right-wing hooliganism, thereby lending legitimacy to the politics of coercion.

This dysfunctioning of the legal system existed in part because some magistrates were antidemocratic themselves but also because the decisions of those who were not antidemocratic were complicated by other factors. In both Germany and Italy, police and military forces often stood by as paramilitary organizations took massive coercive action on their own. Sometimes, as in Italy in 1921, elements of the army even lent fascist mobs trucks and weapons. Magistrates who sought to control right-wing violence often could not depend on the official coercive apparatus of the state to report crimes, arrest criminals, or even eschew criminal behavior themselves.

A second complicating factor derived from the effects of bipolar extremism on centrists. Centrists who might have been the foundation of the new democratic order were convinced that right-wing paramilitary organizations were needed as a bulwark against the sort of leftist revolution that had triumphed in Russia. This conviction enabled the far Right to play the center against the far Left, thereby ensuring the passivity of the judiciary.

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Rather than charging fascist hooligans with crimes, centrists often relied on the fascists to assault their mutual enemies on the communist Left. The uneasy defensive alliances which at first ensured informal judicial immunity eventually became the voting alliances that endorsed the nominations of Mussolini and Hitler to executive power. The fact that Friedrich Ebert, a revered Social Democrat, called upon the *Freikorps* to crush the Red Army in the Ruhr in 1919 illustrates just how broad the effects of bipolar extremism were.[44]

Fascism triumphed in the streets before it triumphed in governmental institutions. Mussolini and Hitler took multiple paths to power. They assaulted their new democracies from several points. This must be emphasized if comparison between the interwar and East Central European democracies is to prove useful.

The bipolar extremism, bipolar violence, and judicial dysfunctionality that existed in interwar Germany and Italy from the very inception of their new democracies have no readily apparent parallels in the new East Central European democracies. Judicial dysfunctionality is not present because extremist violence is practically nonexistent. Even the breakup of Czechoslovakia was achieved without armed struggle or paramilitary activity. That a nation would actually disassemble itself through a "velvet divorce" seems a remarkable testament to what can be done *without* violence in this region.

The fact that all these democracies were established in the aftermath of a *cold* war rather than an open, armed conflict means that the structural foundations of paramilitarism are much weaker. In East Central Europe, there are no beleaguered veterans to form the bases of contemporary *Freikorps* or *arditi* and thus no ready foundation for extremist parties to engage in the politics of open coercion. Relatedly, there is no event comparable to the Bolshevik Revolution which can serve as a positive example of armed struggle. On the contrary, both the citizenry and the elite of these new regimes seem to take special pride in the nonviolent nature of their revolutionary transformations. As the current president of Hungary reminds us, "not even a slap was heard" as these new democracies came into being.[45] Their interwar counterparts were radically different for they were rooted in both the violent revolutions that were the midwives of their birth and World War I.

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Extremism certainly exists in the new democracies of Central Europe but it has not taken the same bipolar form that proved lethal for the interwar regimes. Whereas armed defenders of the ancien régime were active from the very inception of democracy in Italy and Germany, the old order poses little threat to democracy in Central Europe today—it had few defenders in 1989 and has even fewer now that so many apparatchiks have become "entrepreneurchiks."[46] Although the electoral appeal of former Communist Parties may be on the rise in some of these states, it has yet to approach the historic popularity of Communist Parties in the consolidated democracies of Western Europe.[47]

Another major difference between these new democracies and their ill-fated predecessors relates to political spectrums. The whole concept of a political spectrum running from Left to Right is problematic in the post-totalitarian systems. Forty years of communism have blunted the social and economic divisions which produced this spectrum in capitalist states,[48] and though the spectrum will likely emerge as marketization proceeds, the concept is of little use as a guide to understanding the ideologies of the current set of political parties. If we define the far Left as all those actors hostile to capitalism, we are forced to lump communists together with nationalists, who in terms of religiosity and other cultural values are extremely conservative. The far Right in this scenario would be hard to conceptualize and only some communists and some nationalists would fit this definition anyway. Alternatively, if we define the far Left as embracing all those actors who are hostile to "bourgeois democracy," we find ourselves in the same illogical position.

In any case, we are witnessing a dynamic that differs greatly from the polarities that led to the triumph of fascism. In interwar Germany and Italy, the antidemocratic Right seduced the center into an antidemocratic alliance by presenting itself as the defender of order and private property. Given the party landscape of the new democracies, this is an impossible scenario. No obvious postcommunist substitute for the left-right spectrum is available.

Identifying extremists in these systems is fairly easy but finding their polar opposites and arraying them on a spectrum with a center is extremely difficult. Where, for example, do we find the polar opposite of a nationalist party? Logically it would be an interna-

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tionalist party. We might stretch a bit and argue that all those parties who are open to trade liberalization, foreign investment, and entrance to the European Community (EC) could be so defined—but can we call these parties extremist? Since access to the benefits of internationalism in Europe requires at least a facade of democracy today, this categorization makes no sense. In any case, the parties who have adopted these internationalist ideas define themselves as the democratic center and are seen as such by most outsiders.

The same problems emerge if we search for the polar opposite of populism. Populism is thought to be the major threat to these new democracies today and the troubling rise to power of Vladimir Mečiar in Slovakia shows us how powerful the appeals of populism can be. But who are the *anti*populists in these new regimes? They certainly exist but they do not subvert democracy and they are not extremists. They see themselves and are seen by others as centrists and as the very foundation of economic and political liberalism.

The bipolar spectrum that we have relied on in the past has to be modified to make sense of the East European democracies. The dynamic that produced centrifugal forces in interwar Italy and Germany is absent in these systems and thus the parliamentary paths to power will be harder to negotiate.

Extremism in Eastern Europe today has thus far resulted in centripetal movements, not the centrifugal movements that spelled the death of democracy in the past. Extremist forces exist, but nonextremists, despite their systems' many maladies, are still distancing themselves from the extremes. In Poland, Hanna Suchocka's seven party coalition came together in a deliberate alliance against the two alternative extremes of Olszewski's decommunization and the Polish Peasant Party's recommunization.[49] In Czechoslovakia, the reaction to Mečiar provides another example of centripetal distancing. As soon as Mečiar became an open advocate of nationalist populism, he was dismissed from the ruling centrist party. As soon as he succeeded in creating a large populist-separatist movement in Slovakia, his whole *state* was dismissed. Key Czech elites recognized the opportunity to rid their new regime of a potential liability and acceded to demands for separatism with surprising speed.

Many would characterize Mečiar as an antidemocrat, and he has certainly used the parliamentary paths to power with success, but it

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would be a mistake to see his victory as evidence that dictatorship is especially viable in these states. Mečiar's Slovakia is still, for all its shortcomings, a polyarchy and it does not, at present, seem to be a model that others would want to emulate. Now that Mečiar has achieved his main goal, his popularity has dropped dramatically. He is not reaping the benefits of association with the industrialized states of Europe and cannot make good on his populist promises. Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl remind us that the austerity of the current world economy may have some "perverse advantages." Under current conditions, populism "cannot deliver the immediate rewards that have been its sustenance in the past" and neither the extreme Right nor the extreme Left has a plausible alternative system to offer.[50] The governmental path to dictatorship does not look very promising in the Central European states.

Inside the former Soviet Union the governmental path to dictatorship seems easier to negotiate. This is why references to Weimar Russia have multiplied since the parliamentary elections in December 1993. There are indeed some parallels here but there are dramatic differences too. To begin with, the chronologies of the two cases diverge in important ways. As our previous discussion illustrates, Hitler scored his electoral victories after many years of struggle in the streets. He built a vast (and armed) mass movement *before* playing the parliamentary game with much success. Zhirinovsky and his Liberal Democratic Party have done the opposite. They have scored an important electoral victory before developing a strong organizational movement. This means that they have substantially less to bargain with politically. Their voting base may be very fluid and since they are not a paramilitary organization, they pose no comparable physical threat to their adversaries or to public order more generally. Whether Zhirinovsky (or anyone like him) will succeed in creating the sort of organization a fascist movement requires remains to be seen but it will not be built in the same way or at the same pace as the Nazi movement. The mass unemployment that proved pivotal in the growth of armed extremism during German fascism is not yet among Russia's many maladies, and bipolar extremism—with communists battling fascists in the streets—has not materialized either. In fact, it is the political *alliance* of these groups that troubles democrats most.

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A second major distinction between these cases concerns the role of foreign democracies. The difference between a cold war and a real war matters greatly. There is no Versailles Treaty forcing massive and immediate troop reductions today.[51] Demobilization is a domestic affair and thus is not as easily manipulated by nationalists. There are also no debilitating reparations payments. Whereas the Allies' intransigence on reparations in the 1920s forced Weimar inflation to skyrocket,[52] Western advisers today are trying to control inflation instead. Rather than extracting reparations, they have provided billions in aid. They have also provided the possibility of eventual institutional links to the more advanced countries of Western Europe. These were of great importance to the consolidation of the new democracies of the 1970s. Though the time frame is obviously very different in this case, the acquisition of a European identity may be a powerful rationale for compromise and sacrifice among important sectors of the Russian population. There was no European Community in the days of Weimar. The dynamics of exclusion and inclusion were dramatically different.

The most important difference between these cases may derive from their order of appearance. Those who defend Russian democracy today already know how the Weimar story ended and thus can learn from the errors of their predecessors—if they choose to do so. Three lessons seem particularly important. First, Hitler could not have traveled the governmental route to power without the assistance of *non*fascists. His nomination to the chancellorship in 1933 was not dictated by law or even electoral momentum. He had been defeated in his bid for the presidency by a substantial margin the year before and his party had actually lost two million votes since the previous parliamentary election.[53] Hitler was named to the chancellorship because nonfascists could not agree on an alternative candidate and because a small set of scheming politicians naively assumed they could control him in an almost exclusively non-Nazi cabinet. We now know that alliances with fascists are fraught with danger and that the argument for political distancing is stronger. We also know that fascism feeds on economic dislocation. This is a second lesson from the Weimar experience and presumably why Yegor Gaidar insists that Russia's chance to avoid fascism lies "in making the economy grow."[54] The sad irony is that the model of economic growth which the West has exported to the East will

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cause rather than eliminate economic dislocation for some time to come. Policymakers who understand the history of fascism will realize that meaningful protection for those who are most threatened by marketization may be critical to the protection of democracy itself.[55]

The third lesson of Weimar is that nations take grave risks when they ignore extremist victories abroad. Here the contrast with the Russian case is especially dramatic. Whereas the nomination of Hitler to the chancellorship caused "no great sensation"[56] in the international press, Zhirinovsky's relatively minor victory in parliament has attracted attention across the world. The alarm bells have sounded, and, internationally, Zhirinovsky has immediately become a pariah, forbidden visas and publicly reviled by virtually all powerful heads of state. The international community of the 1930s treated Hitler very differently. The triumph of fascism in Germany (and Italy) has left a legacy of political learning that makes democrats more vigilant, if not wiser.

Whether vigilance will lead to a more successful defense of democracy in Russia (or elsewhere in Eastern Europe) is beyond the modest powers of social science to predict. As the opening section of this essay makes clear, our predictions about new democracies in Western Europe have been consistently mistaken and there is nothing to suggest that they will improve. The fact that these new regimes are struggling with the unprecedented task of creating market economies as well as democracies should make us particularly cautious. Uncertainty is still the defining condition of these new regimes, and thus our efforts are best spent simply trying to understand them as they are today.[57] Comparing the Central European democracies to other new democracies on the same continent helps us gain this understanding, but the comparison must be made with an eye toward differences as well as similarities. Pessimistic predictions based on partial parallels may lead us to give up on Europe's new democracies too soon.

ENDNOTES

[1]Martin Malia, "Leninist Endgame," *Dædalus* 121 (2) (Spring 1992): 58.

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[2]Being accepted into the European Community is important for symbolic as well as economic reasons. Analysts from a variety of perspectives are united in emphasizing the multifaceted importance of joining Europe. See, for example, Jeffrey C. Goldfarb, *After the Fall* (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 9 and Adam Przeworski, "The East Becomes the South?: The Autumn of the People and the Future of Eastern Europe," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 24 (23) (March 1991): 23.

[3]Jean Kirkpatrick, "After Communism, What?," *Problems of Communism* 41 (1–2) (January-April 1992): 7–10. The quotation is from the Editor's Introduction to the issue.

[4]Grzegorz Ekiert, "Peculiarities of Post-Communist Politics: The Case of Poland," *Studies in Comparative Communism* XXV (4) (December 1992): 342–43. The one exception to this argument is Czechoslovakia which had a successful democracy from 1918 to 1938. Michael Bernhard, "Barriers to Further Political and Economic Change in Poland," *Studies in Comparative Communism* XXIII (3/4) (Autumn/Winter 1990): 320. Hannan Rose, "From Command to Free Politics," *The Political Quarterly* 64 (2) (April-June 1993): 160. Dankwart A. Rustow, "Democracy: A Global Revolution?," *Foreign Affairs* 69 (4) (Fall 1990): 86.

[5]Ken Jowitt, *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1992), 310. Benjamin Barber as quoted in Ekiert, "Peculiarities of Post-Communist Politics: The Case of Poland," 360–61. Sten Berglund and Jan Dellenbrant, "Prospects for the New Democracies in Eastern Europe," in Sten Berglund and Jan Dellenbrant, eds., *The New Democracies in Eastern Europe* (Brookfield, Ill.: Edward Elgar Publishing Company, 1991), 22.

[6]Claus Offe, "Capitalism by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe," *Social Research* 58 (4) (Winter 1991): 882. Sidney Tarrow, "Aiming at a Moving Target: Social Science and the Recent Rebellions in Eastern Europe," *PS: Political Science and Politics* 24 (1) (March 1991): 17.

[7]See, for example, Giovanni Sartori, "Rethinking Democracy: Bad Policy and Bad Politics," *International Social Science Journal* XLIII (3) (August 1991): 447; Peter Gowan, "Western Economic Diplomacy and the New Eastern Europe," *New Left Review* 182 (July/August 1990): 77; Mary E. McIntosh and Martha MacIver, "Coping with Freedom and Uncertainty: Public Opinion in Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia 1989–1992," *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 4 (4) (Winter 1992): 388; and Michael Bernhard, "Barriers to Further Political and Economic Change in Poland," *Studies in Comparative Communism* XXIII (3/4) (Autumn/Winter 1990): 329.

[8]Leszek Kolakowski, "Amidst Moving Ruins," *Dædalus* 121 (2) (Spring 1992): 55.

[9]Adam Michnik, "The Church and the Martyr's Stake in Poland," *NPQ* 10 (3) (Summer 1993): 36.

[10]Václav Havel, "Paradise Lost," *New York Review of Books,* 9 April 1992, 6.

[11]Galina Starovoitova, "Weimar Russia?," *Journal of Democracy* 4 (3) (July 1993): 107.

[12]Andrew C. Janos, "Social Science, Communism, and the Dynamics of Political Change," in Nancy Bermeo, ed., *Liberalization and Democratization* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 111.

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[13]Gabriel A. Almond, Taylor Cole, and Roy C. Macridis, "A Suggested Research Strategy in Western European Government and Politics," *American Political Science Review* XLIX (4) (December 1955): 1042–49.

[14]Robert C. Schmid, "The German Election in Perspective," *American Perspective* III (4) (September 1949): 197.

[15]Sigmund Neumann, "Germany's Unresolved Dilemmas," *Foreign Policy Bulletin* XXXII (2) (1 October 1952): 7.

[16]J. Glenn Gray, "Denazification: An American Appraisal," *American Perspective* II (8) (January 1949): 421.

[17]Harold O. Lewis, "German Parties and the Bundestag Elections," *American Perspective* III (4) (September 1949): 205.

[18]K. W. Deutsch and L. J. Edinger, *Germany Rejoins the Powers* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959), 38. Serious scholars argued that "rigidity" and the inability to compromise were still the main features of political life and that only 20 percent of the new democracy's political elite had consistently opposed the Nazi regime. Sigmund Neumann, "The German Elections—Meaning and Impact," *Foreign Policy Bulletin* XXXII (23) (15 August 1953): 2; and Lewis J. Edinger, "Post-Totalitarian Leadership," *American Political Science Review* LIV (1) (March 1960): 75, 79.

[19]Felix Oppenheim, "The Prospects of Italian Democracy," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* II (4) (Winter 1947–1948): 572–74. Oppenheim also said that the situation was not hopeless if the United States could help illustrate that democracy was compatible with bold social planning.

[20]Vittorio Ivella, "Party Rule in the Democratic State," *Foreign Affairs* 28 (1) (October 1949): 75, and H. Stuart Hughes, "Italy under De Gasperi," *American Perspective* II (8) (January 1949): 419.

[21]Hans Kohn, "Austria: Frontier Land of the West," *Foreign Policy Bulletin* XXXIII (8) (1 January 1954): 6. Many scholars wrote that democracy would be jeopardized without drastic redistributive reforms and that the communists and the Christian Democrats faced one another as "two distinct nations" unable even to communicate. See, for example, Clifford A. L. Rich, "Italy's Election Prospects," *Foreign Policy Bulletin* XXXII (12) (1 March 1953): 7, and Elizabeth Wiskemann, "Poverty and Population in the South," *Foreign Affairs* 28 (1) (October 1949): 88. Hughes, "Italy under De Gasperi," 414.

[22]Gordon A. Craig, *Europe Since 1815* (New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1971), 714.

[23]Jean-Marie Domenach, "Democratic Paralysis in France," *Foreign Affairs* 37 (1) (October 1958): 33.

[24]Nicholas Wahl, *The Fifth Republic—France's New Political System* (New York: Random House, 1959), 20.

[25]Juan Linz, "Europe's Southern Frontier: Evolving Trends Toward What?," *Dædalus* 108 (1) (Winter 1979): 204. Linz's point about a crisis of legitimation stands alongside his view that the majority of the citizens in these states seem desirous of a democratic system.

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[26]Virtually all the articles written in major social science journals on Greece were written by Greek or British scholars.

[27]For examples of the Weimar parallel see Anders Åslund, "Russia's Road from Communism," *Dædalus* 121 (2) (Spring 1992): 8, and Starovoitova, "Weimar Russia?," 106–109.

[28]Tad Szulc, "Lisbon and Washington: Behind the Portuguese Revolution," *Foreign Policy* 21 (Winter 1975–1976): 3. Henry Kissinger is said to have suggested the parallel to Mario Soares himself and warned the socialist leader that he was allowing excessive communist influence in government.

[29]Tad Szulc, for example, wrote of the possibilities of a rightist coup or left-wing military regimes on the Peruvian or Algerian model. Ibid., 6.

[30]Kenneth Maxwell, "The Thorns of the Portuguese Revolution," *Foreign Affairs* 54 (2) (January 1976): 258, 265, and 268. The order of these phrases is different in the original.

[31]Richard Gunther, Hans-Jurgen Puhle, and P. Nikiforos Diamandouros, "Introduction: The Politics of Democratic Consolidation," in Social Science Research Council, *The New Southern Europe,* unpublished manuscript, 1993, 38.

[32]Linz, "Europe's Southern Frontier: Evolving Trends Toward What?," 181.

[33]P. Nikiforos Diamandouros and Richard Gunther, "Preface," in Social Science Research Council, *The New Southern Europe,* viii.

[34]Philippe C. Schmitter, "An Introduction to Southern European Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Italy, Greece, Portugal, Spain and Turkey," in Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule—Prospects for Democracy, Part I* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 7. Schmitter does not make this claim himself but states quite sensibly that these claims are often exaggerated.

[35]The subject of how democracies are successfully brought down is undertheorized. Juan J. Linz, *Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 4–5, 13.

[36]Philippe Schmitter, "Interest Systems and the Consolidation of Democracies," in Gary Marks and Larry Diamond, eds., *Reexamining Democracy* (London: Sage Publications, 1992), 158–59.

[37]There are probably only five routes through which a democracy can be assaulted: military coups, foreign military invasions, executive coups, a triumph of an anti-democratic party at the polls, and nomination by legitimate actors within existing institutions. I discuss these routes at length in a forthcoming manuscript, *Democracy and the Legacies of Dictatorship.*

[38]On Hungary see Jason McDonald, "Transition to Utopia: A Reinterpretation of Economics, Ideas, and Politics in Hungary, 1984–1990," *East European Politics and Societies* 7 (2) (Spring 1993): 239. See also Wojciech Maziarski, "The Powerlessness of the Powerful: Walesa Now," *EER* (January-February 1992).

[39]George Schöpflin, "The Problem of Nationalism in the Post-Communist Order," in Peter Volten, ed., *Bound to Change: Consolidating Democracy in East Central Europe* (New York: Institute for East West Studies, 1992), 34–35, 41; David

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Ost, "Labor and Societal Transition," *Problems of Communism* XLI (3) (May-June 1992): 49–50.

[40]The enterprises here were typically left-wing publishing houses and newspapers.

[41]For details on this see Adrian Lyttleton, *The Seizure of Power* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973) and Denis Mack Smith, *Mussolini* (New York: Vintage, 1982).

[42]See, for example, Allan Bullock, *Hitler: A Study in Tyranny* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) and Walter Struve, *Elites Against Democracy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973).

[43]Craig, *Europe Since 1815,* 568.

[44]Ibid., 556–57.

[45]Rudolf Tokes, "Democracy in Hungary: The First Hundred Days and a Mid-Term Assessment," in Volten, ed., *Bound to Change: Consolidating Democracy in East Central Europe,* 153.

[46]Ellen Comisso, "Property Rights, Liberalism, and the Transition from 'Actually Existing' to Socialism," *East European Politics and Society* 5 (1) (Winter 1991): 187. Valerie Bunce and Maria Csanadi, "Uncertainty in the Transition: Post-Communism in Hungary," *East European Politics and Society* 7 (2) (1993); David Ost, "Labor and Societal Transition," *Problems of Communism* XLI (3) (May-June 1992): 49.

[47]As of this writing in December 1993, the maximum percentage of the vote in a national election garnered by a reformed Communist Party in East Central Europe was 20.4 percent in Poland's 1993 election. This is well below the maximum percentage garnered by a Communist Party in the West: 34.4 percent by the Italian Communist Party in 1976.

[48]On the problems with this spectrum see Editors, "Left, Right," *EER* 4 (2) (Spring-Summer 1990): 3. See also an article by X in the *British Journal of Political Science.* See Karol Modzelewski who argues that in Czechoslovakia, for example, the "views propagated by the traditionalist right with regard to the economy were in fact quite leftist." Karol Modzelewski, "A Temporary Truce?," *EER* (January-February 1992): 25.

[49]Modzelewski, "A Temporary Truce?," 24.

[50]Philippe Schmitter and Terry Karl, "The Types of Democracy Emerging in Southern and Eastern Europe and South and Central America," in Volten, ed., *Bound to Change: Consolidating Democracy in East Central Europe,* 64–65. Comisso makes the point that nationalism, too, can only thrive if it has something to offer politically. "If the international economy stays relatively open and major powers make it clear that nationalism has nowhere to go, its potential as a mobilizing ideology may prove much weaker than many believe." Comisso, "Property Rights, Liberalism, and the Transition from 'Actually Existing' to Socialism," 187.

[51]The Treaty reduced the German army to 100,000 and the navy to 15,000. John Hiden, *Germany and Europe 1919–1939* (New York: Longman, 1993), 25.

[52]Gordon Craig, *Germany: 1866–1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 441.

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[53]Hitler lost the 1932 presidential election by six million votes. For a very careful study of the Nazi voting base, see Richard F. Hamilton, *Who Voted for Hitler?* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982).

[54]*Moscow Segodnya,* 14 December 1993, 1, as in *FBIS,* 14 December 1993, 27.

[55]It is interesting to note that all three of the new democracies that emerged in the 1970s increased welfare spending substantially. The Spanish case is particularly instructive because it managed to consolidate democracy despite unemployment levels of 20 percent or more. A number of analysts attribute Spain's success to the quality of the social safety nets provided for Spanish workers. See Jose Maria Maravall, "Economic Reforms in New Democracies: The Southern European Experience," *East-South System Transformations,* Working Paper No. 3 (Chicago, Ill.: Department of Political Science, University of Chicago, October 1990), 25.

[56]Craig, *Germany: 1866–1945,* 569.

[57]Bunce and Csanadi, "Uncertainty in the Transition: Post-Communism in Hungary."

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Jack Snyder

Russian Backwardness and the Future of Europe

FOR OVER TWO CENTURIES, EUROPE'S geopolitical and ideological rivalry with looming, backward Russia has played a pivotal role in the continent's politics. Now Russia is poised between a tarnished hope in liberal reform and the growing fear that habitual patterns are reemerging, both in domestic and foreign affairs. In the party-list voting for parliamentary representatives in December 1993, liberal reformers, illiberal nationalists, and neocommunists won roughly equal shares. Pressed by these protest votes, President Boris Yeltsin's relatively liberal government has had to move slowly on market reform and reassert Russia's interests in the "near abroad." Ominously, Yeltsin and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, leader of the ultranationalist party, agree that Russia needs a constitution reserving decisive powers to a strong president.

In short, Russia seems in danger of slipping back into its accustomed pattern of autocratic politics, state-dominated economics, and militarized foreign policy.[1] Even worse, many observers see parallels to late Weimar Germany in Zhirinovsky's nationalist, racist backlash against the rigors of market economics.

In responding to these developments, the West is prone to two opposite, but equally erroneous impulses. The first concludes that a backward, unreformed Russia is necessarily a hamstrung Russia: a shrunken, local nuisance that at worst might sell arms to thugs, provoke inconvenient migrations, and vote inappropriately in the United Nations, but will not make significant trouble as a player in Great Power politics. The opposite impulse is to see Western acquiescence in Russian coercion of its near neighbors as a fatal act of

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appeasement. The President of Kazakhstan has compared Russia's pretensions to protecting Russians outside its borders to Hitler's claims to defend the Sudeten Germans. Likewise, the Foreign Minister of Poland has warned that Russia's attempt to veto NATO membership for Eastern European states contained "an echo of Yalta." Some Western commentators considered Zhirinovsky's electoral success a consequence of the West's appeasement of Serbian President Slobodan Milošević. Others saw a need to "reaffirm a strong interest in insuring the independence and sovereignty of the countries that a nationalist Russia might threaten," including the Baltic states.[2]

Much of the debate on Russia's future role in Europe hinges on purported patterns from the past. A review of these historical patterns suggests that Russia is unlikely to remain a peripheral backwater. Rather, the outcome of its reforms may be defining for the future of Europe as a whole. Time and again, Russia has played a pivotal role in Europe's political life despite—indeed because of—its backwardness.[3]

Russia's stance toward Europe has been shaped by its size, political autonomy, and retarded economic development. Large and centrally organized, the Russian state has been able to maintain its autonomy in the face of international competition and penetration. Yet, at the same time, keeping up was always a strain for Russia, requiring extraordinary measures and unique adaptations. Russian leaders from Peter the Great through Stalin exploited "the advantages of backwardness," using autocratic powers to whip their societies into reforming themselves and catching up with the West.[4] The coercive instruments used to promote modernization engendered a treadmill of reforms from above, which succeeded in the short run, but in the long run contained the seeds of their own failure. This reinforced the pattern of autocracy, repression, stagnation, the dominance of the military-industrial sector, and ideological divergence from the rest of Europe.

In short, the nature of Russia's regimes, whether revolutionary or reactionary, sharpened Europe's security dilemma, creating incentives for aggressive strategies of self-defense.[5] Often the problem was not that Russia was unusually belligerent, but that other Powers overreacted to a perceived Russian threat.

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Russia's cycles of reform and stagnation led to repeated episodes of military collapse. But collapse was inevitably followed by a military rebound, stimulated by another reform from above. Though humiliated by its defeat in the Crimean War in 1856, the Russian army was back at the gates of Constantinople in 1878. Though disintegrating in the face of revolution and the Japanese War in 1905, the fighting power of the Russian army was growing so rapidly by 1914 that German generals felt themselves forced to seize a now-or-never chance for war.[6] Smashed again in 1918, Soviet military power was reconstituted and played the central role in Hitler's defeat. Judging by this yardstick, the full revival of today's unraveling Russian army might take a decade or two, depending on the pace and nature of domestic reforms and the stimulus provided by foreign threats.[7] Those who think that Russia will never revive itself are probably whistling in the dark.

When Russian power *does* rebound, the nature of the regime holding that power could be decisive for Europe's future. Boris Yeltsin's present regime is about the best that can be expected, but it is hard pressed by nationalist and neocommunist critics to adopt economic policies that would reestablish old patterns and foreign policies that could alienate liberal democratic powers abroad. Thus, Russian liberals and their potential backers in the West face a seemingly intractable dilemma: appeasing the critics means drifting back into old habits, whereas opposing their demands risks strengthening the populist backlash against reform. The solution must be to show that liberal policies backed by the international community can successfully address the concerns animating the backlash constituencies. By helping Russian liberals defuse the agenda of the opponents of reform, the West can increase the chances of breaking the syndrome of backwardness that has in the past embroiled Russia with its neighbors.

RUSSIAN BACKWARDNESS AND COMPETITION WITH EUROPE

Exhorting Soviet industrial managers at the height of the First Five Year Plan, Stalin captured Russia's chronic strategic problem: "Old Russia. . .was ceaselessly beaten for her backwardness" by Swedes, Poles, and everyone else. "We are fifty or a hundred years behind

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the advanced countries. We must make good this lag in ten years. Either we do it or they crush us."[8]

More recent and more scholarly students of Russian history concur with Stalin's prognosis. William Fuller's magnificent, multiarchival *Strategy and Power in Russia 1600–1914* takes as its central theme the impact of backwardness on Russian military policy. Russia, he shows, was incessantly contending with competitors that outstripped it in material, technological, financial, organizational, and intellectual resources.[9]

This created a host of strategic problems for Russia. Low levels of education meant poor military skills, bureaucratic weakness at the local level, and a consequent inability to expand tax revenues to support military campaigns. Moreover, Russia lagged in the ability to project military power at long distances—for example, in 1905 Russian troops were transported to Manchuria over a single line of trans-Siberian track, which was completed only by laying rails across the ice on Lake Baikal. Britain and France were better able to sustain a logistical line to their troops in faraway Crimea than could roadless, creditless Russia on its own territory.[10] In wartime, Russia chronically ran out of money before its competitors, whose more sophisticated, flexible economies enhanced their ability to raise revenue on short notice by borrowing or by taxation.

On the other hand, backwardness had its advantages. Fuller shows that Peter the Great did not simply copy Europe's more modern armies. Rather, he grafted Western technological and doctrinal advances onto distinctively Russian organizational forms, which exploited or even magnified comparative advantages inherent in Russia's backwardness. Indeed, modernizing the army meant making Russian society less like that of Western Europe. Under Peter, serfs were bound more tightly to the land so that they would be available for the lifelong conscription that his military reform required.[11]

Fuller thus confirms economic historian Alexander Gerschenkron's notion of "the advantages of backwardness." Gerschenkron argued that late industrializing states like Germany and a fortiori Russia followed a much different path of economic modernization than did early developers like England. Whereas in England industrial capital had been accumulated gradually in a multiplicity of commercial hands, the latecomers, knowing the outcomes they were

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aiming for and pressed by the strategic need to catch up quickly, could take shortcuts to their goal. In Germany this meant raising capital for rapid, large-scale industrial development through centralized banks. In Russia the state itself took the lead in mobilizing economic resources, substituting for missing entrepreneurial skills and private capital.[12] Whether implemented by the czars or Stalin, this strategy often yielded dramatic short-term results for reasons that resonate with the newest theories of state-led industrial policy and strategic trade theory. The state invested in infrastructure, mobilized fallow resources, and broke bottlenecks caused by the inefficiency of immature markets, with the "simultaneity of industrialization along a broad front assuring large flows of external economies."[13]

But forced-draft economic development tended to be self-defeating in the long run. Gerschenkron sees Peter's reforms as typical: military pressure from more modern states causes the autocrat to squeeze resources out of the population to finance a spurt of economic investment in military-related sectors. The spurt ends, says Gerschenkron, in part because of the economic exhaustion due to declining standards of living.[14]

In Gerschenkron's view, the latecomers' top-down substitutes for the spontaneous institutions of early industrialization had a tendency to turn into obstacles to further stages of development. In Peter's Russia, for example, the intensified serfdom initially spurred development, in Gerschenkron's view, but eventually degenerated into an inefficient monopoly privilege of landowners, which hindered economic efficiency. Alexander II, consequently, had to abolish serfdom after the Crimean defeat in order to create a mobile pool of wage laborers.[15] This reform was also intended to establish a reservoir of more skilled manpower for a shorter service system of military conscription, incorporating aspects of the Prussians' reservist-based system.[16]

Stalin's revolution from above also illustrates this pattern. The institutions and ideas of the First Five Year Plan — central planning, the political monopoly of the coercive party apparatus, the priority for military supporting heavy industry, even the police and the dictatorship — were arguably functional for forced draft industrialization and the rapid development of a modern economic base for military power.[17] These statist substitutes for more gradual capital

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accumulation from below eventually turned into obstacles to further development. Institutions and political ideas that were well adapted to the mobilization of underused resources became, under Brezhnev, self-serving atavisms that hindered growth in a later period, when a market system's more efficient allocation of already mobilized resources was needed. Like Alexander II, Gorbachev was a reforming autocrat who tried to sweep away some of the institutional detritus of a previous top-down reform, which was becoming a fetter on further development.[18]

Sweeping away these fetters is, of course, easier said than done, in part because the vested interests of the old regime are politically powerful. Gorbachev and Yeltsin could draw upon the intelligentsia to promote the political aspects of their reform, but there was no existing entrepreneurial class to harness to their economic plans. Moreover, the autocrat himself has a vested interest in maintaining those aspects of the old system which protect him from revolutionary overthrow. Thus, most modernizing Russian autocrats from Alexander to Khrushchev have tended to be what George Breslauer calls "conservative innovators," seeking new ways to achieve the regime's traditional goals.[19] Even today, conservative marketizers, who want to retain a decisive economic role for the state and industrial vested interests, remain a powerful force both as participants in and critics of Yeltsin's government.

In Gerschenkron's view, from the 1890s to 1914, Russia successfully achieved "a Germanization of its industrial growth"[20]; commercial banks were replacing the state as the principal instrument of capital accumulation, and investment no longer relied on exorbitant extractions from the peasantry. Thus, "the pattern of substitutions was changing rapidly" to a mode of self-sustaining modernization where today's successes no longer threw up obstacles to the successes of tomorrow.[21] Had this trend not been aborted by World War I and the Bolshevik Revolution, it would have constituted a decisive break with the stop-and-go oscillations of the earlier Russian pattern. The large-scale St. Petersburg riots that immediately preceded the war suggest, however, that this view may be too sanguine.[22]

CONSEQUENCES FOR RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Russia's pattern of adaptation to relative backwardness chronically exacerbated its relations with the more advanced states of Europe.

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This was not because Russia was an exceptionally aggressive state compared to the other Great Powers. It was because the distinctive nature of Russia's power, institutions, and ideologies, arising from the pattern of late development, created a situation in which Russia and the West seemed inherently threatening to each other. Each felt vulnerable to the other's aggressive strategies of self-defense. Russian backwardness created this conflict by intensifying the security dilemma.[23]

This was most clearly the case in the early Soviet period. Stephen Walt has offered an elegant and persuasive explanation for the fact that revolutionary states, including Bolshevik Russia, typically end up embroiled in war. It is not that they use force to spread the revolution; rather, he says, conflicts arise because the very fact of the revolution sharpens the security dilemma between the revolutionary state and its neighbors. One or both sides begin to see offense as a necessary form of self-defense, though usually it is the status-quo states that initiate the fighting.[24]

Backward Russia constituted a vulnerable yet provocative target for its European competitors. Huge and lumbering, Russia always seemed an immense threat, but one that could be neutralized by a bold stroke aimed at one of its innumerable weak points. The size of Russia's army fueled worst case analysis about its aggressive capabilities and intentions, while the relative immobility of its forces convinced opponents that aggressive containment could effectively fend off the threat.[25] Thus, the British in the era of the Crimean War saw Russia's gigantic military potential as a danger to their positions in India and the Mediterranean, but they were confident that the mobility of their naval forces, if used offensively on the shores of the Black Sea or the Baltic, could keep Russia off balance.[26] In another instance, Alfred Schlieffen, Chief of the German General Staff who devised Germany's plan for war in 1914, saw Russia as part of a nightmarish encirclement, but also as the weak link whose slow mobilization would allow Germany to defeat its opponents piecemeal.[27]

At the same time, the sharp fluctuations in Russian power, linked to the stop-and-go nature of its efforts to catch up with the West, created strong incentives for preventive war initiated by Russia's foes. Sometimes these spurts actually triggered attacks whose motive was at least partly to forestall an adverse shift in the military

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balance, as in the German attacks of 1914 and 1941 and the Japanese attack of 1904. Sometimes Russian spurts merely stimulated talk of preventive war, as in Germany in 1887 and in the United States in 1950, but even in these cases, the impending power shift had real effects in exacerbating Cold War tensions.[28] Admittedly, proponents of preventive attack were sometimes misguided in their strategic reasoning, looking for a pretext for a conflict that they wanted for other reasons. Typically, it was the incipient Russian power spurt combined with the overreaction of Russia's opponents that precipitated the attack.[29]

Also exacerbating the security dilemma was the tendency of Russia's state-led, catch-up industrialization to produce military-industrial power rather than commercial power. The Russian state's comparative advantage in foreign affairs has always been military. It has lacked the economic instruments to successfully adopt what Richard Rosecrance has called a "trading state" strategy.[30] Relatively uncompetitive in world markets, Russia has had to maintain its market position along the imperial periphery through military conquest and protectionism. State monopolies and protectionism have been needed by both czars and Bolsheviks to protect even the core of the Russian economy from unwanted foreign penetration. This militarized mercantilism caused friction with other states and hindered the development of a mutually beneficial web of transnational ties. It also meant that Russia lacked the instruments to carry out foreign policy through economic statecraft.[31] As a result, Russia's normal diplomacy looked threatening to its neighbors.

Russia's political ideas, whether suited to justifying autocratic regimes of a reactionary or a revolutionary nature, increasingly made it an outlier in Europe, an object of diplomatic distrust, and a lightning rod for public xenophobia. This was especially true during the Soviet period, when the nature of the Soviet regime hindered the conclusion of alliances with democracies to contain Hitler's aggression. Moreover, because Russia's regime and ideology were always outliers and because its army was always the largest in Europe, Russia constituted a dual internal and external threat to its European competitors. One of the triggers of the US-Soviet security dilemma was the fact that Stalin simultaneously deployed a substantial army in Eastern Europe and a fifth column inside France and Italy.[32]

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As Michael Doyle has argued, the same normative glue that makes democracies behave peacefully toward each other creates friction between democracies and autocratic states.[33] If this was incipiently true for the nineteenth century, it became and remains increasingly true in the twentieth century's era of mass politics. This creates yet another reason to fear a Western overreaction if an authoritarian, nationalist regime should come to power in Russia in the coming years.

THE GERMAN PATTERN: AGGRESSION AND LATE DEVELOPMENT

As Gerschenkron argues, nationalism is the ideological "substitute" for liberalism in countries that develop late.[34] Laissez-faire ideas are not suitable for mercantilistic late developers. Instead, what is needed is an ideology that glorifies a strong state, political intervention in markets, and rivalry among nations; consequently, they develop nationalist ideas like those of Friedrich List or, even worse, Heinrich von Treitschke. In Germany this was compounded by the logrolling and nationalist rabble-rousing of military and economic interest groups.

In contrast, Russia's still later industrialization was dominated even more completely by a strong, unitary state, which used its authority to limit such logrolling. The centralized state, particularly under the Bolsheviks, developed its own ideology of mass mobilization against alleged foreign threats. But in a polity more tightly controlled from the center, this had less effect on foreign policy-making, which was expansionist but more prudent.

Both the Russian and the German patterns contrast with the British and American patterns of early industrialization and democratic controls on foreign policy. These two Powers were relatively good at pulling back from imperial overstretch, because the average voter who bears the cost of the policy is ultimately sovereign.[35] Thus, the Russian pattern checks interest groups and nationalist mythmaking (more or less well) from above, whereas the democratic pattern constrains them (more or less well) from below.

Only in two periods did Russian foreign policy manifest any symptoms of the German syndrome. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when, Gerschenkron argues, economic development was converging with the German pattern, develop-

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ments in foreign policy also mildly echoed German pathologies. Public groups outside the government used pan-Slav appeals to show that the czars' policies ought to be popular and national, not narrowly dynastic. At the same time, some figures in the old governing elite exploited this to shore up the regime's support.[36]

The other period with echoes of the German pattern occurs after Stalin's death, particularly in the Brezhnev era. The relatively weaker general secretary of that period needed to rule by logrolling the interests of groups like the Party ideologues and the military. This contributed to an overextended, self-defeating policy of arms racing and support for "progressive change" in the Third World.[37]

For the future evolution of the Russian political system, this raises the question of whether escaping from the historical Russian pattern of late development might come at the risk of escaping into something like the historical German pattern. In an elitist pattern of privatization, for example, industrial vested interests might join with elements in the Russian military to capture the policy of an activist state, legitimating their rule through a nationalist mass ideology. Some of the elements of this pattern are already taking shape in the apparently heavy military vote for Zhirinovsky and the convergence between the populists' and the industrialists' reservations about rapid economic reform. Whether or not this would work economically, it would be hard to be optimistic about the foreign policy consequences of such a regime.

Even if this "German" scenario does not unfold fully, the emergence of a Wilhelmine style of militarized, pressure-group foreign policy is hardly farfetched. Already, under the Yeltsin regime, Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev has admitted that "the armed forces have a foreign policy of their own."[38] During the summer of 1993, freelancing Russian military units aided Abhazian rebels in Georgia, broke apart the Georgian state, and then gained an invitation from Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze to establish order in the country as the only alternative to anarchy. Moreover, trading on their role in backing Yeltsin's use of force against the parliamentary conservatives in October 1993, the military insisted on a new doctrine renouncing no-first-use of nuclear weapons and featuring Russian military assertiveness in neighboring states.[39]

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RELEVANCE TO THE FUTURE: RUSSIAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY

Several objections to the continued relevance of the backwardness paradigm may be raised. First, scholars like Moshe Lewin and Jerry Hough have argued that the modernizing policies of the Soviet regime have produced a Soviet population that is well-educated, urban, and middle-class.[40] The social preconditions for democracy, capitalism, and the adoption of Western values grew in the womb of the old Soviet system, so now a new Russia which is no longer backward can emerge. Five years ago this seemed a rather persuasive argument.[41] And even today this theory is supported by the strong backing given to Boris Yeltsin's reform program by urban voters in the April 25, 1993 referendum. However, this view seriously underestimates the institutional shortcomings that are hindering the emergence of a truly modern Russia, despite its demographic modernity in many respects. A country without a market, without meaningful property rights, without a working court system, without political parties, without a legitimate constitution, and without a developed civil society is still backward. Moreover, it has turned out that such institutions do not quickly and spontaneously emerge just because they are functionally necessary. They must be purposefully constructed or substitutes must be found for them. Thus, contemporary Russia still faces the familiar dilemmas of backwardness.

A second objection is that reform from above has come to a dead end. Stalin's top-down revolution still made sense in 1929 because the difficulties to be overcome were those of extensive development—that is, the mobilization of underused human and natural resources as well as the overcoming of bottlenecks due to the immaturity of markets. But now the problem is one of intensive development—using resources more efficiently and creating incentives for initiative and innovation. Arguably, this can be achieved only by abandoning the authoritarian model of reform and embracing a decentralized, democratic, market-oriented, unplanned approach.

Not everyone, however, is convinced of this. As late as the early 1980s, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov plumped for a top-down reform of Soviet military and economic policy, rationalizing the authoritarian command system in order to better meet the coming challenge

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of NATO's high-technology conventional weapons revolution, which was later unveiled in the Gulf War.[42] More recently, scholars in Russia and in the West have worried that free-market shock therapy would be incompatible with electoral democracy in economies as distorted as that of the former Soviet Union.[43] For a time, some Russians looked to the Pinochet model, where military dictatorship was forced through a market reform and then stepped aside when the reform's success made dictatorship no longer necessary. More recently, they have looked to the Chinese model of authoritarian market reform. And, in a more general vein, Western proponents of industrial policy and strategic trade theory continue to invoke Gerschenkron in arguing the beneficial role of a *dirigiste* state in dynamic, but late developing economies like those of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore.[44] In short, those who argue that top-down methods are harmful or obsolete may possibly be right, but proponents of state-led development strategies may nonetheless prevail in Russia and elsewhere.

A related objection may be that there are no longer any advantages that accrue to backwardness. Arguably, the states in the strongest competitive position are those that have modern infrastructures and highly skilled work forces. Though this is true, the best move for relatively disadvantaged states who want to catch up may still be to exploit the advantages of backwardness. One of these advantages that has been important in the success of East Asia's newly industrialized countries is the ability of their insulated, authoritarian states to suppress the wage demands of labor. This route to accumulating investment capital and creating a comparative advantage in world trade would be an obvious complement to a strategy of "*nomenklatura* privatization" through cartels of former communist industrialists.

For these reasons, Gerschenkron's pattern of substitutes for the institutions of early industrialization may still be relevant. This is probably true for the central role of the state, and is possibly true for the role of centralized economic cartels in a new, privatized model of Russian development. Most ominously, it may also be true of the ideological substitute for liberalism: nationalism. As Gerschenkron would have predicted, there is a very strong connection in Russian policy debates today between those who argue for a strong state regulating economic reform and those who bluster

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about Russia's imperial legacy and the alleged mistreatment of ethnic Russians in the near abroad.[45]

This new pattern of substitutes continues to produce obstacles to convergence with the Western model of advanced capitalism. Though Stalinist central planning will not return, a capitalist *dirigiste* state could be captured by interest groups formed out of the detritus of the old Soviet system, including heavy industry and the military-industrial complex. These atavists are attempting to penetrate the new Russian state, turn privatization into a vehicle for the partial defense of old structures, buffer those economically distorted structures from market forces, and buffer the state from mass democratic accountability. Russia's strategies for coping with economic backwardness can be sorted into three general categories. First, Russia may try to catch up with the West through direct emulation. Alternatively, Russia may return to its traditional strategy of modernizing under the whip of the authoritarian state. Under contemporary conditions, this would presumably involve state-regulated, state-subsidized, but privately-owned cartels, price controls, protectionism, attempts to reassert control over some of the non-Russian successor states, military priority in the economy, repressed labor, and sporadic, plebiscitary, noncompetitive elections. A third trajectory of reform would seek a middle way between liberalization and centralization, aiming ultimately to approximate Western institutions, but temporarily tolerating some substitutes during the transition. In this variant, the state would play an active role in shaping investment strategy, subsidizing sectors with good prospects for adaptation to market conditions, and practicing triage in the hopeless cases.[46]

The potential political coalition for this last strategy would include the young, the urban, those who own or work in relatively competitive sectors of the economy, as well as people and regions holding natural resources whose value would rise toward world-market levels. One central question in this variant is whether its natural drift would be towards a fully liberal, free-market system, or whether the workings of political pluralism would drive it towards crippling subsidies for economically uncompetitive, but politically concentrated interests. Gerschenkron, observing Russia before 1914, thought that once the Russian pattern had evolved this far, its natural momentum would tend towards convergence with

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the West. Joel Hellman's dissertation on the contemporary evolution of Russian banks spun off from state bureaus might support a similar inference about the future.[47] The record of Latin American liberalizations, however, suggests that the middle way tends to yield stop-and-go oscillations.[48]

Thus, the syndrome of backwardness remains highly relevant to thinking about Russia's current options. Substitutes for the institutions of advanced capitalism may remain attractive in a strategy of exploiting the advantages of backwardness, though these substitutes may create or preserve obstacles to Russia's long-term modernization. Insofar as they are becoming increasingly linked to assertive forms of authoritarian nationalism, such substitutes are likely to entail conflict with Russia's neighbors and possibly the rest of Europe. However, it is worthwhile distinguishing between the milder substitutes associated with the democratic industrial policy of the middle way, which may tend toward convergence with the pattern of advanced Europe, and the more extreme substitutes of authoritarian cartelization. The latter would perpetuate Russia's status as an outlier from Europe, and also risk creating a political system in the style of Wilhelmine Germany, featuring logrolling among protectionist, militarist, and nationalist groups.[49]

RELEVANCE TO THE FUTURE: THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

Though the backwardness syndrome may still be relevant to Russian institutional development, skeptics may doubt that it will have the same effects on European foreign affairs as in the past. Because of the dramatic changes in the West, Russia's competition with Europe may not operate in the same way. A more prudent Europe may short-circuit the traditional problems.

One argument is that nuclear weapons have made war among the Great Powers obsolete; consequently, Russia no longer has to engage in forced-draft mobilization to insure its basic security.[50] This view is at most partially persuasive. It is true that some prominent new thinkers of the Gorbachev era argued that the mutually suicidal nature of nuclear war had virtually eliminated the military threat from the West. However, they also argued that liberal democracy, with which they strongly identified, had forced Western militarists to act prudently in the face of that nuclear danger.[51] A new Russian

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elite with a more malign view of liberal Western society may not feel so reassured. Even Russian intelligence director Yevgeny Primakov, one of the new thinkers of the Gorbachev era, warned in late 1993 that extending NATO eastward would

> bring the biggest military grouping in the world, with its colossal offensive potential, directly to the borders of Russia. If this happens, the need would arise for a fundamental reappraisal of all defense concepts on our side, a redeployment of armed forces and changes in operational plans.[52]

Kozyrev has likewise warned East European countries clamoring to enter NATO that this would "play into Zhirinovsky's hands and do little to enhance their security in practical terms."[53] An environment of high threat perception persisted through the first forty-five years of the atomic era, and there is no assurance that it could not return, the nuclear stalemate notwithstanding.

More importantly, nuclear weapons provide no answer to the problems of regional and economic security that Russia faces. The main threat to Russia's security stems from the breakup of the Soviet Union into a patchwork of states and regions, both inside and outside the Russian Republic, where Russians live intermingled with other ethnic groups. The solution that Yeltsin and other liberals prefer is to promote a civic rather than an ethnic criteria of nationality and to attract loyalty to the liberal state through the success of its political and economic reforms. However, this is not the only conceivable solution. An authoritarian, mobilizational reform strategy motivated by nationalist appeals would be highly relevant to this particular strategic challenge.

Finally, nuclear deterrence does nothing to eliminate the threat of economic penetration. The aim of retaining economic autonomy has always been a significant element affecting institutional responses to backwardness. Throughout Russian history, one of the tasks of the centralized state was to mediate economic intercourse with the advanced Powers, so that Russia could gain some of the benefits of trade and capital imports without surrendering its ability to protect its internal markets. Economic challenges from advanced states remain to be parried, notwithstanding the nuclear peace.

If Russia turns toward military mobilization, imperial assertiveness, and economic insulation, many of the typical strategic dilemmas of

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backwardness would reappear. A Russia ruled by nationalist, militarist, mobilizing authoritarians would, as before, look aggressive, alien, and potentially powerful, yet weak in the short run and vulnerable to the aggressive exploitation of its many weak spots. Onlookers to Russian interventions on its periphery would, as usual, be uncertain about the extent of Russian aims: does Moscow just want to gather ethnic Russians back into the empire, people would ask, or do they intend to reestablish the whole of their traditional geopolitical position? Russian nationalist rhetoric tends to mix these two themes together, making it hard to distinguish between them. Western strategic experts would quickly point out the advantages in an active, forward strategy of containment, aiding Russia's many enemies in the "near abroad."

Tensions over fifth columns would reemerge, though they would be different in certain respects. Russians outside Russia would increasingly look like fifth columns, especially in the Baltic states and Ukraine. In these cases, day-to-day ethnic tensions between Russians and non-Russians have been virtually nonexistent, and the Russians there want primarily to integrate themselves into the normal life of states which define citizenship in civic, not ethnic terms. But if politicians in Moscow keep threatening to use force on behalf of the rights of diaspora Russians, the non-Russian successor states will be increasingly likely to treat their Russian minority as a distrusted fifth column. In the summer of 1993, Estonia passed a law requiring Russians who had not applied for citizenship to register as resident aliens.

Elsewhere, however, the politics of fifth columns would probably not replicate earlier periods. Unlike the czars and the Bolsheviks, a new Russian nationalist regime would attract fifth columns inside the societies of few European states and none of the Great Powers. Zhirinovsky's flirtation with German neo-Nazis proposes an alliance that can have no appeal for Russians.[54] Nonetheless, a Russian nationalist regime would indirectly play into the hands of militant nationalists in Germany by creating a plausible external threat to spur nationalist mobilization.

A Russian nationalist regime would have to worry even more about Western fifth columns in its own camp. One of the main goals of Western strategic pressure on Russia would be to bring the liberals back to power. Out of self-defense, Russia's conservative

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leaders would have little choice but to crack down on the vestiges of the liberal faction exemplified by Yegor Gaidar and Andrei Kozyrev.

But would the West overreact to this seeming threat, as in the past? Changes in Western societies make this less likely, but not farfetched. Western strategic experts are already updating their analytical tools, preparing to think through the whys and hows of a new round of containment. Stephen Blank of the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College writes in March 1993, for example, that "right-wing parties in Russia" want to "restore the 1945 borders and to retain privileges for Russians in the diaspora." Calling Russian minorities a "fifth column," Blank argues that the Baltic states are perfectly justified in denying them citizenship rights. He says that Russian accusations "bear strong resemblance to Hitler's and Stalin's use of violations of the human or ethnic rights of kinsmen abroad as cloaks for aggression and dismemberment of states in the 1930s."[55]

To counter this, he calls for "Western guarantees to uphold the Baltic states' sovereignty" and making Western economic aid to Russia conditional on military withdrawal from the Baltics. A failure to do so, he argues, would show a lack of resolve and encourage further aggressive demands by the likes of the Serbs and the Russian nationalists:

> Abdicating that role in the Baltic when we have already indicated via the National Guard and CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] commitments that the area is important to our own and our allies' security will call into doubt the United States' leadership, the viability of NATO and other institutions as providers of security, and prospects for Russia's democratization and Europeanization.[56]

Blank manages to recapitulate most of the arguments for aggressively containing Russian expansion that have been used from the time of Palmerston down through the Cold War. In the wake of Zhirinovsky's electoral success in December 1993, even archliberal columnist Anthony Lewis echoed some of these same arguments.[57]

In short, the major differences between the old Europe and today's Europe may mitigate the strategic consequences of Russian backwardness, but they do not eliminate them. How strongly the

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security dilemma would operate between Europe and Russia would depend both on the extremeness of Russian policy and on the prudence of Europe's reaction to it.

PRESCRIPTIONS FOR THE WEST

If the above analysis is correct, a reassertion of the syndrome of Russian backwardness in both its domestic and international dimensions is far from unthinkable. Even worse, the traditional Russian pattern might be intermingled with elements of the more aggressive turn-of-the-century German pattern of late development, featuring logrolling among protectionist, militarist, and nationalist groups.

Meanwhile, a neglectful West, focusing on internal problems, has been doing too little to help Russian liberals overcome the syndrome of backwardness and too little to prepare to manage Russia's return. The prospect of token Western aid has been just enough to humiliate proud Russians. West Europeans have been loath to reduce barriers to the importation of East European agricultural and manufactured goods, let alone exports from Russia. The West needs to provide more aid that is not closely tied to extremely stringent International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditions on fiscal austerity. Even if Yeltsin is forced by political prudence to retreat from ultradisciplined shock therapy, the West needs to finance the development of Russia's energy sector, noncartelistic forms of privatization, and a social safety net. As long as industrial subsidies are used primarily to help proliberalization groups restructure rather than prop up existing obstacles to change, their net effect will be to help break the pattern of backwardness.

On the ethnic relations front, the West has been tardy in pressing Latvia and Estonia to give Russians full citizenship rights. When Estonia was admitted to the Council of Europe in the spring of 1993, Estonian nationalists concluded that they had "won" the propaganda battle on the citizenship issue and were being given a blank check to proceed with a restrictive policy. Thus, they quickly passed the law registering most Russians as aliens and withdrawing their right to permanent residence—a law that was amended only after Europe took the Estonians to task.[58] More recently, US Secretary of State Warren Christopher has called upon the Baltic states

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to be more forthcoming in their policies toward their Russian minorities.[59] In short, the West is getting a very late start in helping Russian liberals solve the problems that Russian nationalists are successfully exploiting.

The West should help solve the legitimate security problems of Russia's southern borderlands. Toward this end, it should promote a regime for security and minority rights in former Soviet republics embroiled in civil conflict. As part of this regime, Russia and the other successor states would all be expected to respect civil rights, regardless of ethnicity, or risk losing economic and other benefits of participation in the world community.

Russia has a chance to break free of its treadmill of authoritarian, catch-up reforms. But the likelihood is growing that the syndrome of backwardness, including domestic repression and international conflict, may repeat itself. Indeed, there is a risk that the historical Russian pattern, where the main problem is overreaction by the West, might converge with the even more dangerous historical German pattern, rooted in the logrolling of narrow elite groups and nationalist mass mobilization. Whichever of these outcomes occurs, it may be decisive for the political future of Europe. It is unlikely that Russia will remain an irrelevant backwater for long. In the past, Russia has recovered from its periodic collapses in about a decade or two. Given that time frame, the West must act decisively to promote liberal change in Russia and thus end the cycles of Russian backwardness by helping liberals deal effectively with issues that nationalists and neocommunists are now successfully exploiting.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to Alexei Bogaturov, Valerie Bunce, Alicia Levine, James McAllister, Kathleen McNamara, Scott Parrish, Barbara Walter, participants at seminars at Princeton University and at the Program on International Politics, Economics and Security at the University of Chicago, contributors to this issue of *Dædalus,* and especially Paul Schroeder for their helpful criticism of earlier drafts.

ENDNOTES

[1]For a good summary of Russia's contemporary foreign policy debate, see Alexei Arbatov, "Russia's Foreign Policy Alternatives," *International Security* 18 (2) (Fall 1993): 5–43.

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[3]Valerie Bunce, "Domestic Reform and International Change: The Gorbachev Reforms in Historical Perspective," *International Organization* 47 (1) (Winter 1993): 107–38.

[4]Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1962). I use the term backwardness to refer to the country's per capita economic product, its technological level, and its organizational capacity compared to its competitors abroad. When I refer to the pattern or syndrome of backwardness, I mean the distinctive institutional and political consequences of that lag.

[5]For this argument applied only to revolutionary states, see Stephen Walt, "Revolution and War," *World Politics* 44 (3) (April 1992): 321–68.

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[14]Alexander Gerschenkron, *Europe in the Russian Mirror* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 85, 94.

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[19]George Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982).

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[21]Ibid., 135; Gerschenkron, *Europe in the Russian Mirror,* 123. Paul R. Gregory, *Russian National Income* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 193, generally supports Gerschenkron's findings, except for his views on the exploitation of agriculture.

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[50]For arguments along these lines, see Kenneth Oye, "Explaining the End of the Cold War: Adaptations to the Nuclear Peace," in Richard Ned Lebow and Thomas Risse-Kappen, eds., *The End of the Cold War and International Relations Theory* (forthcoming); see also Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "The International Sources of Soviet Change," *International Security* 16 (3) (Winter 1991–1992): 74–118.

[51]Vitaly Zhurkin, Sergei Karaganov, and Andrei Kortunov, "Vyzovy bezopasnosti—starye i novye," *Kommunist* (1) (January 1988): 42–50, esp. 45.

[52]Steven Erlanger, "Russia Warns NATO on Expanding East," *New York Times,* 26 November 1993, A11.

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[53]Steven Erlanger, "NATO Issue: Rightist Vote Helps Russia," *New York Times,* 29 December 1993, A6.

[54]Craig Whitney, "Russian Rightist Angers Germans," *New York Times,* 24 December 1993, A8.

[55]Stephen J. Blank, *Russia and the Baltic: Is There a Threat to European Security?* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army War College, 31 March 1993), esp. 9–10, 16, 20.

[56]Ibid., 12, 20.

[57]Lewis, "When You Appease Fascism," A39.

[58]Peet Kask, "The 'Russian Question' in Estonia," unpublished manuscript, Columbia University, December 1993, 29–30, quoting Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste in *Rahva Hääl,* 3 May 1993, 1.

[59]Doyle McManus, "Christopher Prods Baltics on Behalf of their Minority Russians," *Los Angeles Times,* 28 October 1993, 13.

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In conclusion, this survey of economic and social developments accompanying the modernization of European society has shown compelling evidence for the moderation of ideological differences in Europe as a consequence of the increasing affluence of European nations, the attainment of economic as well as political citizenship by the workers, the gradual absorption and assimilation of the remnants of European society still living in feudal or otherwise underdeveloped economic and social conditions. The changes in parties of the left, especially Communist parties, to a more moderate orientation toward capitalist society and class conflict have been shown to be also related to broad changes in the international Communist world, as exemplified by the thesis of polycentrism and the reinterpretation of Marxism concerning the possibility of a rapprochement with capitalism. But it has also been pointed out that industrialization does not automatically remove sources of tension. These sources are endemic to an industrial society which permits a relatively open struggle for the fruits of individual effort and which does not automatically give access to opportunity for individual advancement to those on the lower rungs of the status ladder.

Seymour Martin Lipset

From "The Changing Class Structure and Contemporary European Politics"
Dædalus 93 (1) (Winter 1964)

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Stevan K. Pavlowitch

Who is "Balkanizing" Whom? The Misunderstandings Between the Debris of Yugoslavia and an Unprepared West

THE YUGOSLAV NATION: IDEAL AND ILLUSION

OUR APPROACH TO THE YUGOSLAV TRAGEDY is strewn with misapprehension. Yugoslavia was not, by definition, a "nation." The modern *nation,* endowed with a political identity, was built on the *ethnic community,* a collective characterized by cultural and historical affinities. In Western Europe, political unity had been established well before the emergence of modern nationalism, but in the East, where the continued existence of the imperial idea and the Turkish conquest prevented the creation of such stable entities, ethnic communities developed without turning into political communities.

Since the French Revolution, the nation has been seen as the parameter of modernity. The controversy that contrasted the German model of a nation molded by its speech and its past to the French one of a nation willed by its citizens turned two different histories into a quasi-ideological opposition. The nations of Europe were mostly founded on a combination of both. The later they emerged, the more they started on the German model and then aspired to the French one. Each new "nation" wanted to coincide with a territory, and to blend its population into a whole so as to constitute a nation-state.

Yugoslavia was built across a zone of fault lines: it was in the Balkans that the Mediterranean world cracked, on a peninsula made up of fractures and watersheds, but also of passageways and crossroads. The Yugoslav lands in particular are an area of transition. In spite of its religious unity, the Italian peninsula at the time

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of the Risorgimento was linguistically more diverse, and its north-south divide can be traced back to the Middle Ages. There have been other religious fault lines in Europe. The Protestant-Catholic watershed has affected much of Europe from the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, and continues to affect Ireland. As for the Catholic-Orthodox enmity, it is one that has been felt more particularly by the northern Slavs. The separation came about only gradually in the southern Slav lands, where Catholic-Orthodox conflicts remained for long secondary as a consequence of cooperation against the Turks.

The tug-of-war between the Ottoman conquests and the Habsburgs' imperial ambitions displaced and destroyed native realms. It moved and harassed populations without integrating them. The concept of ethnicity that emerged in East Central Europe in the first half of the nineteenth century was based on language, and as the entire Slavonic belt of the Balkans formed one single area where dialects shaded into one another, a potential source of unity came to be seen in the speech of the South Slav or Yugoslav populations.

Right from the start, dualism was stamped on an ideology that looked ahead to the unification of a greater linguistic part comprising at least two religious parts.[1] In Serbia, which had emancipated itself from Ottoman rule, Yugoslavism was seen as a way of uniting all the dispersed Serbs into one unit built around Serbia. This could come about only after the empires had been destroyed, and on the understanding that all South Slavs would come together in the same independent state. A different conception was to be found in Habsburg-ruled Croatia, where it was realized that Croats had to combine with other South Slavs in the empire in order to gain more weight. That would be a union within a reorganized Habsburg monarchy. Reinforced by the religious difference, the dualism of the Yugoslav idea provoked suspicion on both sides. As long as Austria-Hungary existed, that idea remained a unifying ideology, not an identity, subject to a variety of interpretations.

The movement for South Slav unification was generally connected with forward looking ideas,[2] and its promoters tended to be visionaries rather than politicians. Most politicians nevertheless did adopt the cause of the unification of all Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes right from the start of World War I. It is, however, difficult to know how much the population at large supported the idea while it waited for

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the outcome of the war. As for the international climate, it suddenly became more favorable to Yugoslav unification only when Austria-Hungary went to pieces. Yet, Yugoslavia emerged as a fait accompli before the peace conference even convened, and its first major problem was to gain recognition of its existence and of its territory. A nineteenth-century dream had come true at the end of World War I, when the articulation of several South Slav identities was already well advanced. The triumph of the nation-state had been consecrated by the collapse of empires and turned into a universal formula at a time when it had become difficult to emulate the French model. In Yugoslavia, it mixed past, present, and future around a teleological reading of history according to which Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes were three subgroups of the same nation, which was still an ideal while already an illusion.

Unification had to a large extent been the result of Serbia's role in the Great War, and Serbia understood only centralized statehood. The result was a unitary Yugoslavia which did not acknowledge its diversity. It may have been an especially tricky case, but all over Eastern Europe the nineteenth-century dream fitted uneasily the realities of the twentieth century.

Because the Yugoslav state was generally seen to be the most reasonable framework for the coexistence of its ethnic groups, Yugoslavs went on searching for a viable political solution for more than seventy years, united by the need to survive. The main challenge to the Serbian conception of the state came from Croatia, yet, despite recriminations against "Serbian hegemony," only the political extremes wanted to dismantle the South Slav state. The Communist Party eventually changed its tack to federalization, but the fascist ustaša movement always aimed for the violent separation of Croatia.

World War II brought occupation, dismemberment, civil war, and ethnic strife. The conquerors of Yugoslavia not only destroyed the state, but set its components against each other in a unprecedented way. An infernal cycle of massacres started when the ustašas, installed as rulers of a nominally independent State of Croatia, which took in Bosnia and Herzegovina, attempted a "final solution" to the question of the Serbs living on their territory. This was not taking up an age-old struggle, but was a new departure under the influence of Nazi racial theories. Yet, the outcome of the war

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again led to a united Yugoslavia because the defeat of the Axis Powers destroyed those native movements that had thought of solving the problem of ethnic coexistence by withdrawing into tribalism under foreign protection.

The Communist Party had brought the Yugoslavs out of the war. It had provided refuge for the Serbs of the ustaša state, but it had also used the old Comintern slogan of "Serbian hegemony" to ingratiate itself with the other nationalities. Yugoslavia was reunified as a federation of related ethnic communities. In setting up the republics, the communist leadership had used a blend of ethnic and historic factors, giving each component "nation" a territorial base — the old-established ones, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, but also the newly-recognized ones, Macedonia, Montenegro. It had kept Bosnia-Herzegovina[3] within its old "colonial" borders to prevent its division and to give Muslims, too, a territorial base, and it had set up autonomous provinces in Serbia to give satisfaction to the non-Slav minorities. All this had been done in part to keep Serbia down to size, but the Communist Party had used mainly Serb manpower to come to power, and the federation was a purely Leninist arrangement. Furthermore, as communism never bothered to analyze fascism, made synonymous with anticommunism, there was no "denazification," and wartime wounds went unhealed in the hope that they would eventually disappear.

THE BARBARITY OF TRIBAL MAJORITY RULE

The usual explanation now for the nationalism in Eastern Europe is that it came out of the deep freeze of history into the vacuum left by communism. This is true to the extent that communism did not find new ways of expressing local identities but eradicated the old ways, exploiting nationalism as a tactical device. In Yugoslavia, the nationalism of Serbs and Croats was repressed, but this was not the case with the smaller groups whose nationalism could keep the former in check, and there was innovation in the creation of new "nations" as a means of resolving ethnic competition.[4] It had first been done in the 1940s in Macedonia, where the Slavonic population was acknowledged as a separate "nation" to remove Serbian-Bulgarian-Greek competition over this area. The naming in the 1960s of a new South Slav Muslim nation, Serbo-Croat speaking

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but neither Serb nor Croat, in order to reinforce the "Yugoslav" balance of Bosnia between Croatia and Serbia, was similarly intended to remove Serbo-Croatian competition over that mixed territory.

By then, the challenges to central control by the generation of wartime revolutionaries were such that a redistribution of power was required. Formalized by the constitution of 1974, this redistribution returned to strict Party rule, but a feudalized one through the republics and provinces, under the paramount suzerainty of the aging dictator. The regime degenerated into a coalition of local oligarchies which allowed the nationalism of the majority group to assert itself in every constituent unit.

Tito had known how to modulate ethnic tonality. He could get away with cutting back the Serbs as a community while using them as communist individuals. After his death, and with the erosion of communist legitimacy following on increasing economic misery and political paralysis, two tendencies began pulling in opposite directions: the Serbs tried to tighten up the federation again, starting in Kosovo;[5] the others tried to loosen it even more. But the system still held on through inertia for a decade until communism collapsed elsewhere.

What appeared in Eastern Europe was not simply the old nationalisms that had hibernated. It was an attempt not so much to restore links with real tradition as to erase the recent past, and it was also the product of communism which had manipulated nationalism.[6] The new anticommunist nationalism has points of contact with the old Party-based nationalism. Personalities of the communist oligarchy have often continued to head an apparatus that is almost unchanged except in name, and a majority of the *nomenklatura* has not found it difficult to go over to the new national ruling party. In such conditions, the elections held in 1990 in all the Yugoslav republics rendered the local governments vulnerable to populism. The "republicanization" of the 1974 Constitution was by then so far advanced that the central government allowed the running to be done by the constituent territories, and regional forces acquired legitimacy at the expense of the federation.[7] Politicians found it easy to establish control by adopting mobilizing banners, by appealing to prejudices, and by retaining existing authoritarian structures.

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Surprised by the sudden outbreak of the Yugoslav tragedy, Western observers have tended to explain it as a return to ancestral hatreds, yet there is no need to go back further than World War II. The immediate cause of the present cycle of warfare was the brutal and officialized revelation, the orchestration of recollections, of horrors *then* committed against *us* by *others*. The massacres of a half century ago have fed perceptions and fears. Public opinion, as it emerged from forty years of brainwashing, was pounced upon by new agitators who were the worst remains of Tito's power structure. This time they brainwashed communities into believing that they had to get rid of others in order to survive.

Serbs and Croats had fought each other in earlier wars between empires into whose armies they had been drafted, and in World War II as collaborationist soldiers against insurgents, or as communists against anticommunists, but in these configurations so had Croats fought against Croats and Serbs fought against Serbs. They had never fought wars against each other as Serbs and Croats. Because of the way in which they are intermixed and related, those among them who want them separated irreparably must commit irreparable crimes. The ustašas did it in the early 1940s, and almost succeeded in their endeavor. The Serbs of the same mixed areas a half century later justified what they were doing by the fact that they had been the victims of a first round of what is now generally called "ethnic cleansing"— a historical argument that cannot counterbalance the immediate impression made by the cruel advance of Serb armed units. Whatever the differences, the "return match" has led to a terrible "draw."

As living conditions deteriorated, centrifugal tendencies intensified in the privileged areas where they were more and more reticent to support the cost of the underprivileged and of the central power structure. When Slobodan Milošević rose to power in Serbia in 1987 as the head of its Communist Party, the legitimating force of Titoist principles had been exhausted and an absolutist ethnic majority was taking over. The fear of a resurgent Serbia under Milošević provoked a chain reaction, which accelerated after his attempt to climb to the top of the Yugoslav party. When, in June 1991, Slovenia announced that it would secede, the Yugoslav army made a feeble attempt to regain control of the border posts before the northernmost republic was given up: two of the sovereignty prin-

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ciples of Tito's Yugoslavia—nation and republic—happened to coincide there. Elsewhere, the confusion of principles and the absolute nature of claims led to confrontation.

Croatia, too, went for an independent nation-state within the borders of the existing federated republic. In the flush of its electoral victory, the new administration of President Franjo Tudjman behaved towards the Serbian minority with an incompetence reinforced by much discrimination and some violence. The independent republic was to be exclusively Croatian. The Serbs there could take it, leave it, or. . .resist it. Those Serbs who lived where they were in a majority, in territories contiguous to the Serb-inhabited territories of western Bosnia, were organized into the secessionist Republic of Serbian Krajina by hard-liners who already held power locally. The others, who lived mainly in towns, remained threatened and unprotected. The war in Croatia started when the Krajina Serbs voted to stay in Yugoslavia. The remains of the federal authority and the Yugoslav army encouraged and backed their right to do so until Milošević stopped championing their cause when he sensed that continued action in Croatia was endangering his own claim to be master of what was left of the federation.

It followed that the other non-Serb components did not want to stay in a rump Yugoslavia obviously dominated by Serbs, however much a Yugoslav structure was necessary to their survival. In Bosnia, three communities lived entangled, distinguished only by their nominal religious affiliations. The electorate had gone for ethnic parties, and the referendum on independence, decided by the Muslim-led collective presidency, was boycotted by the Serbs in February 1992. They perceived it as another distorted echo of World War II—a way of cutting them off from Yugoslavia. It was not possible for Bosnia to survive outside a larger structure that included both Serbia and Croatia. The Serb representatives proclaimed their territorially undefined Serbian Republic. They had the advantage of the military capacities concentrated in Bosnia, not to mention the Yugoslav army, whose large Bosnian-Serb component remained even after federal forces had formally withdrawn.

The separation between Serbs and Croats in Bosnia is virtually complete and accepted. The Muslims, the most victimized, have been left with little territory. The Croats have all but achieved their aims. The Serbs, having caused the most suffering, are the strongest,

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but they have no clearly expressed territorial aims nor any overall policy. Serbian opinion tends to think of self-determination in terms of people rather than of territories. The difficult aspiration of the western Serbs—to continue to live in a Serbian state once Yugoslavia no longer existed—was seen as aggressive because they operated in the territories of republics that had been internationally recognized.

Milošević wants to hold on to power over as much territory as he can—originally the whole of Yugoslavia, then as much of it as could be salvaged, and finally the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SRJ), proclaimed in April 1992 and made up of Serbia and Montenegro. He is anxious for the SRJ to pose as international successor to Yugoslavia and as protector of Serb minorities in the neighboring successor states.

The SRJ is divided. Although it feels linked to Serbia, tiny Montenegro does not like to be pushed about by its "big brother." Immigrants from the poorer and mountainous regions—Tito's Serb partisans of Croatia and Bosnia who settled around the seat of power after 1944, the steady trickle of newcomers from those republics since the 1970s, the mass of refugees that have come since 1991—look up to Milošević, if not to his sorcerer's apprentices on the nationalist Right. People with older roots in Serbia tend, on the other hand, to regard the oligarchy as the main obstacle to peace. These divisions cut across the other divisions to be found throughout Eastern Europe: town and country, young and old, educated and uneducated. Such ambiguities have led the government of Serbia, the army, and even the leaders of the various unrecognized Serb republics to adopt an antagonistic attitude to the foreign media. The western Serbs, seeing no need to present their case, were deprived of a voice at a time when international opinion on the war was being formed. The result has been a collective demonization of the Serbs.

That leaves Macedonia in limbo (not least because of a Greek veto on its name). The Macedonians, who make up no more than 65 percent of the population of that republic, are a young (Slav) ethnic community with an ancient (Greek) name who have lost their (Yugoslav) sponsor.

The whole of Yugoslavia has suffered from the collapse of the common state. Independence has broken all ties, the beneficial

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along with the hated. The republics have, at best, become insignificant statelets, disappointed at not having been accepted into the European Union (EU), or mini-Yugoslavias challenged by irredentism. Territorial mutilations, the presence of radicalized refugees, alienated minorities, an economy disrupted by the breakup and by the war when not actually destroyed by sanctions, all preclude any democratic evolution in the foreseeable future. What the most forward-thinking and the best among the South Slavs had built up to the point of unification, what had survived from crisis to crisis from 1918 to 1991, the worst and the most backward-looking have managed to destroy, sending fears of regional conflicts throughout Europe.

THE WEST PANICS: LIBERALISM DOES NOT FOLLOW COMMUNISM

The West had welcomed the birth of Yugoslavia as it seemed to fit the new European order. Liberal and democratic Americans[8] and Europeans supported it against the revanchism of those who had been defeated in World War I, against Nazism, fascism, and Bolshevism, and then against Stalinism. They now see its demise as only too obvious, resulting from the fall of the last remaining European empire. The West had supported Tito right from the start—the communist autocrat supported by liberal democracies—as he was deemed to be the best chance for a united Yugoslavia. Since 1948, the West had turned his regime into a bastion against Soviet advance in the Cold War. It had done all it thought it could do to further the country's cohesion. The West had helped Tito's Yugoslavia both financially and diplomatically, armed it, and considered it to be a model for the development of the rest of Eastern Europe.

Knowledge and understanding of Yugoslavia in the West was illusory. Western experts might have had the information, but their perceptions were often wrong. Many specialists had looked at the institutions, scanned published statistics, and read official documents. They could easily do it within the constraints of time, grants, and linguistic skills, and some actually found the brave new world they looked for. Political scientists had discussed centrifugal tendencies in terms of international, more particularly East-West, relations and centripetal forces in terms of the one-party state. Economists

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had studied the phantom models of social ownership and self-management. But students of Yugoslav history were rare.

Little was known about the ideals and the realities that had inspired the Yugoslav movement, the way in which unification had been achieved, the accomplishments and the failures of precommunist Yugoslavia, what had happened during World War II, or the complex background to the victory of Tito's communist partisans. Taken in by the Yugoslav communists' slogan that the alternative to their rule was chaos, governments supported them to the very end, beyond the Cold War and even beyond Tito's lifetime, thus enabling his heirs to avoid real reforms. With the end of the Cold War and the death of Tito, Yugoslavia was no longer appealing, but conventional wisdom and the misapprehension of potential dangers made up for a lack of imagination.

Yugoslavia's troubles became visible at a time when the West was bewildered by the collapse of communism and the breakup of the Soviet empire, which had reined in the turbulent peoples of Eastern Europe. The United States had lost interest, and the European Community, as it turned into the European Union, was in the middle of a public argument about where it was going. The Yugoslav crisis threatened to destabilize the continent when Europe as a whole was trying to adjust to the changes brought about by the end of the Cold War.

The EU, seeking a united international role, was forced into the Yugoslav mess, first as mediator, then as arbiter. It had prestige and influence, but it was not a security organization, and it had certainly not been put together to deal with civil wars outside its territory. The Twelve talked about a common foreign policy. They hoped to acquire one in handling the breakup of Yugoslavia, but in the meantime pretended to have one at the lowest level. Some governments feared the consequences that the breakup of Yugoslavia could have in the Soviet Union, or even at home. Others rushed in to stake their share of influence, as there no longer was a Soviet Union to make use of centrifugal forces in the land of the South Slavs. They all had different motivations, which reflected different domestic predicaments, but the Twelve contained these differences, and were not going to allow Yugoslavia to explode the EU.

As usual, the Powers wanted the observance of the status quo: they would not, they stated, tolerate the disturbance of existing

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boundaries. However, when the secessions removed the known map of Yugoslavia's international borders, there was an inflection in the interpretation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 1975 Helsinki principles of respect for state borders in exchange for respect for human rights within them, including the rights of individuals belonging to ethnic minorities. The Hague principles of October 1991 assumed, or acknowledged, that Yugoslavia was falling apart, but not that the internal boundaries between the federated units were dissolving. Resorting to the inviolability of internal frontiers was an attempt to impose some kind of superficial paper order on the chaos that was emerging, and to save something of the principle of inviolability of frontiers. Having at first opposed any secession on the grounds that it would result in conflict, the Powers moved to the position that recognizing secession would end the conflict which was in fact taking place. Some governments changed their position more slowly and more reluctantly than others.

Even so, the fallback on the constituent units of complex states could have been made by a simultaneous recognition of all republics, conditional on strict adherence to the stipulations of the Helsinki Act. Instead, preoccupation with domestic issues, ignorance, and lack of vision and of common political will led the EU to give its blessing initially only to Slovenia (which created relatively minor problems) and to Croatia (which created more serious problems). Bosnia was thus cornered into following suit and was duly recognized in its turn even though it was in no position to constitute itself—rejected by one of its communities, and accepted only through lip service by another.[9]

As a consequence of premature recognition, Croatia cannot deal with the status of its Serb minority or regain control of a third of its territory, and it is virtually cut in two. Atrocities have been committed in Bosnia, where a ruthless television war of words and images and an even more ruthless war of terror by armed bands have pushed populations around and carved up territories. The Muslim community there is now made to pay for having been led to believe in the fiction of an internationally recognized state. Majority ethnic opinion in Croatia, Bosnia, and Serbia has been radicalized. By not acknowledging the validity of some of Serbia's claims, the West has increased the audience of Serbia's nationalist extremists, who saved

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the ruling party's hold on power at the December 1992 elections in the SRJ; the West has thus also pushed the opposition generally to move on to more nationalist positions.

American leadership was resorted to when EU policy failed to prevent civil strife and even made matters worse. UN sanctions against the SRJ were followed by the US threat of unspecified military action "to contain Serbian aggression"—a slogan backed by no policy at all. Was the intent to restore Bosnia, or to prevent Serbian aggression from spreading to Macedonia or Kosovo? The Bosnian conflict, since the spring of 1992, has to a large extent homogenized the ethnic groups. It is no more possible to get them to live together again in a genuinely united Bosnia than it is to get them to live in a united Yugoslavia. It was difficult to believe that a few "surgical strikes" against the nerve centers of the strongest and most aggressive armed camp, or even the presence of an international expeditionary corps for a limited period of time, could help set up a complex political structure depending on mutual trust when this had given way to mutual fear and hatred.

Serbia has no claim to Macedonia despite whatever nostalgic thoughts Serbian nationalists may harbor about it having really been southern Serbia (similar to those Bulgars who think of it as having been an unredeemed western Bulgaria). Macedonia, now practically as isolated as the SRJ, has to live with the absurd provisional name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Its government is under increasing pressure from hard-liner nationalists, both Macedonian and Albanian.

As for Kosovo, it is part of the recognized territory of Serbia, and it is already dominated by military force. The political leadership of its overwhelmingly Albanian population has shown remarkable self-discipline so far, under pressure from Serbia's direct rule, from Serbian radicals, and from Western "do-good" interventionists. The situation there could really be inflamed without any conscious decision from the Belgrade authorities. But a more obvious risk of warfare extending outside Bosnia is that of renewed fighting in Croatia over the question of Serb enclaves.

THE WEST WAS UNPREPARED FOR WHAT HAPPENED

The West was not prepared for major risks or long-term commitments. Most official factors, and the military in particular, had such

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reservations about a strike, let alone an expedition, that they paralyzed any action at all beyond the imposition of ever tighter sanctions against the SRJ (the party apparently most responsible for the tragic consequences of Yugoslavia's disintegration). The threat was an emotional response, due to the pressure of a distressed public, fueled by media spectaculars, trying to exorcise its own anxieties about the future. The West did not understand Yugoslavia better than it understood Armenia or Georgia, Afghanistan or Cambodia, Somalia or Angola, but Yugoslavia was nearer. Many Westerners had spent holidays there, and they had all been led to believe that its problems had been solved long ago under the glorious yet benign rule of Marshal Tito.

In the absence of coherent policies, the media played a great role in forming Western European opinion. It was difficult for television to focus viewers' attention on incomprehensible horrors without clearly distinguishing between "good" and "bad." Reporters, like viewers, were ignorant, and their task would have been arduous if they had seen more than one side. If a culprit, and only one, had to be identified, it had to be the Serbian side. It was the strongest, it appeared to be communist, and in its radicalization it had turned against the West. And so it was until British troops in Bosnia, carrying out their humanitarian mission, came across the local Croatian ethnic leaders' method of implementing the plans established by the international mediators. They were as shocked as Italian troops had been who were operating in the same area over fifty years ago.

It was not only the viewer-in-front-of-the-box, who held the silly belief that the collapse of communism equaled the triumph of liberalism,[10] who wanted to find again something of the reassuring bipolarity that had gone with the Cold War. Minor and vain politicians, outgoing and incoming presidents, and even journalists who thought they knew, made do with moral indignation instead of policy or analysis. Lacking the necessary knowledge, devoid of informed imagination, they resorted to bogus historical parallels drawn from textbook and newspaper reminiscences. The less they understood the historical context, the more historical analogues they found.

The responses varied from country to country. In the United States, sections of elite opinion and of the press strove to generate

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from an indifferent public the pressure needed to force an intervention. Germany, in the euphoria of reunification, wanted to give all the peoples who had lived under communism the chance to determine again their own fate. The Germans were also keen to show their total rejection of Nazi methods by being in the forefront of those who stigmatized the repetition of such methods under the guise of national communism. Parisian intellectuals, orphaned by the collapse of the Left and rediscovering the appeal of the romantic Right, campaigned for the entitlement of ethnic groups for independence from a once-powerful state structure. Thus they were able to purge their own frustrations and guilt through a country that was near in time and space and yet remote from France's political cleavages. The East continues to be a repository of hope for Western European intellectuals, as fellow travelers on one side of the road have been replaced by those on the other side. There were also wider malaises, common to most Western European countries, that appeared in Yugoslavia, such as a crisis of the political class, of economic management, of national identity, of state structures, of intellectual energy, or of leadership, and usually a combination of a few of these.

Believing that it had found a new role in Europe commensurate with its economic and territorial importance, and that the recognition of the secessionist republics of Yugoslavia would stop the fighting, the German government rode on the crest of media revolt against "Serbian communism." Paris, London, and eventually Washington followed Bonn's lead, anxious at the time of the Maastricht negotiations to give Germany, which looked much stronger than it was, more influence within the EU. Nationhood was seen to be an antidote to communism; at the same time it was feared that the virus of tribal conflict, long kept at a safe distance in the darker continents, had now appeared in Europe's body. The old disease had to be fought, and the new syndrome had to be contained by remote therapy.

Meanwhile, far from moving towards nationhood, disillusioned ethnic communities in Eastern Europe returned to tribalism, with values based on ancestry, leadership, and self-mystification, cherishing the memory of injustices received while ignoring injustices committed.[11] They have all played variations on the theme of having defended Christendom against barbarian aggressors from the East

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in the belief that it would give them a special relationship with the EU. Each wants to be a nation-state but balks at having to share power with minorities. Each wants to own by indisputable historic right the territory it inhabits.

Caught between a planned economy that no longer exists and a market economy yet to come, these countries are engulfed in an economic crisis that encourages the search for scapegoats and the rise of demagogues. Citizens expected affluence and freedom from responsibility, and got the opposite. Power remains largely in the hands of remnants of the old regime. Their aim is to hold on to the political apparatus for as long as possible and to grab economic power when politics begins to slip away. They have rid themselves of their communist ideological shackles, but what ideology they have remains isolationist. Frustrated electorates respond to a strong government, riding primitive passions. A siege mentality gives cohesion. Only in the restricted structures of repressive ethnic states can such groups remain in power. And the debris of *nomenklaturas* are sensitive to the calls of the extreme Right, whose reflexes come from the hatred of Marxist-Leninism, from xenophobia, from patriotism, and from religious fundamentalism.

Ethnic communities have, in many instances, come to be defined by religious affiliation, so that "church" and "nation" are regarded as almost synonymous. Systems of faith and worship emerge triumphalist from the ruins of communism, even where beliefs and practices have been largely eradicated. They are all the more rigid in their beliefs because the values they stress have withstood their ordeals, and they fear the flattening out that Westernization can bring. Yet religion so used loses its spiritual and universal dimension and becomes a totem and an instrument of nationalist doctrine.

Communism, coming on top of the older town-country divide, had virtually eliminated all contact between the intelligentsia and the working classes. The educated classes, once nurtured as part of the establishment, and most of whom support nationalist myths, are now largely committed to urban opposition movements which are trying to rise to power. In either case, they face the working classes, who are clinging to the devil they know, or responding in their disappointment to the old *nomenklatura*'s appeal. The working classes had been comforted by the leveling communist ethos.

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The Serb revolt in Croatia and Bosnia is partly a continuation of the Balkan-peasant revolution tradition.

In societies where ideologies had, in the nineteenth century, seen the nation-state (more often than not, the ethnic state) as the only possible repository of political aspirations, where forty years of communism had prevented both a critical study of the past and a political discussion of the future, there is no political culture. With no understanding of politics, people look for the simplest (and the most dangerous) explanations: conspiracies, love, and hate.

"TOO MANY PEOPLE MADE TOO MANY MISTAKES AT THE SAME TIME"[12]

All the ailments of postcommunist Eastern Europe and all the problems that Western Europe imagined it had safely put away, such as borders, minorities, and migrations, are concentrated in what was Yugoslavia. History needs to be studied again before the West can help.[13]

Bosnia lies as destroyed as its parent Yugoslavia, whose contrasts and contradictions, ideals and weaknesses it reflected. As it would be an illusion to think that the Yugoslav state can be rebuilt, so is it an illusion to believe that the neat pattern of its Titoist republics and autonomous provinces can be salvaged, or that the ethnic pattern of 1981, 1945, or 1941 can ever be restored. The trend toward regrouping had started before the civil war.[14] The international community was unable to prevent the formation of successor states by conflict, but more could have been done to regulate the process. Governments could have responded more constructively to events even after the EU had changed its interpretation of the Helsinki principles relating to state borders, at least by resisting the temptation of playing godfathers to the protagonists. Realism should have prevailed, with the regrouping of populations and border modifications carried out through mutual concessions. The fighting might have been brought to an end by an ultimatum to the combatants under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, followed by a provisional UN administration and a substantial international military presence to ensure the sealing of borders with both the SRJ and Croatia, to oversee the disarmament of local armies, and to guarantee the protection of minorities. Would it have been more expensive than

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the consequences of continued conflagration "to kingdom come"[15] or of a renewed Serbo-Croatian war?

A Bosnian settlement should have been part of an overall settlement of the issues of territory, minorities, refugees, and of relations between the successor states of Yugoslavia, not to mention their reconstruction. The republican borders of what used to be the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia are but historical. They are the result of successive historical acts, such as treaties between empires or the modifications decided by the Yugoslav communist leadership on taking power. They should have been accepted as provisional, pending negotiated changes. A period of transition was necessary in order to establish an atmosphere in which valid talks could have taken place under international mediation and control so that in any final arrangement, which could take years to achieve, none of the communities would have felt at risk.

The task was not an impossible one. People in the ruins of Yugoslavia will still have to live in that geographic area, however much they move, or are forced to move, from one part of it to another. A conference which took in *all* questions relating to Yugoslavia would have helped all sides to appear as neither winners nor losers. At the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, the Powers still had great prestige and influence, but the EU rushed in to handle it, not because it had a solution or the necessary means, but because it hoped to acquire both.

The intervention of the EU into the Yugoslav crisis has been a disaster. In little over a year it passed from support for Yugoslavia's territorial integrity to serial recognition of three would-be independent states, but no more; from wanting to restore a reduced version of Yugoslavia in Bosnia to practically accepting a carve-up between its Serb and Croat leaderships; from encouraging its Muslim leadership to believe it could stick out for a unitary state without the need to compromise with the other two communities to offering no more than "safe havens" for a maltreated civilian population. The United States criticized the EU but offered no more than the possibility of "surgical strikes against Serb positions" or the legalization of the acquisition of weaponry on the international arms market by the Muslim-lead nominal government of Bosnia. Both the EU and the United States have now lost most of their influence over the mini-dictators, the tribal leaders, and the warlords who know that

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in the end the international community, whatever it may say, has generally come to accept what has emerged by force. And the populations of these new nations, who, battered by war, brainwashed by propaganda, and punished by sanctions, are turning against the West. Presidents, foreign ministers, and international mediators are reduced to negotiating with leaders accused of war crimes; and present and past foreign ministers blame Bonn for providing the lead that they followed.

Some of the politicians and captains of Yugoslavia's warring communities still think that continued, low-intensity conflict is preferable to political risk-taking as a short-term way of consolidating themselves. Others, and particularly those at the head of the larger successor states, may be on the point of deciding that, tired of fighting, they would prefer a peace of sorts to continued fighting "to kingdom come." They have, after all, achieved a high degree of ethnic homogeneity and the dictatorships in Serbia and Croatia are fairly strong. Once the fighting stops they will quickly discover that the survival of their electorates demands the restoration of some of the severed links.

Even in circumstances that are clearly less favorable than three years ago, the outside world can still hold out to them a useful procedural framework (if all can be assured that none is in favor or disfavor). The more or less regularly elected local leaders must be induced to restore their communities and regions, to cease hostilities and rough-and-ready self-rule. This first stage would be conducive to the emergence of a second generation of leaders and entrepreneurs able to envisage compromises across the divides.

The Yugoslav problems remain connected in a Yugoslav crisis even though the Yugoslav state no longer exists. While it may be too late for the various communities to learn to live together, what fragile elements of a civil society have managed to survive must be protected, and new ones brought to life. They must be helped to live with the memory of what has happened and to analyze critically the behavior of their own side. Much could be done towards reconstructing essential ties in transportation, energy, communications, and culture by helping the independent media in Yugoslavia transmit objective foreign broadcast information. With the aid of the media, it is possible to listen and speak to a wide spectrum of people, not only those who have carried out, ordered, or inspired

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the killing. This is a task which could be taken up by an equally wide spectrum of people in the West, not only governments and politicians, who tend to act for domestic audiences. In other words, it is possible for the West to make up in unspectacular and long-term efforts for the lack of imagination and understanding it has shown hitherto in its short-term gestures.

In order to help Eastern Europe, politically, economically, and morally, and to avoid the proliferation of regional conflicts that it so dreads, the West must persevere with the *acquis* of European integration and with EU-US cooperation. Whatever the tensions between them, the economic problems they face, and the need for new inspiration, the Twelve are a unique pole of stability in the world today, a guarantor of institutionalized democracy, and an essential component in the balance of power on the continent. The challenges of postcommunism are much more complex than those of the Cold War. They should turn back from the dangerous track they have followed over the past two years, of accelerating the "Balkanization" of Yugoslavia by their indecision and ignorance, and of being in turn "Balkanized" by Yugoslavia.[16]

Greece, the only East European country to have been spared the ills of communism and to be a member of the EU, must play a more positive role, as an intermediary rather than as a party, and as a stabilizer rather than as an agitator. In so doing it would help itself to overcome its own nationalist temptations. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary proudly see themselves as now being in a first division of the postcommunist world, differentiated from the rest, in fact Central rather than East European, and in need of protection from the dangers of chaos coming from the East. At risk in their transition, they should not seek to separate themselves too much from their less fortunate brethren or profit from their misfortunes, but to play a positive role that could help the whole of Europe, East, Center, and West.

If Western Europe were still capable of teaching Eastern Europe to ponder on Montesquieu's thought: "*Je suis homme avant d'être français. . .parce que je suis nécessairement homme, et que je ne suis français que par hasard*," even Serbs and Croats could eventually develop into nations rather than regress into tribes. Is Western Europe willing to do it? Can it? Does it think it worthwhile? And

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does America still think it worthwhile to help? Does it still have a foreign policy, or a vision?

ENDNOTES

[1]The role of Muslims was not then thought to be important.

[2]See Aleksa Djilas, *The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and Communist Revolution* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991).

[3]Thereafter referred to, erroneously, as Bosnia for short.

[4]I am indebted to George Schöpflin for the formulation of this idea.

[5]Ever since the autonomous province had started to emancipate itself from the control of the Republic of Serbia in the late 1960s, Serb emigration and the Albanian birthrate had reduced the Serb population in Kosovo. By 1981 it was down to 10 percent, and the frustrated minority turned to Belgrade for help. Serbs could not bring themselves to accept that they had lost the demographic game in that most sacred of Serbian lands—where the medieval realm had emerged, and where it had symbolically gone down to the Turks.

[6]Desimir Tochitch, "Les mystères contemporains du nationalisme," *Dialogue* 4 (Paris, 1992).

[7]Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan make the interesting comparison between Spain and Yugoslavia in "Political Identities and Electoral Sequences: Spain, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia," *Dædalus* 121 (2) (Spring 1992).

[8]The United States was the first Power to recognize the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, as Yugoslavia was then officially called.

[9]Quebec, Jura, and New Caledonia should have alerted the West to the time needed to negotiate a referendum on such an issue; in territories whose citizens are divided on ethnic lines, elections can lead to nothing more than numerical predominance, unless minorities feel guaranteed.

[10]Francis Fukuyama's "The End of History," expanded into a book, *The End of History and the Last Man* (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1993), now faces Guillaume Parmentier's "The Return of History," *Le Retour de l'Histoire* (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1994).

[11]Adam Michnik, *La Deuxième révolution* (Paris: La Découverte, 1990), 75.

[12]Film director Dušan Makavejev on London Channel IV television "Opinions" program, 8 August 1993.

[13]It was not more than a half century ago that the Soviet Union annexed a whole new western glacis of territories, and that Poland was shifted westwards, with consequent population movements. German minorities were expelled from countries where they had lived for centuries, and most surviving Jews also left. In the noncommunist part of the Balkans, Greece lost most of its Slav population and some of its Muslims too. The Greek-speaking world has known more traumatic changes. Earlier in the century, Anatolia was "cleansed" of its Greek population,

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as was northern Cyprus later in the century. Not even the spiritual monastic haven of Mount Athos has been spared, with a current towards the Hellenization of non-Greek monasteries.

[14]To take but one important example: Serbs no longer form the important minority they once were in Croatia. From a population of 766,000 in 1948, their number decreased to 541,000 in 1981. By August 1992, only about 100,000 were left in territory administered by the Zagreb government, according to the UN High Commission for Refugees. Their number had been yet further reduced to some 70,000 by April 1993, according to the Helsinki Human Rights Commission for Croatia, *La Nouvelle Alternative* 30 (Paris, 1993), 9. The rest are in the Republic of Serbian Krajina, in Serbia as refugees, or refugees abroad. How many would remain in the Serb enclaves if these were restored to Croat control?

[15]The British foreign secretary, Douglas Hurd, at the end of the G7 Summit in Tokyo, 9 July 1993.

[16]*Pace* the President of the Republic of Croatia, who prefers the more civilized-sounding "Scandinavianization" (see President Tudjman's New Year conversation on Croatian Radio-Television, 1 January 1994), "Balkans" has become a euphemism for (former) Yugoslavia, a name people are reluctant to use, even to the point of denying it to the new, rump, Serbo-Montenegrin, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The new SRJ is, nevertheless, no more absurd than was the Kingdom or the Federal Peoples'/Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia without Bulgaria, or the Kingdom of the Netherlands continuing under that name after the independence of Belgium.

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With all its defects colonialism was a definite, positive and understood relationship between the metropolitan country and what is today called the "developing" country. That relationship has now ended for most European countries, and they are, consciously or unconsciously, seeking for another relationship to the developing world, with the bleak alternative of isolation never quite out of mind. . . .There are, in fact, many reasons of interest and sentiment why helping the poorer countries to develop should become a unifying and positive force in the Atlantic Community. But it remains necessary to translate sentiment into effective action. Here there is a great lacuna, for the West has singularly failed to produce any science of development. A great deal of experience is available, from the time of the Marshall Plan to the latest Indian Five Year Plan. Yet there has not been much attempt to synthesize this experience so as to save new countries from making all the mistakes of their predecessors. Nor has the West yet worked out a successful cooperative system of giving aid without rousing resentment and cries of neocolonialism, or alternatively of miserliness if the amounts are too small.

William Clark

From "New Europe and the New Nations"
Dædalus 93 (1) (Winter 1964)

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